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 ABSTRACT 
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF THE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE: 
CULTURE, PHENOMENOLOGY 
AND ETHNOMUSICOLOGY  
IN CONVERSATION 
 
 
J Tyler Friedman, B.A., B.S., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2018 
 
 
 This dissertation engages the questions and methodologies of phenomenology, the 
philosophy of culture, the philosophy of music and ethnomusicology in order to investigate the 
significance of music in human life. The systematic orientation of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of 
symbolic forms provides the overarching framework that positions the approach in chapter one. 
Following Cassirer, art in general and music in particular are not regarded as enjoyable yet 
dispensable pastimes, but rather as fundamental ways of experiencing the world as intuitive 
forms and sensations. Establishing the ontological significance of music entails unpacking the 
sui generis experience of time, space and subjectivity that characterize the musical experience.  
 
 Phenomenology, in particular the thought of Alfred Schütz, provides a point of departure for 
thinking more concretely about the musical experience. The turn to phenomenology is motivated 
both by its systematic consanguinuity with Cassirer’s project as well as its insistent focus on the 
details of lived experience. However, bolstered by what is argued to be a more holistic 
description of the musical experience gleaned from the work of ethnomusicologists, Schütz’s 
phenomenological account of the music is challenged on a number of key issues such as music’s 
ontological status and the tendency to equate “music” with “musical works.” 
 
 Despite the blind spots of his writings on music, Schütz’s phenomenology of the social world 
proves to be a useful framework for thinking about the multiplicity of ways in which music is 
experienced as meaningful and how the equivocality of the concept of musical meaning brings 
the social nature of the musical experience into view. Sociality also figures into a discussion of 
improvisation, an important theme that has only relatively recently begun to receive 
philosophical attention. Arguing that an adequate philosophical treatment of music must account 
for both the variety of musical cultures as well as the variety of musical practices, a 
consideration of improvisation helps philosophy think outside of the work-paradigm that was 
critiqued in chapter two.  
 
 By incorporating ethnomusicological theory and ethnographies as well as downplayed 
musical practices like improvisation, this dissertation offers an enriched account of the ways that 
music shapes human life.
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Introduction: 
 
Considering its ubiquity and significance in day-to-day life as well as the diverse functions 
that it serves, music has received comparatively little philosophical attention. In fact, a survey of 
the history of thought would seem to suggest an inverse correlation between the passage of time 
and the significance accorded to music. Plato so respected, if maligned, music’s bewitching 
power that the Socrates of his Republic banished the art, with a few exceptions, from the walls of 
the ideal city. Some two and a half millennia later, cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker would 
characterize music as “auditory cheesecake,”1 pleasurable but unnecessary and perhaps a bit 
indulgent.  
Such wildly divergent outlooks suggest that music’s status vis-à-vis the human condition is 
still undecided. Is music of utmost political and ethical significance or is it a trifling 
divertissement? This dissertation will not argue for either extreme but will instead contend that 
music represents a sui generis type of experience through the lens of which we catch sight of a 
unique mode of consciousness that furnishes us with a richer conception of the human being. 
One of the central contentions of this dissertation is that a clear-eyed evaluation of music has 
been hindered by the philosophy of music’s limited approach to its theme, which has 
traditionally been oriented by the Western classical tradition of the past few centuries. This 
dissertation will thus bring interdisciplinary resources to bear on the philosophy of music while 
situating such an expansion within the framework of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of culture. 
The philosophy of culture is a philosophical project with deep historical roots that determine 
its scope and methodology. In his presentation of the significance of Immanuel Kant’s critical 
                                                        
1 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 534. 
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philosophy, Cassirer regards Kant’s prioritization of “the problem of accessibility” over the 
“problem of objectivity”2 to be the move that makes the introduction of the theory of 
transcendental idealism an epochal moment in the tradition of philosophical idealism in 
particular and Western thought in general. Concretely, this reprioritization of philosophical 
method entails that philosophers investigate first the conditions for the possibility of knowledge 
– or, more broadly, experience – before staking positions on the objects that are thereby known 
or experienced. To adapt Clifford Geertz’s claim that “art and the equipment to grasp it are made 
in the same shop,”3 the critical idealist seeks to understand the object of research through the 
equipment necessary to grasp it.  
 Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms is well understood along such lines. Each distinct 
cultural domain is to be submitted to such an analysis: how is the experience of language, myth, 
religion or art given its particular shape? Cassirer’s approach to this question is broadly 
phenomenological in its shape. Moored to concrete cultural products, Cassirer seeks to describe 
how these products embody a distinctive experience of the world; how fundamental forms of 
relation like space, time and the experience of oneself are co-extensive with experience yet 
change character according to the domain of experience, or symbolic form, currently ‘inhabited.’ 
Doing so is important not only for the philosophy of music but also for Cassirer’s project. 
The “critique of culture”4 that Cassirer undertakes in his multi-volume Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms (PSF) entails a systematic study of art, which Cassirer, in no small part due to the turmoil 
of the times, never wrote. But his scattered writings on the subject make it clear that “art” names 
                                                        
2 Ernst Cassirer, “Critical Idealism and a Philosophy of Culture,” in Symbol, Myth, 
Culture, edited by Donald Phillip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 69. 
3 Clifford Geertz, “Art as a Cultural System,” MLN 91.6 (1976): 1497. 
4 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 1: Language, translated by 
Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 84. 
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one of the fundamental ways that experience takes shape. Music is a particularly interesting 
subject to consider since Cassirer most frequently opts for examples derived from poetry and 
painting than music. But music – which in contradistinction to much poetry and painting is 
neither referential nor representational – differs in marked respects from the other arts and 
thereby challenges a univocal approach to the theme. 
Just as studies of art that restrict themselves to representational arts are impoverished by their 
myopia, many philosophical studies of music commit a similar sort of pars pro toto mistake. The 
philosophy of music is frequently vitiated by an inordinate emphasis on the Western classical 
tradition, which historical and cross-cultural scrutiny reveals to harbor particular aesthetic values 
and to represent an extremely limited body of musical practices. Such a limited focus calls into 
question the universality of the insights gleaned. Thus, one of the central claims of this 
dissertation is that the philosophy of music must become ethnomusicological; that is, the 
philosophy of music must not equate “music” with any particular tradition but instead must 
contend with the unruly variety of ways that human beings relate to sound. To this end, this 
dissertation will cite a broad swath of ethnomusicological sources treating particular musical 
cultures located in Papua New Guinea, Sub-Saharan Africa, Tuva, the Solomon Islands and the 
United States.  
 Not only does ethnomusicology study a variety of musical cultures, the discipline knows 
better than to reduce music to a purely auditory phenomenon. In Alan Merriam’s classic three-
pronged formulation of the ethnomusicologist’s task, the discipline studies music as concept, 
behavior and sound.5 That is to say, while the ethnomusicologist may analyze the purely acoustic 
properties of music (i.e. music as sound), this aspect is always contextualized by the ways in 
                                                        
5 Cf. Merriam, The Anthropology of Music, 32. 
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which the culture in question speak and write about music (i.e. music as concept) and perform 
music (i.e. music as behavior). 
 This broad-minded approach to music is well suited to be brought to bear on Cassirer’s 
approach to culture, which is ultimately geared towards a philosophy of human nature insofar as 
it strives to understand the constructive role of human consciousness in the shaping of 
experience. What should be the method for reaching this lofty goal? Kant undertook a similar 
project but was criticized, for instance, for deriving his table of categories from logic textbooks 
of the day. Cassirer, on the other hand, defends the necessity of an empirical approach: “[a]ll the 
so-called definitions of man are nothing but airy speculation so long as they are not based upon 
and confirmed by our experience of man. There is no other way to know man than to understand 
his life and conduct.”6 Or, in a pithier formulation: “‘being’ can be apprehended only in 
‘action.’”7 
 This conviction gives Cassirer’s work the occasional character of a literature review. 
Impressive swaths of intellectual history are trotted out and placed into conversation, often not in 
service to any explicit agenda or in defense of an explicit thesis put forth by Cassirer. Indeed, in 
a 1972 lecture course devoted to Cassirer, Aron Gurwitsch claims “The basis of Cassirer’s theory 
is laid down the Intro. to vol. I of PSF [i.e. the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms]. All that comes 
later is more or less elaboration – necessary to be sure, but the principles are laid down here.”8 
The empirical material on conceptualizations of music, musical behaviors and analyses of 
                                                        
6 Cassirer, EM, 16. 
7 Cassirer, PSF I, 80. 
8 Aron Gurwitsch, Unpublished Transcript of a Lecture Course at The New School For  
Social Research (1972), 18. The status of this text is problematic, but I cite it nonetheless, 
albeit not in defense of any essential points. I received the text from Professor Sebastian 
Luft, who in turn received in from William McKenna, who did his doctoral work at the 
New School. To the best of my knowledge, the text is a transcript of tapes that recorded 
Gurwitsch’s lectures. 
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musical sound that are derived from ethnomusicological research thus serves as a necessary 
foundation for a critique of musical consciousness.  
The initial task of chapter one is to situate Cassirer’s critique of culture historically and 
systematically. I take two approaches to doing so. First, the critique of culture is situated within 
the tradition of philosophical idealism, in which Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is the decisive 
text for Cassirer’s project. In Cassirer’s telling, Kant’s decisive gesture was to prioritize the 
“problem of accessibility” over “the problem of objectivity.”9 Stated differently, Kant 
inaugurates a new focus on the boundaries and conditions of human knowledge as opposed to the 
objects of knowledge themselves. This approach to metaphysics, epistemology and philosophical 
anthropology more generally is the direct predecessor of Cassirer’s emphasis on the role of 
symbols in human existence.  
 Utilizing an unpublished draft manuscript of Cassirer’s Essay on Man, I propose a second 
approach to contextualizing Cassirer’s critique of culture, which I call the philosophical-
anthropological approach. What Kant is to Cassirer’s idealistic approach, Montaigne is to 
Cassirer’s philosophical-anthropological approach. The epochal consequences of Copernicus’ 
cosmological revolution were not lost on Montaigne who did not shrink from the philosophical 
implications stemming from a new picture of the universe in which a benevolent divinity could 
not be taken for granted and human beings were no longer the geographic or teleological center 
of the universe. Montaigne is thus the first philosopher to take seriously the insights that can be 
gleaned from so-called primitive cultures, which Cassirer takes up in his many treatments of 
myth. Montaigne’s discovery of “the problem of individual life”10 also leads him to emphasize 
human beings’ becoming and opposed to being. This orientation is also present in Cassirer’s 
                                                        
9 Cassirer, SMC, 69. 
10 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 35-36. 
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thought in his emphasis on the genealogy of ideas, understanding them in light of their 
predecessors and progeny.  
 With this understanding of the background of Cassirer’s project, chapter one turns to the 
manner in which the critique of culture unfolds in Cassirer’s multi-volume Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms. The goal is to flesh out Cassirer’s schematic writings on art in order to attain a 
clearer view of how art fits among the other symbolic forms, but doing so requires a preparatory 
consideration of what constitutes a symbolic form as such. For Cassirer, following Kant, 
experience is the result of a unity of consciousness, whereby a manifold of stimuli becomes 
synthesized. This synthesis is brought about through different types of relation: space, time, 
thing, number, subjectivity. These categories are what Cassirer calls the “quality” of a relation.11 
In different symbolic forms, however, these relationships take different forms, yielding different 
types of synthesis, which account for the different nature of aesthetic, theoretical, religious and 
mythical experience: “The synthesis by which the consciousness combines a series of tones into 
the unity of a melody, would seem to be totally different from the synthesis by which a number 
of syllables is articulated into the unity of a ‘sentence,’” writes Cassirer. “But they have one 
thing in common, that in both cases the sensory particulars do not stand by themselves; they are 
articulated into a conscious whole, from which they take their qualitative meaning.”12 Cassirer 
calls the different manifestations of the relational categories their “modality.”13 
 Thus an elaboration of the symbolic form of art entails unpacking the modalities that 
characterize aesthetic experience. Stated differently, this involves answering questions about the 
unique form that space, time and other such categories take in the experience of art. Along the 
                                                        
11 Cassirer, PSF I, 95. 
12 Cassirer, PSF I, 94. 
13 Cassirer, PSF I, 97. 
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way, questions arise about the validity of speaking about ‘art’ as a unified category as opposed to 
the plurality of ‘arts,’ the relationship between art and myth and the relationship between art and 
knowledge. 
 The relation of space is first dealt with in the context of art as such. The point of departure is 
Cassirer’s most explicit treatment of the theme in the essay “Mythic, Aesthetic and Theoretical 
Space.” With the assistance of this essay, the particular character of aesthetic space is 
distinguished from the modality of space for mythic and theoretical consciousness. In contrast 
with theoretical space, both mythic and aesthetic space are concrete, which means that they know 
nothing of theoretical abstractions such as Cartesian grids. Instead, concrete spatial experiences 
are characterized by the always already being positioned of one’s lived body (as in the everyday 
experience of space), felt qualities such as holiness and profanity (as in the mythic experience of 
space) and the contemplative disinterestedness of aesthetic space. The artistic concept of space is 
further determined with reference to sources that Cassirer mentions, such as Adolf Hildebrand’s 
Das Problem der Form in der Bildenden Kunst, as well as artists who were working and thinking 
contemporaneously with Cassirer, such as Wassily Kandinsky and his Concerning the Spiritual 
in Art.  
 Considered in the context of music, “space” becomes a problematic concept. In fact, many 
thinkers have argued that music involves merely metaphorical spatiality. The origin of this 
skepticism is a matter of ontology. The common ontological characterization of music as an 
ideal, or non-empirical, phenomenon displaces music from the realm of literal space. If music is 
not to be conflated with the sound waves that constitute the condition for the possibility of 
perceptible sounding; if, in other words, music is not a physical phenomenon, then it cannot 
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partake in the physical sense of spatiality that is commonly held to be the literal sense of the 
term.  
 Despite this skepticism, several thinkers offer compelling defenses of the meaningful 
spatiality of music, although this sense of spatiality is not necessarily co-extensive with the 
common understanding. Don Ihde diagnoses skepticism about music’s spatiality as a symptom of 
“sensory atomism,”14 the misleading tendency to regard the senses as divorced from one another. 
While the ears may not provide as robust a spatial experience as the eyes, this should not lead us 
to overlook the genuine spatiality of audition. Viktor Zuckerkandl argues that the ear’s ability to 
differentiate between simultaneously sounding tones militates in favor of the sound as spatial. If 
space were entirely absent from auditory perception, then simultaneously sounding tones would 
blend indistinguishably together as do colors on a painter’s palette.  
 The second chapter turns from Cassirer’s philosophy of culture to the phenomenological 
movement. The reasons for this shift of focus are manifold. First, Cassirer conceived of 
phenomenology and his project mutually beneficial, with phenomenology’s rigorous description 
of phenomena finding broader significance under the theoretical umbrella of the philosophy of 
symbolic forms, which is itself protected against the encroachment of untoward theoretical 
prejudice by the close, phenomenological description of concrete phenomena. 
Having established the consanguinity of the philosophy of symbolic forms and 
phenomenology, the latter comes under explicit consideration. Prominent phenomenological 
treatments of music are then brought under consideration, with an emphasis on unpacking the 
ontology of music that will be seen to belong by the general phenomenological outlook. 
                                                        
14 Ihde, Listening and Voice, 60. 
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This ontology comes under a critical scrutiny in the second major section of chapter two and 
is subjected to a two-pronged critique. The conception of music as an ideal object is questioned 
both on account of its ideality and its objectification. Conceiving of music as ideal proves to 
harbor some problematic assumptions about the musical experience of the listener. Music makes 
sense as ideal when it is supposed that there is one correct, inevitable manner of constituting the 
work across the consciousness of all actual and potential listeners. A few considerations, 
however, cast aspersions on such a universal claim. First, this seems to ignore the perceptual 
agency of the listener; the fact that attention can be directed to different aspects of the musical 
event, rendering different component parts more salient than others. In short, supposing a 
musical work is not a bare bones monophonic melody, it admits of multiple possible 
constitutions. This conclusion is illustrated with reference to multistable acoustic phenomena, an 
auditory equivalent of well-known visual illusions such as the duck/rabbit or the face/goblet 
illusion.  
The second prong of the critique of phenomenology’s musical ontology takes aim at the 
reduction of musical phenomena to works. The work-paradigm is shown to be a historically 
contingent view that has emerged and achieved ‘common sense’ status only in the past few 
centuries of the Western tradition. Formerly, and still in the case of many musical events that are 
overlooked by philosophers, music was essentially functional. This functional status had material 
implications for the composition and performance of music, which run counter to essential 
assumptions belonging to the view that ‘music’ is equivalent to ‘musical work.’   
Having problematized the conception of music as an ideal object, we turn to several accounts 
that offer alternative ways of thinking about what music essentially is, and whether ‘music’ itself 
even constitutes a unified category. The alternatives considered argue that, contrary to the work 
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paradigm, music is fundamentally an activity; that, contrary to the view that musicality is a 
province restricted to the talented or the trained, musicality names a faculty of human 
consciousness; and that, contrary to the terminological tendency to regard ‘music’ as a unified 
object, the term in truth encompasses an indeterminate number of importantly distinguishable 
activities and products. These alternative conceptions of music are then put into conversation 
with Schütz’s account of the musical experience in order to determine the extent to which his 
phenomenological account is able to accommodate salient considerations that Schütz either 
brackets or fails to acknowledge.  
The third chapter picks up on themes addressed in the second chapter. The account of the 
musical experience that Schütz presents in FPM and MMT appear to downplay the social 
dimension of the experience to a troubling degree. In MMT, the title of which all but promises a 
robust phenomenological account of the activity of making music together, the social dimension 
of making music takes an unusual shape. While one first encountering the essay would likely 
expect a description of multiple musicians engaged in the process of playing music with one 
another, Schütz downplays such manifestations of making music together. Instead, Schütz 
devotes the most attention to the social relationship that obtains between a beholder, which in 
Schütz’s parlance encompasses mere listeners, musicians playing instruments and individuals 
reading a musical score without hearing externalized sound, and the composer of the musical 
work in question. While such a relationship may include the social interchange of co-performers, 
it holds equally well for the relationship between a listener and a composer who is absent or has 
even been dead for centuries. 
A reader interested in the social dimension of the musical experience may find this 
presentation of the sociality of the musical experience interesting and provocative but ultimately 
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dissatisfying. This conception of the social dimension of musical experience is irreproachably 
grounded in Schütz’s foundational, phenomenological claims about the ontology of music. As an 
ideal object, music is subject to “the principle of the relative irrelevance of the vehicle,”15 which 
holds that because, in essence, ‘music’ names a series of polythetic processes performed by the 
consciousness of the beholder, then all means of effectuating these processes are equally valid 
manifestations of the musical work in question. Thus, reading a musical score and thereby 
performing the same polythetic processes that the composer performed yields a “quasi 
simultaneity”16 of consciousness that is inherently social. 
Schütz’s treatment of the sociality of the musical experience is ingenious but not the final 
word on the subject. The account of sociality offered by post-Schützian musicologists, such as 
Christopher Small, offers a richer picture of the intersubjective character of music making and 
pushes one’s intuitions about what the sociality of music entails by arguing that ostensibly 
insignificant figures such as ticket-takers and janitorial staff actually figure importantly into the 
musical experience.  
As has been noted, one of the central claims of this dissertation is that a philosophical 
investigation of human musicality is incomplete without incorporating the evidence of varied 
musical cultures. The fourth chapter treats a hitherto unaddressed aspect of this claim. While 
earlier chapters consider conceptualizations of music that challenge prevalent Western ideas 
about the boundaries of what constitutes music, chapter four more explicitly focuses on a 
particular form of musical praxis that is frequently overlooked by the philosophy of music; viz. 
improvisation. 
 The nature of improvisation has frequently been misunderstood, so the chapter begins with 
                                                        
15 Schütz, Symbol, Reality, and Society, 303. 
16 Schütz, MMT, 171. 
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an examination of the concept. With reference to the term’s etymology, the history of Italian 
poetic improvisation, and the pedagogy of improvisation, certain generalizable characteristics of 
improvisation as such are gleaned: improvisation involves the performer’s submission to the 
onrush of time, an engagement with the context of performance and creation within the 
paradoxically liberating limitation of a theme or framework. 
The method of learning to improvise put forth by renowned pianist and teacher Lennie 
Tristano yields a provocative question: if, as Tristano was convinced, the practice of 
improvisation is best learned through the analysis, memorization and reproduction of exemplary 
improvisations – which, in effect, treats an improvisation as though it were a composition – then 
how are we to defend the unicity of improvisation vis-à-vis composition? If improvisations strive 
for the character of a composition, what is valuable about improvisation as such? This question 
becomes an impetus for considering the relationship between improvisation and composition as 
well as the literature that thematizes and valorizes the imperfections endemic to improvisation.  
After surveying different approaches to the question of improvisation versus composition, we 
elect a different approach to the question of the uniqueness of improvisation. The previously 
considered approaches to the question are offered from a reflective standpoint; they put forth 
conceptions of improvisation and composition and then argue for one’s precedence. Ingenious 
though they may be, these approaches overlook the listener’s experience; whether, and to what 
extent, a performance is heard as improvised. Ethnomusicologists Bruno Nettl and Thomas 
Turino offer the tools for addressing this question, leading to the conclusion that hearing an 
improvisation as improvised means listening with the appropriate context in mind, which entails 
a preexistent understanding of what “improvisation” means in the tradition in questions. 
Listening to music thus proves to be an activity that is deeply informed by the listener’s frame of 
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reference. The consequent inability to assume uniformity among different listeners’ experiences 
is another nail in the coffin of the conception of music as an ideal object, which presupposed the 
constitution of the same musical object across listeners, no matter their historical or 
epistemological position.   
Next, the theme of improvisation is brought into conversation with Schütz’s writing on the 
social situation of making music. As has been mentioned, a major motivation for chapter four’s 
focus on improvisation is the fact that many philosophers have conspicuously overlooked the 
ubiquitous practice. Schütz in no exception.17 It is argued that the social situation we find in 
improvisation differs in important respects from Schütz’s presentation of musical sociality. The 
social relationship of most interest to Schütz is that which obtains between the “between 
composer and beholder;”18 the beholder encompassing “the player, listener, and reader of 
music.”19 The improviser, on the other hand, is involved in a plurality of relationships, which 
often includes a relationship with the composer but is by no means limited to it or even best 
characterized by it. Taking a typical jazz ensemble as a case study, the section then untangles the 
relationships that characterize an improvising group of individuals. 
A consideration of the social situation of improvisation naturally leads to the theme of 
improvisation and ethics, since the fluidity and indeterminateness of the rules governing the 
interaction of co-performers leads to questions about the responsibilities that co-performers owe 
to one another and other such ethical questions. A survey of the literature reveals many different 
                                                        
17 Accuracy demands noting that Schütz does in fact once mention improvisation. 
However the reference is brief and inessential. Schütz never gives improvisation the 
attention it warrants from someone whose focus on music stems from an interest in what 
making music has to teach us about communication, which, of course, is writ large when 
performance is a matter of co-performers negotiating indeterminacies. Cf. Schütz, MMT, 
165. 
18 Schütz, MMT, 169. 
19 Schütz, MMT, 169fn. 
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approaches to the theme of improvisation and ethics, the most compelling of which do not offer 
any hard and fast directives but are rather interested in the ways that different musical contexts 
yield different sorts of ethical responsibility.  
The aim of this dissertation is to achieve a better understanding of the significance of music 
in human life. Following Cassirer, music will be regarded as a distinct type of experience, the 
borders of which are broader than has traditionally been recognized in philosophical discourse. 
Building on the work of Cassirer and Schütz, we will piece together a view of the musical 
experience by critiquing and developing upon ideas drawn from an appropriately 
interdisciplinary cast of characters, including philosophers – both ‘continental’ and ‘Anglo-
American’ - art historians, art pedagogues, musicologists, ethnomusicologists, anthropologists, 
sociologists, sculptors, composers, critics, prehistoric cave painters and non-idiomatic 
improvisers. Along the way, we will tilt at some windmills of the Western tradition of the 
philosophy of music by addressing intractable debates such as the ontological status of music, 
the nature of the relationship between the concept of space and the musical experience and the 
nature of musical meaning. We shall emerge with an enriched conception of what music is, what 
music does and what music reveals about our relation to the world and to one another. 
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Chapter One: Cassirer’s Critique of Culture and the Position of Art 
 
 Cassirer’s announcement, in the introduction of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 
Volume 1, (PSF I) that “the critique of reason becomes the critique of culture”20 is an apt 
inroad to the project that would occupy him for the remainder of his life. Contained in the 
phrase are both Cassirer’s point of departure and the specific difference of his project from 
its Kantian origin.  
 This chapter will begin with a general presentation of Cassirer’s project. Two ways of 
approaching Cassirer’s mature project will be presented; one of which is the more or less 
standard account, the other of which has received almost no attention in scholarship. The 
traditional account of Cassirer’s project will be characterized as the idealistic approach. 
Using an unpublished manuscript copy of an early draft of Cassirer’s Essay on Man (EM), I 
will propose another way of approaching Cassirer’s philosophy that will be called the 
philosophical-anthropological approach. 
Once Cassirer’s motivation, aims and core terminology have been discussed and defined, 
we will narrow our focus from the philosophy of symbolic forms in general to the place and 
nature of art within Cassirer’s system. Finally we will further refine our focus to consider 
how music fits into the picture. By raising questions and addressing ambiguities pertaining to 
an account of music that is true to Cassirer’s theory of art, we will prepare the way for later 
chapters that will thematize music. 
 
 
                                                        
20 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 1: Language, translated by  
Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 80. 
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1. From a Critique of Reason to a Critique of Culture: The Idealistic Approach 
 The standard scholarly account of Cassirer’s project of a philosophy of symbolic forms is 
based on Cassirer’s place in the history of philosophical idealism, with a special emphasis on 
his fundamental adherence to the project that Kant inaugurates with the Critique of Pure 
Reason (CPR). Cassirer acknowledges this bequest in his Introduction to PSF I, noting that 
his specific contribution to this line of development consists in transforming Kant’s critique 
of reason into a wider-ranging critique of culture. 
 In the lecture “Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture,” Cassirer situates his project 
within the history of philosophical idealism that traces its lineage back to Plato. Despite the 
terminological similarity, however, Kant’s transcendental idealism, in Cassirer’s view, marks 
a decisive departure from idealists past. Kant’s epochal move is to place the “problem of 
accessibility” before “the problem of objectivity.”21 Stated differently, an investigation into 
the modes of cognition that would render the experience of metaphysical objects such as God 
or the human soul possible – or impossible, as the case may be – must precede an 
investigation into the nature and essence of these objects. This initial consideration of human 
cognition is what marks Kant’s idealism as transcendental. “I entitle transcendental all 
knowledge,” writes Kant, “which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of 
our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.”22 
Thus, before speculating about the nature of God and becoming embroiled in long-standing 
theological debates, the philosopher must inquire into the possibility of metaphysics by way 
                                                        
21 Ernst Cassirer, “Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture,” in Symbol, Myth, and  
Culture, edited by Donald Phillip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 69. 
22 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, edited and translated by Paul Guyer and 
Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 132-133. 
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of an analytic of the understanding, that is, a determination of the “principles for the 
exhibition of phenomena.”23 
 Kant’s prioritization of the problem of accessibility marks a new philosophical epoch. 
But according to Cassirer, Kant did not go far enough. If we regard Kant’s idealism “not 
from the point of view of its special historical conditions, but from the point of view of its 
general systematic tasks,”24 that is, by remaining true to the spirit, if not the letter, of Kantian 
philosophy, we are led from a critique of reason to a critique of culture. Such a gesture in fact 
finds a precedent in Kant himself, who writes with reference to Plato: 
I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts 
which an author has expressed with regard to his subject – whether in ordinary 
conversation or in writing – to find that we understand him better than he understood 
himself, in that he has not sufficiently determined his concept and therefore has 
sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.25 
In Kant’s case, it is on the basis of both his special historical conditions and his general 
systematic task that Cassirer understands him better than he understood himself and thus 
enlarges the scope of his critique of reason to encompass the whole of culture. With respect 
to Kant’s special historical conditions, the Marburg Neo-Kantian reading of Kant, to which 
Cassirer subscribes, emphasizes Kant’s intention to serve as “the philosophical systematizer 
of the Newtonian natural science.”26 Thus when developments in modern physics 
problematize Newtonian physics, the status of Kant’s system is also thrown into question. 
                                                        
23 Cassirer, “Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture,” 70. 
24 Cassirer, “Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture,” 70. 
25 Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, 396. 
26 Ernst Cassirer, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity,” in Substance and Function and  
Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, translated by William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins 
Swabey (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1953), 355. 
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With respect to Kant’s general systematic task, “the purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason 
was not to ground philosophical knowledge once for all [sic] in a fixed dogmatic system of 
concepts, but to open for it the ‘continuous development of a science’ in which there can be 
only relative, not absolute, stopping points.”27 Kant’s later critical works also demonstrate 
the “gradual unfolding of the critical-idealistic concept of reality and the critical-idealistic 
concept of the spirit,”28 as in the Critique of Judgment in which Kant treats the objectivity 
that is correlated to an aesthetic and teleological mode of cognition. 
 How then does Cassirer get from “reason” to “culture,” of which science is but one 
component? This move is made possible by the realization that the human being is an 
“animal symbolicum;”29 that, despite philosophy’s ancient search for some ultimate material 
or principle undergirding all phenomena, human cognition ineluctably makes use of “symbols 
created by the intellect itself.”30 This realization does not stem from armchair speculation, 
but rather takes its cue from the history of science. “Mathematicians and physicists,” writes 
Cassirer, “were first to gain a clear awareness of this symbolic character of their basic 
implements.”31 The basic concepts utilized by physics – “such as those of mass and force, the 
atom or the ether, the magnetic or electrical potential, even concepts, like those of pressure or 
of temperature”32 – confounds the theory that concepts are simply copies of things given in 
perception. In truth, these concepts are “theoretical assumptions and constructions, which are 
intended to transform the merely sensible into something measurable, and thus into an ‘object 
                                                        
27 Cassirer, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity,” 355. 
28 Cassirer, PSF I, 79. 
29 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, 
edited by Birgit Recki (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2006), 31. 
30 Cassirer, PSF I, 75. 
31 Cassirer, PSF I, 75. 
32 Cassirer, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity,” 357. 
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of physics,’ that is, into an object for physics.”33 “In this sense,” concludes Cassirer, “the 
reality of the physicist stands over against the reality of immediate perception as something 
through and through mediated; as a system, not of existing things or properties, but of 
abstract intellectual symbols, which serve to express certain relations of magnitude and 
measure, certain functional coördinations and dependencies of phenomena.”34 
This notion of function is central to Cassirer’s thought as well as the development of the 
sciences presently being discussed. If the basic concepts of a science do not pick out a 
substance in the world, what they do is describe functional relationships: “The concept of 
function constitutes the general schema and model according to which the modern concept of 
nature has been molded in its progressive historical development.”35 This point is well 
illustrated by theoretical physicist Richard Feynman when he writes of the conservation of 
energy: 
there is a certain quantity, which we call energy, that does not change in the manifold 
changes which nature undergoes. That is a most abstract idea, because it is a 
mathematical principle; it says that there is a numerical quantity which does not 
change when something happens. It is not a description of a mechanism, or anything 
concrete; it is just a strange fact that we can calculate some number and when we 
finish watching nature go through her tricks and calculate the number again, it is the 
same…It is important to realize that in physics today, we have no knowledge of what 
energy is. We do not have a picture that energy comes in little blobs of a definite 
                                                        
33 Cassirer, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity,” 357. 
34 Cassirer, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity,” 357, italics added. 
35 Ernst Cassirer, “Substance and Function,” in Substance and Function and Einstein’s  
Theory of Relativity, translated by William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey 
(Mineola: Dover Publications, 1953), 21. 
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amount. It is not that way. However, there are formulas for calculating some 
numerical quantity, and when we add it all together it gives [for instance] ‘28’ – 
always the same number.36 
Or, as Cassirer writes “the epistemological, as well as the physical, value of energetics is not 
founded on a new pictorial representation to be substituted for the old concepts of ‘matter’ 
and ‘force’ but on the gaining of equivalence-numbers, such as were expressly demanded and 
discovered by Robert Mayer as the ‘foundation of exact investigation into nature.’”37 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does not analyze objectivity as such, but rather the 
form of objectivization correlated to the “basic concepts of science, particularly the concepts 
and principles of mathematical physics.”38 Thus the furtherance of Kant’s project entails a 
similar analysis of the other modes of cognition that render different types of objects 
accessible. These various modes of objectivization are what Cassirer names symbolic forms. 
A symbolic form, then, is characterized by serving as a functional series by way of which 
the world is organized and understood. Let us seek a more concrete understanding of the 
symbolic forms through a heuristic device that Cassirer often employs to elucidate their 
functioning: the Linienzug, or line segment. Consider a line drawing encountered in the 
“lived-experience of perception itself as a purely phenomenal givenness.”39 There are 
instances where Cassirer seems to concede that it is possible to encounter the Linienzug, and 
                                                        
36 Richard P. Feynman, Six Easy Pieces: Essentials of Physics Explained by Its Most  
Brilliant Teacher (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 69-72. 
37 Cassirer, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity,” 359. 
38 Cassirer, PSF I, 79. 
39 Ernst Cassirer, “The Problem of the Symbol and Its Place in the System of 
Philosophy,” in The Warburg Years (1919-1933): Essays on Language, Art, Myth, and 
Technology, translated and edited by S.G. Lofts and A. Calcagno (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2013), 258. 
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other phenomena, in “the realm of pure intuition [Intuition],”40 that is, outside of the realm of 
meaning. However, in such an experience, “the unlimited wealth of life itself would not be 
encountered; rather, it is, again, only the narrowness and dullness of sensuous consciousness 
that surrounds us,”41 but when we regard the Linienzug as a meaningful entity, we are 
operating under the auspices of one of the symbolic forms.  
One of the most obvious ways to regard the Linienzug is on a purely formal level. In this 
case I am attentive to considerations such as the drawing’s overall balance, tonal contrast and 
dynamism. Considered thusly, “the drawn line suddenly begins, as it were, to animate itself 
from within as a whole. The spatial formation [Gebilde] becomes an aesthetic formation 
[Gebilde].”42 In other words, the meaningfulness of my experience is configured by the 
symbolic form of art. 
Under the symbolic form of science, the Linienzug “can also offer itself to thought as an 
example of a coherent purely logical conceptual structure.”43 Whereas the symbolic form of 
art shows the Linienzug as saturated with an expressive value, within the symbolic form of 
science the Linienzug attains the sphere of pure signification [reine Bedeutung]. Here a “mere 
abstract correlation”44 obtains between the elements of the symbolic relationship. For 
instance, instead of seeing the Linienzug as a pure form suggestive of equilibrium or as a 
                                                        
40 Ernst Cassirer, “The Concept of the Symbolic Form in the Construction of the Human  
Sciences,” in The Warburg Years (1919-1933): Essays on Language, Art, Myth, and 
Technology, translated and edited by S.G. Lofts and A. Calcagno (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2013), 100. 
41 Cassirer, “The Concept of the Symbolic Form in the Construction of the Human  
Sciences,” 100. 
42 Cassirer, “The Problem of the Symbol and Its Place in the System of Philosophy,” 258. 
43 Cassirer, “The Problem of the Symbol and Its Place in the System of Philosophy,” 259. 
44 Cassirer, “The Problem of the Symbol and Its Place in the System of Philosophy,” 262. 
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representation of waves on the ocean, “the mathematical physicist perhaps recognizes in this 
same curve the law of a certain natural process, such as the law of periodic oscillation.”45  
Although there is no unmediated access to being, the symbolic forms represent a 
multiplicity of modes of access to being. “If the object of knowledge can be defined only 
through the medium of a particular logical and conceptual structure,” writes Cassirer, “we are 
forced to conclude that a variety of media will correspond to various structures of the object, 
to various meanings for ‘objective’ relations.”46 Thus even within the natural sciences, as a 
consequence of the variety of conceptual structures utilized, individual sciences have 
‘different’ objects: “Each science has its object only by the fact that it selects it from the 
uniform mass of the given by certain formal concepts, which are peculiar to it.”47 A similar 
sort of critique is at play in the introduction to Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, albeit 
with different results.48 In the section entitled “The Ontological Priority of the Question of 
                                                        
45 Cassirer, “The Problem of the Symbol and Its Place in the System of Philosophy,” 259-
260. 
46 Cassirer, PSF I, 76. 
47 Cassirer, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity,” 356. 
48 In fact, Heidegger may well be implicitly differentiating his project from Cassirer’s in 
this section, when he writes “Thus, for example, what is philosophically primary is not a 
theory of concept-formation in historiology, nor the theory of historical knowledge, nor 
even the theory of history as the object of historiology; what is primary is rather the 
interpretation of genuinely historical beings with regard to their historicality.” (Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2010), 10). It is quite possible that he has Cassirer in mind in this 
passage. His reference to a “theory of concept-formation in historiology” recalls the first 
chapter of Cassirer’s Substance and Function, “On the Theory of the Formation of 
Concepts,” which traces the treatment of concepts in Aristotle, Berkeley, Mill and with 
reference to contemporary work on mathematical concepts. What Heidegger calls the 
“theory of historical knowledge” may be a reference to Cassirer’s momentous four-
volume Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit. 
For more on the relationship of Cassirer and Heidegger, cf. Steve G. Lofts, “Cassirer and 
Heidegger: The Cultural-Event The Auseinandersetzung of Thinking and Being,” in The 
Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: A Novel Assessment, edited by J Tyler Friedman and 
Sebastian Luft (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015). 
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Being,”49 Heidegger argues that his own project of fundamental ontology is necessitated by 
the individual sciences’ reliance on regional ontologies (i.e. fundamental concepts that 
determine the science’s object from “the uniform mass of the given”), which themselves are 
founded upon naïve concepts of being derived from “pre-scientific experience.”50 Thus, 
Heidegger concludes that “All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of 
categories it has at its disposal, remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost 
intent if it has not previously clarified the meaning of being sufficiently and grasped this 
clarification as its fundamental task.”51 Whereas Heidegger’s project seeks to ground and 
reorient the positive sciences on the basis of his investigation into the meaning of being, 
Cassirer’s project picks up with the sciences already in full bloom.52  
The ineluctable mediation of knowledge constitutes an insuperable challenge to 
philosophy’s traditional search for the unity of being. Each mode of accessibility carves up 
the world according to its conceptual paradigm, showing different structures of objects. 
Where once was the promise of the thing in itself, the noumenal substrate of reality, “the 
unity of being…threatens once more to disintegrate into a mere diversity of existing 
things.”53 But the critique of culture does not have to discard the postulate of unity tout court. 
Rather, mirroring the shift from a substantial to a functional ontology, philosophy now 
operates with a “postulate of a purely functional unity,”54 which explains why Cassirer does 
not seek to ground the sciences, but is rather grounded by them. 
 
                                                        
49 Heidegger, Being and Time, 8. 
50 Heidegger, Being and Time, 8. 
51 Heidegger, Being and Time, 10. 
52 Cf. Cassirer, PSF I, 71, 77 and 81. 
53 Cassirer, PSF I, 76. 
54 Cassirer, PSF I, 77. 
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2. A Kaleidoscopic View of the Human Being: The Philosophical-Anthropological  
Approach 
 
In the preface to EM, Cassirer discusses the initial impetus for the book stemming from 
repeated requests from his English-speaking colleagues to publish a translation of the three 
volumes of PSF. Cassirer demurred not only on account of the enormity of such an 
undertaking, but also because he found it “unjustifiable to reproduce the former book in its 
entirety.”55 Noting that he had conceived of his project and written PSF several decades 
earlier, Cassirer explains that in the intervening years “the author has continued his study on 
the subject. He has learned many new facts and he has been confronted with new problems. 
Even the old problems are seen by him from a different angle and appear in a new light.”56 
In a chapter on “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” which does not correspond to any chapter 
in the published version EM, Cassirer presents a history of the philosophy of man (i.e. of 
philosophical anthropology) in terms of “two perilous cliffs between which every philosophy 
of man has to find its way and to steer its course,”57 namely absolutism and relativism (or, 
dogmatism and skepticism). These two perilous cliffs represent two fundamental orientations 
of human beings. On the one hand there is the mythical tendency to attribute a supernatural 
or divine origin to symbolic forms such as language, religion and art. Thus among so-called 
primitive human beings (or, better, human beings in thrall to the symbolic form of myth), 
words and images have a power of their own (cf. PSF II and Language and Myth for 
illustrations). Human beings may learn to harness the power of words, images and numbers, 
                                                        
55 Cassirer, Essay on Man, 1. 
56 Cassirer, Essay on Man, 1. 
57 Ernst Cassirer, “Essay on Man: Part III. Symbol and Truth, Ch. I, ‘Dogmatism and  
Scepticism,’ draft B, typescript, carbon, corrected (corresponds to no published chapter),” 
Ernst Cassirer Papers, Box 11, Folder 212, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, 
Yale University, 4. 
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but these objects have an independent existence and origin that is not traced back to human 
beings. 
The emergence of the diametric opposite point of view is, according to Cassirer, “one of 
the hardest tasks and one of the greatest achievements of Greek philosophy.”58 Already 
among the Pre-Socratic philosophers the “anthropomorphic character of the fundamental 
concepts of man”59 began to be recognized as such. Xenophanes, for instance, levels a charge 
of anthropomorphism at the gods of Homer and Hesiod: “It is man, declares Xenophanes, 
who has made these gods in the image of himself. If oxen and horses or lions had hands and 
could paint with their hands and produce works of art – they would act in the same way. But 
in this case the gods would have no human forms but the shapes of oxen or horses or lions.”60 
The apotheosis of this skeptical or relativistic view is found in the famous remark by 
Protagoras that “Man is the measure of all things, of those which are, that they are, and of 
those which are not, that they are not.”61 
True to the irenic character of Cassirer’s thought, he believes each of these standpoints to 
have an essential function. It is not a matter of declaring dogmatism or skepticism to be the 
“correct” position and it also is not a matter of presenting a disinterested, merely historical 
account of their role in the history of philosophical anthropology. Rather, by tracing the 
history of the conflict that Cassirer names the “Dialectic of symbolic consciousness,”62 he 
intends to prepare the ground for “a critical theory of Symbolism.”63 “We are in quest for 
truth, for an absolute truth,” says Cassirer of philosophy’s enduring task. “But instead of 
                                                        
58 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 2. 
59 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 2. 
60 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 3. 
61 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 4. 
62 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 5. 
63 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 8. Cassirer’s underlining. 
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finding it we find ourselves bound to the endlessly revolving wheel of our own concepts, our 
images, our symbols, our abstractions.”64 While some have sought to skirt the mediation of 
symbolism, the critical theory of Symbolism that Cassirer proposes would seek “a 
justification of this inevitable element: a vindication of the rights of symbolic thought and 
symbolic expression.”65 
In the course of presenting the history of the dialectic of symbolic consciousness, 
Cassirer spends nearly fifteen pages discussing the transitional position of Montaigne.66 
According to Cassirer, Montaigne “offers a new anthropology, a new picture of man and of 
his relation to the universe,”67 which derives in turn from the new picture of the universe put 
forth by Copernicus. Whereas Montaigne’s Stoic and Christian predecessors saw the universe 
as governed by a divine power and teleologically ordered with human beings at the center, 
Montaigne’s thought has been marked by the dislocations of Copernican cosmology; namely, 
human beings are no longer the center of the universe, but instead find themselves in the 
midst of a vast, infinite space, the silence of which terrified Pascal. Montaigne, on the other 
hand, was not terrified and instead recognized that “[t]eleology is anthropomorphism; and 
anthropomorphism is nothing but a continual self-deception.”68  
The implications of this new cosmological position were far reaching. For one, 
Montaigne was “the first admirer and defender of the ‘primitive’ mind and of primitive 
culture.”69 The inferiority of primitive culture had been argued on the basis of a teleological 
                                                        
64 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 7-8. 
65 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 8. Cassirer’s underlining. 
66 By comparison, Cassirer allots Montaigne approximately one page in the published 
version of Essay on Man. 
67 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 30. 
68 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 31. 
69 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 33. 
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position according to which European culture represented a more advanced stage of 
development. “To seek after a universal moral law and after a universal truth means to pursue 
a fantastic and illusory end,” Cassirer writes of the consequences of Montaigne’s position. 
“Every age, every nation, every country has a truth and a morality of its own. We may 
compare these different perspectives of humanity, but we cannot judge them. The law of 
relativity that we have discovered in the physical universe holds just as much in our logical 
and moral universe.”70 
Montaigne’s Essays also inaugurates a new procedure in philosophical anthropology: 
“All the former writers – philosophers, theologians, moralists, pedagogues – were concerned 
with some general aspects of human life…Montaigne is the first author who dares to abandon 
this procedure. He detects a new problem: the problem of individual life.”71 Whereas 
philosophers up to Montaigne’s time searched for “the ‘idea’ of man,” an idea that has 
“permanent being and an eternal truth,”72 by probing in painstaking detail the aspects of his 
individual life, Montaigne finds no unchanging essence, no being but rather a perpetual 
becoming. As a consequence of Montaigne’s fascination with the ever-changing and oft-
overlooked aspects of human existence, Cassirer claims that Montaigne “has not a theoretical 
but a kaleidoscopic view of man.”73 
Cassirer inherits these two features of philosophical anthropology – a pluralist orientation 
and a kaleidoscopic view of man – that are first found in Montaigne’s Essays. Cassirer’s 
pluralist orientation finds expression in his defense of the independence and irreducibility of 
the different symbolic forms. “Each function [i.e. symbolic form] makes use of different 
                                                        
70 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 34-35. 
71 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 35-36. 
72 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 37. 
73 Cassirer, “Dogmatism and Scepticism,” 38. 
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instruments, each one presupposes and applies entirely different standards and criteria; and 
the result is different also,” writes Cassirer. “…The achievement of each one must be 
measured by itself, and not by the standards and aims of any other…”74 Such a position leads 
Cassirer to regard with respect, as did Montaigne, the so-called primitive mind, or in 
Cassirer’s parlance, the worldview correlated to the symbolic form of myth. 
Whereas Montaigne’s skepticism prevents him from dismissing outright primitive culture 
in favor of ‘more civilized’ cultures and his kaleidoscopic view of man welcomes what is 
odd and putatively trivial into the philosophical fold, Cassirer sees mythical consciousness as 
not merely interesting to but essential for philosophical anthropology.75 In the Preface to PSF 
II, he offers an argument for the indispensable role of myth in the philosophy of man, which 
we will now briefly recapitulate. 
Speaking in Hegelian terms, Cassirer claims that the lowest rung of the ladder leading 
consciousness to itself is not, as Hegel had it, sensory consciousness. He dismisses this claim 
by pointing to the phenomenological insight that the consciousness of abstract perceptual 
phenomena such as pure color and tone is “itself a product of abstraction, a theoretical 
elaboration of the ‘given.’”76 As such, this realm of experience is in fact more sophisticated 
than its rudimentary elements would suggest. 
                                                        
74 Cassirer, PSF I, 91. 
75 Cassirer also undercuts the hierarchical perspective of the relationship between 
“primitive” and more advanced cultures by identifying so-called primitive elements in 
more advanced cultural phenomena. For instance, in his discussion of space and spatial 
relations in language, Cassirer points out that more advanced languages, like their 
primitive counterparts, similarly express spatial relations with terms that are ultimately 
oriented by reference to the human body. Cf. Cassirer, PSF I, 207. 
76 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 2: Mythical Thought, translated  
by Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), xvi. 
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The lowest rung of the ladder, the most basic type of distinctly human consciousness, in 
Cassirer’s view, is mythical consciousness. As the lowest rung, myth stands in a “genetic 
relationship” as the “primal source”77 of higher cultural forms. In fact, so close are myth and 
religion that in “the development of human culture we cannot fix a point where myth ends or 
religion begins. In the whole course of its history religion remains indissolubly connected 
and penetrated with mythical elements…Myth is from its very beginning potential 
religion.”78 Religion is animated by the same energy that underlies the mythical worldview, 
which Cassirer describes with the Stoic’s concept of the “sympathy of the Whole.”79 Both 
myth and religion give form to the instinct of mankind that “nature [is] one great society, the 
society of life,”80 in which human beings exist on the same level as flora and fauna. Religion, 
however, introduces individuality into the universality of feeling characteristic of myth.81 
Cassirer also adopts the kaleidoscopic view of human beings that he attributes to 
Montaigne. As opposed to the theoretical view, which attempts to fix the essence of human 
beings at the outset of its investigations, Cassirer follows his own decree that 
All the so-called definitions of man are nothing but airy speculation so long as they 
are not based upon and confirmed by our experience of man. There is no other way to 
know man than to understand his life and conduct. But what we find here defies every 
attempt at inclusion within a single and simple formula.82  
                                                        
77 Cassirer, PSF II, xv. On this point also cf. Cassirer, “Critical Idealism as a Philosophy 
of Culture,” 86f. 
78 Cassirer, Essay on Man, 96. Below we shall also consider the close relationship 
between myth and art. 
79 Cassirer, Essay on Man, 103. 
80 Cassirer, Essay on Man, 91-92. 
81 Cf. Cassirer, Essay on Man, 105. 
82 Cassirer, Essay on Man, 16. 
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Whereas Montaigne takes himself as his test subject, enumerating the quirks of his body and 
mind, Cassirer casts a wider net, claiming that the only way to study human beings in all 
their kaleidoscopic richness, the only way to understand their life and conduct is by studying 
their varied works: “‘being’ can be apprehended only in ‘action.’”83  
 
3. Art as a Symbolic Form 
 Although art is mentioned whenever Cassirer lists the symbolic forms and although it 
receives relatively extended treatments in essays and monographs, Cassirer’s presentation of 
art is much less developed than his accounts of language, myth and science.84 There is 
evidence that Cassirer planned to write a volume of PSF devoted to art but set the project 
aside on account of Hitler’s rise to power and the existential tumult that ensued.85 
 The aim of this section is to present Cassirer’s theory of art as it can be reconstructed 
from his writings on the subject. Despite being one of the ‘main’ symbolic forms, we shall 
see that many questions remain that are necessary in order to fill in the lacunae of Cassirer’s 
theory. Thus presenting the theory is preparatory to discussing the work that remains to be 
done in understanding art as a symbolic form. 
 As it appears in his scattered writings on the subject, the symbolic form of art never 
receives the systematic treatment that language, myth and the theoretical world-view receive 
                                                        
83 Cassirer, PSF I, 80. 
84 Cassirer’s discussions of art can be found in a chapter on the subject in Essay on Man 
as well as the essays “Eidos and Eidolon: The Problem of Beauty and Art in the 
Dialogues of Plato,” “Mythic, Aesthetic, and Theoretical Space,” “Language and Art I,” 
“Language and Art II” and “The Educational Value of Art.”  
85 In a 1942 letter to Paul Arthur Schilpp, Cassirer cites “die Ungunst der Zeiten” (the 
disfavor of the times) as the reason he was unable to write a projected volume of the 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms devoted to art. Cf. Fabien Capeilleres, “‘K’ for ‘Kunst”: 
Cassirer’s Pages on Art for PDSF IV. With a note on Francis Bacon,” Cassirer Studies 2 
(2009): 14fn2. 
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in their respective volumes of PSF. Consequently, we face a challenge in the elucidation of 
art as a symbolic form; namely, what would a systematic presentation require? 
 A recently discovered, newly published document dating from 1917, entitled 
“‘Philosophie des Symbolischen’ (allg[emeine] Disposition)” is the earliest known sketch of 
the project that Cassirer would undertake during the 1920s. The document is comprised of 
six sections: I) Die Psychologie des Symbolischen, II) Die Logik des Symbolischen, III) Die 
Zahlfunktion, IV) Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, V) Die Grundprobleme der Aesthetik, VI) 
Die Metaphysik des Symbolischen. Given the panoptic character of the document, as well as 
its explicit consideration of the basic problems relating to aesthetics, we might find some sort 
of orientation here. 
 Unfortunately the section on “Die Grundprobleme der Aesthetik” is not as developed as 
one would hope; in fact there is only a single subsection, a single Grundproblem addressed, 
namely, the primordial function of the aesthetic [Die aesthetische Urfunktion].86 
Nevertheless, Cassirer makes some interesting remarks that are worthy of consideration. In 
the document, Cassirer favors a negative approach to the theme of aesthetics; that is, he 
spends more time addressing mistaken aesthetic theories than he does offering a positive 
determination of the aesthetic standpoint. For instance, when characterized in opposition to 
“the world of empirical reality, as against the logical-scientific world [the world of 
‘causality’],”87 the aesthetic realm becomes viewed as “the world of play, of appearance, of 
                                                        
86 Arno Schubbach, Die Genese des Symbolischen: Zu den Anfängen von Ernst Cassirers  
Kulturphilosophie (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2016), 411. 
87 “die Welt der empirischen Wirklichkeit, wie gegen die logisch-wissenschaftliche Welt 
[die Welt der >Kausalität<].” Schubbach, Die Genese des Symbolischen, 411. 
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illusion.”88 According to Cassirer, however, such a characterization is misleading since it 
fails to recognize the relativity of this illusion: “Conscious self-deception –  but one can only 
speak of deception when another criterion of absolute reality has already been 
presupposed!”89 Cassirer claims that his interest is not in setting up one tier as reality par 
excellence, “rather we ask: which positive, qualitatively determined form of configuration 
corresponds to the aesthetic outlook.”90 As we shall presently establish, answering this 
question entails a consideration of the unique form that space, time and other such 
foundational aspects of experience take in the domain of the aesthetic.  
 In different terms, Cassirer is asking about the constitution of a “unity of 
consciousness,”91 a Kantian notion that Cassirer, in keeping with his project’s relationship to 
Kant, both adopts and expands. Kant claims “that we recognize [an] object when we have 
effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition.”92 Cassirer is interested in the different 
ways that we can recognize an object, the different unities that the manifold of intuition can 
result in. Hearkening back to his example of the Linienzug, it is possible to recognize this 
object as an artistic ornament, the graphic representation of a sine curve, as an attempt to 
obscure the writing it is superimposed over, etc. What determines the particular meaning 
context of an object is the particular type of synthesis that consciousness performs. “The 
synthesis by which the consciousness combines a series of tones into the unity of a melody, 
                                                        
88 “die Welt des Spiels, des Scheins, der – Illusion.” Schubbach, Die Genese des 
Symbolischen, 411. 
89 “Bewusste Selbsttäuschung – aber von Täuschung kann eben nur die Rede sein, wenn 
schon ein anderer Maßstab der absoluten Realität vorausgesetzt wird!” Schubbach, Die 
Genese des Symbolischen, 411. 
90 “sondern wir fragen: welche positive, qualitative bestimmte Gestaltungsform entspricht 
der aesthetischen >Auffassung<.” Schubbach, Die Genese des Symbolischen, 413. 
91 Cassirer, PSF I, 94. 
92 Ernst Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, translated by James Haden (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981), 172. 
  
33 
would seem to be totally different from the synthesis by which a number of syllables is 
articulated into the unity of a ‘sentence,’” writes Cassirer, “But they have one thing in 
common, that in both cases the sensory particulars do not stand by themselves; they are 
articulated into a conscious whole, from which they take their qualitative meaning.”93  
 The syntheses yielding a unity of consciousness are affected through various types of 
relation. Cassirer offers three examples. “The factor of ‘juxtaposition’ as it appears in the 
form of space,”94 is one such example. Another original type of relation is “the factor of 
succession as in the form of time.”95 Finally there is “the combination of material properties 
in such a way that one is apprehended as a ‘thing,’ the other as an ‘attribute,’ or of successive 
events in such a way that the one appears as a cause of the other.” Cassirer here shows his 
Kantian influence very clearly: space, time and categories such as causality are the 
mechanisms by which consciousness elaborates raw sense data into a meaningful unity. True 
to this systematic statement, Cassirer organizes the volumes of PSF along these lines. The 
first volume, for instance, contains chapters dedicated to “The Expression of Space and 
Spatial Relations,” “The Representation of Time” and “Language and the Expression of the 
Forms of Pure Relation. The Sphere of Judgment and the Concepts of Relation.” On the basis 
of further commonalities in the volumes of PSF we are compelled to add number and 
subjectivity to the body of fundamental relations contributing to the constitution of the unity 
of consciousness.96  
                                                        
93 Cassirer, PSF I, 94. 
94 Cassirer, PSF I, 94. 
95 Cassirer, PSF I, 94. 
96 PSF II has the most lucid organization of the elements of a symbolic from. The first 
part concerns “Myth as a Form of Thought,” i.e. mythical consciousness’ determination 
of an object and the particular categories that are in effect. Part two treats “Myth as a 
Form of Intuition,” involving its characteristic experience of space, time and number. 
  
34 
We learn from the introduction to PSF I that the unity of consciousness, or the form of 
configuration belonging to symbolic forms as such, is the function of two characteristics, 
quality and its modality. “By the ‘quality’ of a given relation,” explains Cassirer, “we here 
understand the particular type of combination by means of which it creates series within the 
whole of consciousness, the arrangement of whose members is subject to a special law.”97 
With respect to time as a basic type of relation, for instance, “simultaneity” and “succession” 
would constitute different qualities. As a basic type of relation, time will be a unifying factor 
in the different symbolic forms. Time in science compared with time in art, however, are 
quite different. In the world of science, for instance, time is “the stable basis of all motion 
and the uniform measure of all change,”98 as Newton explains at the beginning of his 
Mechanics. Time as it pertains to music, on the other hand, in Cassirer’s view is that which 
“governs a work of music and its rhythmic measures.”99 To render the dissimilarity even 
clearer, consider that time in science, as suggested by Newton’s definition, is an objective 
measure. Time in music, however, is thoroughly subjective. In his Making Music Together 
(MMT), Alfred Schütz emphasizes a phenomenological conception of music that defines the 
phenomenon as “meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time.”100 Schütz argues that music 
belongs to inner time (which we might call “subjective time”) with a simple thought 
experiment. “[L]et us imagine that the slow and the fast movement of a symphony each fill a 
twelve-inch record,” Schütz proposes, “Our watches show that the playing of either record 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Part three is on “Myth as a Life Form,” in which subjectivity is discussed. Cf. Cassirer, 
PSF II, v. 
97 Cassirer, PSF I, 95. 
98 Cassirer, PSF I, 96. 
99 Cassirer, PSF I, 96. 
100 Alfred Schütz, “Making Music Together,” in Collected Papers II: Studies in Social  
Theory, edited by Arvid Brodersen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 170. 
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takes about three and a half minutes.”101 However, the time shown by the listener’s watch is 
not the time of the listener’s experience: “It may come as a complete surprise to him that the 
main theme of the second movement of Beethoven’s Pianoforte Sonata in d-minor, Op. 31, 
No. 2, takes as much time in the mere clock sense – namely, one minute – as the last 
movement of the same sonata up to the end of the exposition.”102 Exciting music feels shorter 
than slow music. Music without a consistent, discernible pulse is experienced as longer than 
music with a clearly delineated rhythmic structure. Music associated with a traumatic 
experience will feel longer than music towards which a listener is indifferent. Despite the 
differences of time as it pertains to science and art, “this unity of nomenclature involves a 
unity of meaning at least in so far as both posit that universal and abstract quality which we 
term ‘succession.’”103 
While the different symbolic forms partake of the same basic forms of relation, each does 
so in a singular manner. Furthermore, abstracted from a symbolic context, the basic forms of 
relation would have no “concrete application and concrete meaning”.104 Thus an analysis of a 
symbolic form cannot merely enumerate the forms of relation, but must discuss the particular 
mode that relations take in this context. The unique form that the manners of relation take 
within the holistic context of a symbolic form is its modality: “If we designate the various 
kinds of relation – such as relation of space, time, causality, etc. – as R1, R2, R3, we must 
assign to each one a special ‘index of modality,’ m1, m2, m3, denoting the context of 
function and meaning in which it is to be taken.”105 Space, for instance, is a basic form of 
                                                        
101 Schütz, MMT, 171. 
102 Schütz, MMT, 171. 
103 Cassirer, PSF I, 96. 
104 Cassirer, PSF I, 97. 
105 Cassirer, PSF I, 97. 
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relation that plays an indispensable role in constituting a unity out of a sensory manifold. 
However, space functions differently for scientists and artists: 
In the one case [i.e. of science] we have the modality of the logical-geometric 
concept, in the other the modality of artistic imagination – in the one, space is 
conceived as an aggregate of mutually independent relations, as a system of ‘causes’ 
and ‘consequences’; in the other, it is conceived as a whole whose particular factors 
are dynamically interlocked, a perceptual, emotional unity.106 
The relation between quality and modality can also be understood in the vocabulary of 
symbolism. The qualities affecting a unity of consciousness constitute a “‘natural’ 
symbolism” that are, due to the ineluctably mediated nature of consciousness, “contained or 
at least projected in every single moment and fragment of consciousness.”107 The modality of 
these qualities, the unique form that they take in a given symbolic form, yield “the artificial 
symbols, the ‘arbitrary’ signs which consciousness creates in language, art, and myth.”108 In 
the 1931 essay “Mythic, Aesthetic and Theoretical Space,” Cassirer presents this concept of 
modality with great clarity and is therefore worth quoting at length: 
[T]here does not exist a general, universal, essentially fixed intuition of space; rather, 
space receives its determined content and its particular coincidence by means of the 
order of meaning with which it configures itself in each case. Depending on whether 
it is thought of as mythic, aesthetic, or theoretical order, the ‘form’ of space changes, 
and this transformation not only concerns individual and subordinate features but also 
relates to space as a whole, to its principal structure…That which links all these 
                                                        
106 Cassirer, PSF I, 96. 
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spaces of different characters and provenances of meaning (that which links the 
mythically, aesthetically, and theoretically united spaces with one another) is simply a 
pure formal determination that is expressed most clearly and concisely in Leibniz’s 
definition of space as the ‘possibility of coexistence’ and as the order of possible 
coexistences (l’ordre des coexistences possibles). However, this purely formal 
possibility experiences very different kinds of realization, actualization, and 
concretization.109 
An analysis of art oriented by the theoretical underpinnings of Cassirer’s philosophy of 
symbolic forms will thus have the following elements: an enumeration of the basic forms of 
relation at play in art and a presentation of their respective modalities. Immediately a 
question presents itself – are we at liberty to speak of ‘the arts as such’ or will the different 
art forms require individual accounts? Fortunately, in an unpublished draft of EM, Cassirer 
weighs in on this question in the course of discussing the orientation of the philosophy of 
symbolic forms from the wealth of empirical materials available: 
…what an overwhelming mass of facts and what an amazing list of the most difficult 
and heterogeneous problems we meet here! To begin with the linguistic facts, it 
becomes imperative to study, to order and to classify the languages of the world; to 
answer the question of their mutual relation, to follow up their historical 
development. Moreover, we have to make a comparative study of Myth and Religion 
which, on the one hand, must take into consideration all the facts of primitive thought 
with which we have become acquainted by modern Anthropology and Ethnology – 
                                                        
109 Ernst Cassirer, “Mythic, Aesthetic, and Theoretical Space,” in The Warburg Years  
(1919-1933): Essays on Language, Art, Myth, and Technology, translated and edited by 
S.G. Lofts and A. Calcagno (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 325-326. 
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and which, on the other hand, must be extended to the highest conceptions of 
religious thought. We have to inquire into the origin and growth of our moral ideas, to 
study art in all its forms and in all its periods, to investigate the development of our 
social institutions and our political constitutions.110 
 
3a. Space in (Visual) Art 
In order to hew as closely to Cassirer’s thought as possible, our analysis of art as a 
symbolic form will be oriented by Cassirer’s texts where possible. For instance, in discussing 
the modality of space in art, we shall take Cassirer’s essay on “Mythic, Aesthetic and 
Theoretical Space” (MATS) as our point of departure. 
After beginning with an account of how the history of philosophical thinking ultimately 
leads from substantial theories of time and space to the recognition of their functional nature, 
Cassirer offers a comparative account of space as it occurs within “the order of meaning”111 
that is configured in myth, art and theoretical cognition. Helpful and important though the 
essay is, Cassirer’s account of mythical, aesthetic and theoretical space is disappointingly 
brief and all but devoid of clarifying examples. Consequently, interpretive work is required. 
Compared with theoretical space, exemplified by “the abstract schema of geometry”112 
and “the pure measured space of mathematics and mathematical physics,”113 aesthetic space 
                                                        
110 Ernst Cassirer, “Essay on Man: Part I. What is Man?, Ch. I. ‘The Problem and the  
Method of a ‘Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,’’ draft B, typescript, carbon corrected 
(corresponds to no published chapter),” Ernst Cassirer Papers, Box 10, Folder 186, 
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, 7. Emphasis added. 
111 Cassirer, MATS, 325. 
112 Cassirer, MATS, 328. 
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and mythical space are “thoroughly concrete modes of spatiality.”114 The most fundamental 
concrete mode of spatiality is the everyday space of mere activity. Phenomenology teaches 
that everyday spatiality is constructed around “a kernel of optimal accessibility,”115 which is 
“the sphere of nearness with my own body in the center, constituted as the origin of the 
whole coordinate system which I apply to the spatial field.”116 Thus, closeness concerns that 
which lies within my grasp, while remoteness denotes that sphere requiring the performance 
of “kinaesthesias,”117 i.e. motor mechanisms such as walking, in order to be transformed into 
closeness. As a “‘physiological’ space,”118 i.e. a spatiality constituted from the sense of 
vision and touch, everyday spatiality gains its concreteness. This concreteness of everyday 
spatiality can be contrasted with the abstraction of theoretical space.119 “Euclidean space,” 
explains Cassirer, “is characterized by the three basic attributes of continuity, infinity, and 
uniformity.”120 These three basic attributes are foreign to concrete everyday spatiality. 
Perception is not infinite; it is bounded by sight lines and the extent of one’s reach. The 
uniformity of theoretical space is granted by its purely formal nature. Theoretical space has 
                                                        
114 Cassirer, MATS, 328. 
115 Alfred Schütz, “Fragments Toward a Phenomenology of Music,” in Collected Papers  
IV. Edited by Helmut Wagner and George Psathas (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1996), 251. 
116 Schütz, FPM, 251. 
117 Schütz, FPM, 251. 
118 Cassirer, PSF II, 83. 
119 According to Cassirer, Heidegger’s analysis of space in Being and Time concerns this 
primary experience of pragmatic space. Cassirer does not take issue with Heidegger’s 
“sharp analysis,” but claims that his own account of space is distinguished from 
Heidegger’s insofar as “it does not stop at this stage of the at-hand and its mode of 
spatiality, but without challenging Heidegger’s position goes beyond it; for we wish to 
follow the road leading from spatiality as a factor in the at-hand to space as the form of 
existence, and furthermore to show how this road leads right through the domain of 
symbolic formation – in the twofold sense of ‘representation’ and of ‘signification.’” 
(Cassirer, PSF III, 149fn.4) 
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no content; position in theoretical space is determined with reference to other positions and 
vice versa. Everyday space, on the other hand, is suffused by things with which we are 
concerned and which orient our activity. Position in everyday space is a function of our 
projects and the nearness or farness of the things that are implicated in those projects. Thus, 
my position in everyday space is not abstractly determined in terms of a Cartesian grid or the 
longitude and latitude that I inhabit, but rather by considerations such as whether I am close 
enough to catch the bus that will get me to work on time. 
The concreteness of mythical space is a function not of the correlation between direction 
and physiological orientation121, but rather a correlation between direction and “specific 
mythical feeling values.”122 Although these feeling values take different shapes in different 
cultures, Cassirer identifies underlying commonalities: 
Holiness [Heiligkeit] or profanity [Unheiligkeit], accessibility or inaccessibility, 
blessing or curse, familiarity or strangeness, promise of happiness or threat of danger, 
these are the characteristic features according to which myth separates localities in 
space from each other and on the basis of which it distinguishes directions within 
space.123 
Ultimately, mythical feeling can be traced back to the fundamental opposition of “day and 
night, light and darkness;”124 and Cassirer defends this contention with reference to a wide 
variety of anthropological literature, for instance, on the religion of the Iranians and the Cora 
                                                        
121 At least not directly. Cassirer does identify a similarity between language and myth in 
that both forms originally understand spatial orientation (e.g. “behind,” “above” and 
“below”) in terms of human beings’ intuition of their own bodies. Cf. Cassirer, PSF I, 
206 and PSF II, 90. 
122 Cassirer, PSF II, 85. 
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Indians, the creation stories of the Babylonians and the Egyptians and Herder’s interpretation 
of the first chapter of Genesis.125 
It is systematically appropriate to ground an elaboration of the concept of aesthetic space 
in comparison with mythical space, since, according to Cassirer, art – indeed, all the 
symbolic forms – arise out of myth. “None of these forms started out with an independent 
existence and clearly defined outlines of its own,” asserts Cassirer, “in its beginnings, rather, 
every one of them was shrouded and disguised in some form of myth.” Thus we would do 
well to approach aesthetic space in terms of its difference from mythical space.  
Aesthetic space is characterized by a new relationship between human beings and the 
world. Whereas mythical space is shot through with feeling values, the contemplative attitude 
of aesthetic experience frees human beings from the violent interplay of forces that 
characterize mythical space: “the object [Objekt] shifts to a new distance, to remoteness from 
the I; only in this does it gain its own independent being and create a new form of 
‘objectivity.’ It is this new objectivity that distinguishes aesthetic space.”126 Despite its 
independence, the aesthetic object nevertheless “originates from the I and develops from the 
formative forces of the I.”127 This is an essential point that recurs throughout Cassirer’s 
writing on art, which entails a rejection of the copy theory of art that Plato so influentially put 
forth.128 The “general function” of aesthetic space, in Cassirer’s most direct definition, “is a 
                                                        
125 Cf. Cassirer, PSF II, 96ff. 
126 Cassirer, MATS, 328. 
127 Cassirer, MATS, 329. 
128 For instance cf. Ernst Cassirer, “Language and Art I,” in Symbol, Myth, and Culture, 
edited by Donald Phillip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 154: “What 
is common to language and art is the fact that neither of them can be considered as a mere 
reproduction or imitation of a ready-made, given, outward reality.” In the preface to PSF 
II, Cassirer identifies this impulse as a stumbling block for both myth and art: “And yet in 
this ‘illusionism’ [i.e. the tendency of psychology and psychologism to regard myth and 
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quintessence of possible ways of configuration, and within each, a new horizon of the world 
of objects opens up.”129  
Since art arises out of myth and because the new form of objectivity characterizing 
aesthetic consciousness distinguishes its peculiar spatiality, let us approach a more detailed 
understanding of aesthetic space by first considering the breach between the mythical and 
aesthetic object. Prehistoric cave art is a fitting phenomenon to orient the discussion and a 
consideration of several contemporary interpretations of cave art may serve to illustrate an 
understanding of cave art both as a specifically mythical phenomenon and as a specifically 
aesthetic phenomenon. 
 One of the earliest and most influential interpretations of the meaning of cave art was put 
forth by French priest and archaeologist Abbé Henri Breuil. In his 1952 monograph 400 
Centuries of Cave Art, Breuil defends understanding the creation of cave art in terms of so-
called hunting magic. The efficacy of hunting magic derives from a particular feature of 
mythical consciousness, namely, in Cassirer’s terms, an “indifference of mythical thinking 
towards distinctions in the ‘stage of objectivization.’”130 In other words, the name of a thing 
or an image of the thing are aspects of that thing’s reality. “A man’s image like his name is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
art as a subjective illusion] that keeps cropping up – both in the theory of mythical 
representations and in attempts to establish a theory of aesthetics and art – there lurks a 
grave problem and a grave danger…For if these forms as a whole really do constitute a 
systematic unity, the fate of any one of them is closely bound up with that of all the 
others.” (Cassirer, PSF II, xiv). An especially lucid presentation of this issue comes at the 
beginning of Cassirer’s 1932 essay “Language and the Construction of the World of 
Objects.” Cf. Ernst Cassirer, “Language and the Construction of the World of Objects,” 
in The Warburg Years (1919-1933): Essays on Language, Art, Myth, and Technology, 
translated and edited by S.G. Lofts and A. Calcagno (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2013), 334-336. 
129 Cassirer, MATS, 329. 
130 Cassirer, PSF II, 42. 
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an alter ego,” writes Cassirer, “what happens to the image happens to the man himself.”131 
Breuil’s thesis is that prehistoric cave art is a response to the precarious nature of hunter-
gatherer societies during the Ice Age. Through the manipulation of images, prehistoric 
humans were trying to multiply and control the animals on which their lives depended: “The 
daily pursuit of game and its multiplication by Nature, or the success of hunting expeditions 
were the principal anxieties.”132 Breuil’s interpretation of cave art thus understands the 
phenomenon as a product of mythical consciousness. And the nature of the mythical object 
has implications for thinking about the spatiality of cave art. Although hunting magic has 
been rejected as a global explanation for prehistoric cave art, the basic supposition that this 
symbolic behavior had a supernatural function is still in vogue. The shamanistic 
interpretation of cave paintings put forth by David Lewis-Williams and Jean Clottes133 is 
largely driven by the location of the work: “To venture underground was akin to moving 
between worlds…In this way, the shamans would encounter the spirits that lived inside the 
rocks and inhabited those mysterious, frightening places, contacting the gods through 
painting and engraving and gaining their goodwill or some of their power.”134  
Magical interpretations of cave paintings are consistent with Cassirer’s understanding of 
the development of art: “The beginnings of creative art seem rather to partake of a sphere in 
which creative activity is still embedded in magical representations and directed toward 
specific magical aims, in which consequently the image itself still has no independent, purely 
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aesthetic significance.”135 What would it mean to interpret cave paintings as possessing their 
own “purely immanent validity,”136 as becoming “a self-contained cosmos with its own 
center of gravity”137? At the risk of begging the question, this would mean to interpret the 
paintings as art. But how does Cassirer understand art? 
Art “is not an imitation but a discovery of reality,”138 claims Cassirer. To this extent the 
artist resembles the scientist; through processes of simplification, condensation and 
concentration, both individuals give objective meaning to nature. For instance, the scientist 
deduces general rules governing material nature by abstracting from individual instances. 
Scientists discover reality through a process of “abstraction.”139 Science pursues laws and 
theorems that can encompass the greatest number of phenomena. Thus with a tool such as the 
Pythagorean Theorem, mathematicians are able to determine the length of the sides of any 
triangle. This process of abstraction has proved enormously productive and the determination 
of causes and effects has allowed human beings to cure disease and conquer distance. The 
value of science is not in question for Cassirer. However useful generality may be, this does 
not change the fact that, according to Cassirer, “abstraction is always an impoverishment of 
reality.”140 
Where science generalizes, art intensifies; where science abstracts, art becomes ever 
more specific. “If we say of two artists that they paint ‘the same’ landscape,” writes Cassirer, 
“we describe our aesthetic experience very inadequately.”141 Two artists approaching ‘the 
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same’ landscape from different orientations or at a different time of day or a different season 
do not have the same landscape as their subject matter. What the painter paints is “the 
individual and momentary physiognomy of the landscape.”142 Claude Monet’s 1890-1891 
series of haystack paintings are an apt illustration. From summer’s end of 1890 through the 
spring of 1891, Monet painted twenty-five canvasses of haystacks viewed from different 
perspectives, in different light and under different climatic conditions.143 From a rigorously 
scientific (if somewhat caricatured) point of view, painting the same landscape twenty-five 
times is an incomprehensible redundancy. The scientific treatment of landscapes would seek 
to abstract from Monet’s particular landscape in order to understand something about wheat 
fields as such, which would prove useful to farmers. Art, on the other hand, pursues the 
“intensification and illumination”144 of reality, which tends in the opposite direction of 
science and language. “In art we do not conceptualize the world,” writes Cassirer, contrasting 
art and science, “we perceptualize it.”145 That is to say, art does not attempt to put things in 
boxes, so to speak, but celebrates their unruly multiplicity. “What would we know of the 
innumerable nuances in the aspect of things [for instance, of haystacks],” writes Cassirer of 
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the true meaning and function of art, “were it not for the works of the great painters and 
sculptors?”146  
Thus art ends in knowledge; not theoretical knowledge but sensuous knowledge – this is 
how such a thing looks, this is the affective character of a particular color. “Even art may be 
described as knowledge,” Cassirer affirms, “but art is knowledge of a peculiar and specific 
kind.”147 Certain contemporary studies of prehistoric cave paintings emphasize precisely this 
aspect of the phenomenon. Methodologically, these studies have favored scrutiny over 
speculation. For instance, close descriptive study of the works has yielded insights that call 
for a reevaluation of the painting’s putatively ‘primitive’ character. Although prehistoric 
artists did not paint with the linear perspective that was discovered during the Renaissance, 
prehistoric art frequently evidences other forms of accuracy. Prehistoric artists were able to 
suggest three-dimensionality by exploiting the topographical features of the cave, thereby 
heightening the verisimilitude of the image – the bulging of a rhinocerous’ powerful shoulder 
or a lioness rubbing her flank against her male. By certain criteria, prehistoric artists were 
even more accurate than later artists; for instance, recent studies have shown that prehistoric 
depictions of walking quadrupeds are statistically more accurate than modern counterparts.148 
These canny prehistoric painters saw the “pure forms” of these animals clearly enough to 
reproduce accurate, if not necessarily ‘realistic,’ images in dark caves without the benefit of 
photographs or other models. While we moderns whose relationship with animals is distant 
and mediated may merely see ‘animals’ in prehistoric paintings, these nuanced images 
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contain unexpected detail.149 Subtle variations in animal posture that would go unnoticed by 
modern viewers would be seen by the prehistoric individual as a male/female urination 
posture, a threat vocalization posture or a raised-tail threat position.150 Paleolithic artists also 
depicted animals with telltale signs of different seasonal appearances.151 In short, cave art 
shows us “the innumerable nuances in the aspect of things”152 that we moderns have lost 
sight of. 
In his discussions of art, and especially of aesthetic spatiality, Cassirer frequently 
references Adolf Hildebrand’s Das Problem der Form in der Bildenden Kunst.153 In MATS, 
Cassirer approvingly cites Hildebrand’s methodological claim that “the question of the nature 
[Wesen] of form can only be formulated and clarified once the prior questions of the nature 
[Wesen] of space and spatial presentation have been formulated and clarified.”154 Thus it is 
worthwhile to consider Hildebrand’s theory. Let us also take Hildebrand’s theory as an 
opportunity to consider the aesthetic object once it has been, so to speak, de-mythologized. 
The de-mythologizing of the aesthetic object leaves us with a purely perceptual object. 
This object is not experienced in terms of the affective values that characterized the 
mythological worldview, nor is this object regarded as a pragmatic object. This is precisely 
the sort of object that Hildebrand describes. Hildebrand begins with a comparison of the 
artistic versus the everyday understanding of space, thereby implicitly distinguishing 
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pragmatic from aesthetic space. For purposes of orientation in everyday life, we do not 
reflect on how much our spatial orientation derives strictly from our visual impressions and 
from what we infer based on these phenomenal appearances. Artists adopt a different 
relationship to space and form, which Hildebrand defines as “delimited space.”155 
Anticipating Cassirer’s rejection of the view that art imitates reality, Hildebrand points out 
that artists must not represent what they see with total fidelity: “There are natural conditions 
of light, such as an abundance of reflected light, that dissolve any impression of form and 
thereby defeat any possibility of obtaining a clear spatial impression…[the artist] must learn, 
albeit indirectly, how the appearance expresses its formal content, which he does by learning 
to discern when it speaks clearly to us and when it does not.”156 Given the distinction 
between the ways that things appear and their form, Hildebrand deems it necessary to 
consider our mode of perception in order to draw the distinction between two modes of 
seeing that he calls Gesichtsvorstellungen and Bewegungsvorstellungen. 
Hildebrand asks readers to imagine that before them is an object set against a 
background. Given the distance of the background, movements of the eye will not present 
different sides of the object. Consequently, the background appears as a flat, two-
dimensional surface. As one moves towards and around the object, on the other hand, our 
image of the three-dimensional object is the synthesis of a number of different views. In this 
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case, “seeing becomes scanning, and the resulting ideas are not visual 
[Gesichtsvorstellungen] but kinesthetic [Bewegungsvorstellungen].”157 
These two types of seeing correspond to the activity of the painter and the sculptor 
respectively. Given the three-dimensional nature of sculpture, the sculptor works with 
kinesthetic ideas; but, according to Hildebrand (who was an accomplished sculptor in his 
own right), the sculptor determines the adequacy of his work by viewing it from afar in order 
to see its visual image (i.e. Gesichtsvorstellung). The painter, on the other hand, depicts a 
two-dimensional Gesichtsvorstellung in an attempt to create the impression of a three-
dimensional object. Thus the painter and sculptor approach image and form from opposite 
directions: “The painter creates an image in relation to the idea of form, and the sculptor 
realizes an idea of form in relation to the impression of the image.”158 Whatever the artist’s 
medium, the work must “connect one object with another in every direction of a general 
space, so that we, on the basis of such kinesthetic ideas, experience and understand space as a 
total volume or as general space, a continuous and unbroken whole.”159 
This last quote might lead one to believe that Hildebrand subscribes to some form of the 
copy theory of art. However, this is not so. “Artistic space is also filled and permeated with 
the most intensive values of expression; it is vitalized and moved by the strongest dynamic, 
antithetical oppositions,” Cassirer writes, comparing artistic with mythical space. “And yet 
this movement is not identical with the very immediate movement of life which expresses 
itself in the basic mythical affections of hope and fear, in magical attraction and rejection, in 
the all-encompassing desire of seizing the ‘sacred’ and in the horror of the touch of the 
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forbidden and unholy.”160 It is within the purview of the artist to impart such aesthetically 
expressive values to the work. According to Hildebrand, over the course of life, human 
beings acquire a fund of “functional signs [Funktionsmerkmale]”161 that are derived from our 
own bodily experience, similar to the process by which “the child learns to understand 
laughter and tears by joining in the process and is able to feel, through muscular activity that 
he himself calls forth, the inner cause of pleasure or pain.”162 The sculptor and painter not 
only impart the experience of spatiality to the viewer, but also imbue their work with 
functional signs that render it an affective experience. 
In Concerning the Spiritual in Art (CSA), Russian artist and theorist Wassily Kandinsky 
offers a different account than Hildebrand of intensive values of aesthetic expression in the 
context of painting that are nevertheless of a different order than mythical affections. 
Kandinsky’s theory may be read as a useful supplement to Hildebrand’s account, since 
Kandinsky speaks in the context of non-objective art, whereas Hildebrand’s theory strictly 
concerns the representational arts. According to Kandinsky, colors and forms possess 
“spiritual value”163 that beget a “corresponding vibration of the human soul.”164 It is the 
basic physical impressions of color that are the bridge to the soul: “The eye is strongly 
attracted by light, clear colors, and still more strongly attracted by those colors which are 
warm as well as clear,” explains Kandinsky. “…Keen lemon-yellow hurts the eye in time as 
a prolonged and shrill trumpet-note [hurts] the ear, and the gazer turns away to seek relief in 
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blue or green.”165 Beyond this physical effect, Kandinsky claims that for more sensitive souls 
colors will “produce a corresponding spiritual vibration.”166 Offering a linguistic description 
of this “spiritual vibration” is, to put it mildly, difficult, and Kandinsky himself is not terribly 
interested in doing so. In an essay entitled “On Understanding Art,” he draws a distinction, 
familiar to readers of Dilthey and Ricoeur, between explanation and understanding. 
Explanation is a linguistic affair, an attempt to define one’s “inner experience.”167 
Understanding, on the other hand, is what is granted by experience. Although he concedes 
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that explanation can help prepare someone to understand a work of art, Kandinsky is more 
concerned with the dangers of explanation, in particular that through explanation “no 
spiritual forces are awakened by these [explanatory] words; rather, the living work is ousted 
by the dead word (label).”168 
Although we shy away from offering an explanation of the spiritual vibration brought 
about by color, the vast and significant potential that Kandinsky saw in color’s working is 
made evident by his interest in chromotherapy and his reference in CSA to the research of 
Dresden physician Dr. Franz Freudenberg, “who believed that he could restore a patient’s 
disturbed inner balance by means of colors…To this end chromotherapy made use of colored 
glass panes hung in the window, to which the patient suffering from such disorders was 
exposed.”169 
The spiritual valence of a color has implications for the forms to which it is most suited, 
and thus also for aesthetic spatiality: “Keen colors are well suited by sharp forms (e.g., a 
yellow triangle), and soft, deep colors by round forms (e.g., a blue circle). But it must be 
remembered that an unsuitable combination of form and color is not necessarily discordant, 
but may, with manipulation, show the way to fresh possibilities of harmony.”170 This last 
statement is uncannily resonant with Cassirer’s statement that aesthetic space is “a 
quintessence of possible ways of configuration, and within each, a new horizon of the world 
of objects opens up.”171 
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3b. Space in Music 
Aesthetic spatiality takes a different shape in the various arts. “In the fine arts – in 
painting, sculpture, architecture – configuration is not based upon a determined image, upon 
a finished template of intuitional space into which it drags particular objects,” writes 
Cassirer. “None of them simply comes across space as already given before it; rather, they 
must obtain it, and each of them obtains it in its own and specifically characteristic way.”172 
The question that now concerns us is whether the notion of spatiality that obtained for the 
visual arts will hold equally in the realm of music. It is not difficult to understand why we 
must answer this question in the negative. Aesthetic space, we have seen in the previous 
section, is to be characterized as perceptual space. It is distinguished from mythical space by 
being denuded of the “mythical affections of hope and fear, in magical attraction and 
rejection, in the all-encompassing desire of seizing the ‘sacred’ and in the horror of the touch 
of the forbidden and unholy.”173 Aesthetic space is distinguished from everyday pragmatic 
space by the viewer’s disinterestedness, the fact that the aesthetic object is not viewed as 
something to be used for any end besides mere contemplation. Aesthetic space is 
distinguished from theoretical space by its concreteness, that is, its derivation from the 
individual’s lived experience as opposed to being the abstract product of a view from 
nowhere. 
But the phenomenological stance on the constitution of space puts us in a problematic 
position. Phenomenology, even in Hildebrand’s proto-phenomenology, argues that space is 
constituted through the embodied kinaesthetic experiences of seeing, touching and 
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moving.174 However, as Schütz points out, “the organ by which we experience music, the ear, 
does not have any kinaesthesia…the ear is not able to build up the dimension of space.”175 
And to the extent that the sense of hearing is able to provide spatial orientation – for instance, 
by allowing us to determine that a noise came from a particular direction – this information is 
derived from spatial understanding that is itself ultimately derived from our visual, tactile and 
locomotive experience. Thus we forcefully encounter the question: what does “space” mean 
in the context of music? 
A number of distinctions must be made to orient our survey of this perilously confusing 
terrain. Frederico Macedo argues for five discrete meanings of “space” as it pertains to 
music. The first meaning concerns the use of spatial metaphors in the vocabulary used to 
describe properties of sound. Reference to spatial terminology such as “high” and “low” are 
two common examples of this metaphorical use of spatial language in the context of music. 
This metaphorical use of space is to be contrasted with the subsequent four meanings of 
space in music, which Macedo characterizes as literal uses of space, “in the sense that they 
are related to specific aspects of the perception of sound in space, or to a general perception 
of space and its relation with aural perception…Space becomes then not only a metaphor to 
describe different aspects of music, musical structure or how music of sound is perceived by 
the listener, but also a physical reality that, in interaction with sound, produces different 
kinds of aural perception.”176 
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The first of the literal meanings of space as it pertains to music concerns “acoustic 
space.”177 This category recognizes that sound is affected by the environment in which it 
exists. Factors such as reverberation and resonance are characteristics of sound as it pertains 
to an acoustic space. The second literal meaning of space is “sound spatialisation.”178 This 
category pertains to sound’s ability to encode spatial cues. As Schütz also recognizes, we are 
able to place the direction from which a sound originated, to have a rough idea of the 
distance of the sound source and to hear whether the source of the sound is in motion. 
“Reference,” the third literal meaning of space, is the ability of sound to harbor information 
about its source, or in Macedo’s words, “space as reference, in the context of this typology, 
refers to the use of the referential properties of sound to produce or recall in the listener the 
experience of being places other than the place where the music is performed.”179 Macedo 
discusses the referential capacity of sonic space in the context of the relatively young 
tradition of electro-acoustic music, in which composers have composed soundscapes that 
evoke a particular environmental setting through the use of sounds associated with such a 
setting; for instance, using sounds recorded in nature to evoke associations of the natural 
world. The final meaning of space in music identified by Macedo is “space as location.”180 
This category recognizes that the spatial impressions listeners receive through the senses 
other than the auditory sense interact with the listener’s experience of sound. “The place 
where music is performed stimulates, and often demands, specific kinds of behavior and 
attention on the part of the listeners,” writes Macedo, “also producing different kinds of 
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meaning that can be attributed to sounds.”181 To illustrate this sense of space, Macedo cites 
works by sound artists in which a sense of dislocation is brought about by piping in sounds 
that do not typically belong in the place where they are played; for instance, in one case by 
playing ocean sounds from the coast of Normandy through forty-eight loudspeakers at the 
Arc de Triomphe. The chief characteristic of works utilizing space as location is that they 
encourage the listener to “listen to the environmental sounds as music, to bring to the 
foreground the aural perceptions that are normally in the background, and to produce a 
renewed interest in the environmental sounds.”182 Clearly, space as reference and space as 
location are closely related, but they are to be distinguished by the fact that the latter utilizes 
the experience of space granted by the listener’s other sensory modalities. 
 
3c. Skeptical Conceptions of Space in Music 
What is the relevance of these five different meanings of space as it pertains to sound and 
music for our analysis? The answer depends on the conception of music that is in play. 
According to Schütz’s phenomenological account, music can be defined as “a meaningful 
arrangement of tones in inner time.”183 Thomas Clifton also defends a phenomenological 
understanding of music’s ontological status: 
However we care to defined music, we should agree that one of its important aspects 
is its non-empirical status. It is sustained, no doubt, by a collection of empirically 
verifiable acoustical data, but music is to acoustics what a person is to his body. 
Music has empirical data, but it is not defined in terms of these data, just as we say 
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that my body has muscles and tissue, but that I can neither necessarily nor sufficiently 
be defined by them.184 
Such definitions deny the essential significance of music as an acoustic phenomenon and 
thereby do not concern themselves with the four literal meanings of space in the context of 
sound and music. Let us first be oriented by this phenomenological understanding of music 
and consider the spatiality of music vis-à-vis its putatively metaphorical character. 
We will begin with the skeptics – those thinkers who regard spatial metaphors as 
misguided and misleading in the context of music. Vladimir Jankélévitch is one such 
philosopher who takes issue with what he deems “the spatial mirage.”185 According to 
Jankélévitch, “it is vision layered upon hearing…[that] projects the diffluent, temporal order 
of music into the dimension of space, onto spatial coordinates.”186 This projection seems to 
be a consequence of using language to describe music, since Jankélévitch makes the 
questionable claim that language in toto arose “as means to translate visual experiences.”187  
Thomas Clifton offers a phenomenological justification for the use of spatial language in 
describing the musical experience. Clifton’s position is that spatially descriptive terms such 
as “rising lines” are essences that should be accorded an a priori status and that these 
synaesthetic experiences are rooted in the listener’s body. Clifton’s argument is as follows. 
Synaesthetic characterizations like “rising line” do not derive from abstracting their meaning 
as it relates to an individual phenomenon, say, in this case a drawn rising line. To the 
contrary, the meaning of “rising line” derives from the experience of a collection of objects 
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that would certainly include a line drawing but also, for instance, an ascending musical scale. 
In other words, “it is the essence which defines a collection, not a collection which defines an 
essence.”188 Clifton offers four reasons why such essences are to be considered a priori. 
First, the experience of “rising line” is not to be considered arbitrary and merely subjective, 
“since it does not depend on a mood for its existence.”189 Secondly, the experience of “rising 
line” does not presume a preexisting definition, but rather constitutes an irreducible 
experience.190 Third, the experience of a synaesthetic essence “arises spontaneously from the 
evidence of experience rather than systematically from the evidence of empirical 
observation.”191 And finally, synaesthetic essences are a priori because they are rooted in the 
body. 
Regardless of whether “essences” like “rising line” should be granted an a priori status, 
ethnomusicological research demonstrates that different cultures find such essences in 
different places in the world. Consider “going up,” a sort of variant of “rising line.” In 
Western musical traditions, this sort of language is used to describe a progression of tones 
that move towards the treble, and, in Western musical notation, do in fact go up. Conversely, 
tones “go down” when they move towards the bass, visually traveling downwards on the 
staff paper used for notating music. Self-evident as the correlation between upward motion 
and higher pitch may be (N.B. higher pitch: this sort of language thoroughly permeates 
Western musical vocabulary), other cultures spatialize music differently. In his article 
“Aspects of ’Are’are Musical Theory,” Hugo Zemp discusses the sense of melodic direction 
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that was developed by the ’Are’are people from the Solomon Islands on the basis of their 
predominant use of panpipes: 
The main direction of the melodic movement in a ro’u mani ‘au is expressed by the 
terms siho “to go down” or hi hu’a “towards the bottom,” and hane “to go up” or hi 
uuru “towards the top.” Like their English equivalents, these terms are used primarily 
to indicate movement in space: one “goes up” a coconut tree or “towards the bottom” 
of a mountain; one “goes down” a tree or “towards the bottom” of a hill towards the 
sea. But, to the great confusion of the ethnomusicologist, the ’Are’are terms are 
applied to melodic movements in the sense opposite to that in use in the West: “to go 
down” and “towards the bottom,” indicate a movement towards the treble, and “to go 
up” and “towards the top,” towards the bass. The ’Are’are provide the following 
explanation: going towards the bass of a panpipe, one “goes up” “towards the top” 
because the pipes on this side of the instrument are “long” (’ewa); conversely, one 
“goes down” “towards the bottom” because the pipes on the treble side are “short” 
(ko’osu).192 
This alternative determination of “high” and “low” based on the physicality of the 
musical instrument can also be found in ancient Greece. The lyre was tilted in such a way 
that in being played the bass note (what we would call the “lowest” note) was closest to the 
musician’s head while the treble note (what we would call the “highest” note) was closest to 
the ground. Consequently, with respect to the lyre, the Greeks used “low” and “high” in the 
opposite sense that contemporary musicians are accustomed to describing pitch.  
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Some cultures derive musical vocabulary from their system of notation. The Lau of the 
Solomon Islands make chalk marks on a plank to write out a tune. Low-pitched notes are 
called “bulu (black)” and high-pitched notes are “kwao (white)” on account of the markings 
on the planks, “heavy down-strokes being ‘black,’ and light up-strokes ‘white.’”193 
Other musical traditions do not describe pitch in terms of the spatial contrast between 
high and low. Bulgarian musicians, for instance, distinguish pitch “along a continuum 
labeled fat (debel) and thin (tûnak), where thin corresponds to a high-pitched and fat equals 
low-pitched.”194 The Kpelle tribe of Liberia hear a similar sort of correspondence, describing 
low-pitched instruments as “large-voiced,” and high-pitches as “small-voiced sound”195 A 
similar logic also seems to influence the characterization of tones among the Bashi people of 
the Eastern Congo, who refer to high-pitches as “small” or “weak” tones and low-pitched 
tones as “big” or “strong.”196 This common correlation of small/high and low/big is also 
found in the musical vocabularies of the Chopi of Mozambique197 and the Basongye of the 
Congo.198  
Just as ’Are’are musical theory derives many of its terms relating to musical intervals, 
tunings, song forms and other musical vocabulary from the material, namely bamboo, that is 
central in the construction of their panpipes, so do other musical cultures find a linguistic 
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basis for their musical theory in culturally significant natural phenomena. For instance, 
imagery relating to waterfalls pervades musical understanding for the Kaluli people of Papua 
New Guinea. In “‘Flow Like A Waterfall’: The Metaphors of Kaluli Musical Theory,” 
Steven Feld presents a comprehensive typology of melodic contours used in Kaluli music 
and, with one exception, connects these musical movements with waterfall terminology. 
With respect to melodic contours: 
…the most important features are descent and terracing shapes. In the names for 
waterfall parts the common term for the ledge or upper place from which the water 
drops, is sa-we:l. In melodic terminology sa-we:l refers to the leading pitch in a line 
or phrase from which the melody descends. Descent to level melodic shape is also 
found; the Kaluli name it sa-mogan. A mogan is a still or lightly swirling water pool; 
sa-mogan is the flow of a waterfall into a level waterpool beneath it. The descent to 
level contour is precisely what is melodically marked by sa-mogan.199  
The use of visual imagery is not always applied after the fact to explain music that had 
been created through a purely auditory process. Instead, spatial imagery imported from the 
material world also serves creative, compositional ends. Zemp cites three ’Are’are 
compositions that were inspired by the observation of events that occur in the material world: 
the piece entitled Rawauuruuru ‘Spider’ is composed to follow the swaying 
movement of a species of spider, which, settled in the middle of its web, sets it to 
swinging regularly; the piece ’Ereroaa’i ‘Suspended’ reproduces the pendular motion 
of a necklace of shell beads stirred by the wind; the piece entitled Huu ‘[Fruit of the 
                                                        
199 Steven Feld, “‘Flow Like A Waterfall’: The Metaphors of Kaluli Musical Theory,” 
Yearbook for Traditional Music 13 (1981): 31. 
  
62 
tree] Barringtonia asiatica’ imitates the movements of a piece of fruit that has fallen 
into the sea and alternately sinks and is tossed by the waves.200 
 
3d. Critique of Skeptical Conception of Space In Music 
Despite Schütz’s skepticism regarding the spatial dimension of the musical experience, 
other phenomenologists have defended a meaningful concept of spatiality in music. In this 
section we will consider two such accounts, that of Don Ihde and Victor Zuckerkandl. 
At no point in his landmark Listening and Voice does Don Ihde mention Schütz. Yet his 
account of spatiality in audition involves a critique that might well have been directed 
precisely at Schütz’s concerns about the notion. Ihde sums up traditional positions regarding 
the spatiality of music as follows: “There is often either implicitly or explicitly a negative 
claim that listening is either therefore ‘weak’ spatially or, most extremely, that sounds lacks 
spatiality entirely.”201 Ihde’s unwillingness to subscribe to these positions is a 
phenomenologically motivated desire, to adapt Husserl’s famous phrase, to go back to the 
sounds themselves. In Ihde’s formulation, “auditory spatiality must be allowed to ‘present 
itself’ as it ‘appears’ within this level of experience. Negatively, a predefinition of spatiality 
such that it is prejudged ‘visualistically’ must be suspended.”202 
This visualistic prejudice is a function of what Ihde calls “sensory atomism;”203 that is, 
the theoretical tendency to regard the senses as entirely divorced from one another. However, 
attending to experience itself militates against the fragmentation of the sensorium. In place of 
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sensory atomism, experience reveals “the notion of a relative focus on a dimension of global 
experience such that it is noted only against the omnipresence of the globality.”204 
According to Ihde, in “the first naïve existential level of experience…sounds are the 
sounds of things.”205 This is a well-known phenomenological claim that recognizes that 
regarding sounds abstractly involves a theoretical stance that is derivative of our more naïve 
experience of the world in which sounds are always already heard as something, be it a 
knock at the door, a motorcycle revving its engine or thunder in the distance. 
Where we hear sounds as the sounds of things, in Ihde’s formulation, it is ordinarily 
possible to distinguish certain “shape-aspects of those things.”206 Insofar as shape implicates 
space, the spatiality of audition thus first appears at this naïve experiential level. The auditory 
experience of shape may be weaker than the visual experience of shape, but its actuality can 
be easily established by an auditory game: “Someone puts an object in a box and then shakes 
and rolls the box, asking the child what is inside. […] more specifically, the question is 
directed toward shapes, the observer soon finds that it takes little time to identify simple 
shapes and often the object by its sound [e.g. a marble or a die].”207 Such practices even 
quickly give way to a heightened sophistication of one’s ability to determine the qualities of 
an object through audition. “A rubber ball is as auditorily distinct from a billiard ball as it is 
visually distinct,” writes Ihde, “The very texture and composition as well as the shape-aspect 
is presented in the complex richness of the event.”208 
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Zuckerkandl is familiar with the traditional line taken regarding the relationship between 
music and space: “Music seems to have shaken the last grain of dust of spatiality from its 
shoes.”209 Nevertheless, a comparison with different arts leads him to raise the question anew. 
Zuckerkandl considers the similarity between mixing colors and mixing tones: “If 
simultaneously sounding tones coalesced into a mixed tone as colors simultaneously projected 
upon a surface coalesce into a mixed color, then the chord would simply be another tone, as 
blue-green is another color...”210 But this is not the case, since the ear is able to distinguish the 
tones comprising a chord. Just as space keeps colors separate and distinguishable, so it seems 
that “the fact of the simultaneity of different tones would in some way bring space, as its 
indispensable prerequisite, into music.”211 Zuckerkandl’s admission of space into the realm of 
music is not some naïve equation of the space of the eye and the hand with the space of the ear. 
Rather, in a statement that sounds remarkably consistent with Cassirer’s position regarding time 
and space in different symbolic forms, Zuckerkandl asserts “the experience of music is also an 
experience of space, and indeed a particular experience of space.”212  
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Music and the External World, 337). Indeed, auditory and musical space will themselves 
be distinguished, but understanding why this is the case requires a familiarity with 
Zuckerkandl’s views on hearing noise as opposed to hearing tones. We will address this 
theme below. 
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The difference between the space of the eye and the hand and the space of ear can be 
approached from the concept of place. While the space of the eye and hand is “the aggregate of 
all places,” the space of ear is “a space without places.”213 What, then, is place? 
Phenomenologist Edward S. Casey addresses this question in an essay belonging to an 
interdisciplinary volume of essays on Sense of Place. The common conception of place is a 
bequest of modern thought. Newton and Kant has left us with the assumption that “space is 
absolute and infinite as well as empty and a priori in status,”214 with the consequence that places 
then become “the mere apportionings of space, its compartmentalization.”215 In contradistinction 
to this hierarchy, Casey argues rather that place is in fact general while space is particular; or, in 
other words, that the Newtonian theoretical standpoint that identifies space as empty is derivative 
of the existential standpoint in which we are always already emplaced.216 Place, to condense 
Casey’s insightful and complicated view, is a consequence of the surplus that stems from the 
horizons of experience. At every instant, we are surrounded by things, which possess internal 
horizons of unseen aspects, and the situation as a whole opens on to external horizons of other 
places. On a very basic level, “place” names the particularity of embodied situation. Only from 
this particularity can the theoretician abstract to achieve the placeless standpoint of empty space. 
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Zuckerkandl has claimed that the space of the eye and hand is “the aggregate of all places,” 
while the space of ear is a “a space without places.”217 The eye and the hand are subject to 
perspective in a different manner than the ear. What one sees and is capable of grasping is 
determined by one’s position, while the ear, to some extent, can hear around corners and through 
walls. Zuckerkandl, following William James, likens the situation to laying on one’s back and 
staring into a clear, cloudless sky. This vast vista has no parts. This visual experience is 
analogous to the spatial experience of the ear. Instead of encountering things in places, we 
experience space.  
Zuckerkandl addresses the ear’s ability to localize sound, which, as we have seen, comprises 
a central aspect of Schütz’s dismissal of the spatiality of music. To Zuckerkandl’s way of 
thinking, it is more accurate to speak of the ear’s ability to localize the source of a sound: “The 
ability concerns, not the ‘where’ of the sound, but the ‘where’ of the thing in space that causes 
the sound.”218 This distinction is also essential in the differentiation of noise and tone. Noise, 
believes Zuckerkandl, draws our attention to the thing causing the noise – presumably so that in 
addressing the source, we can halt the noise. Tones, on the other hand, do not direct us to any 
locality in space. “We see blue flower; we touch smooth wall,” writes Zuckerkandl, “but we hear 
tone – not sounding string.”219 Noise belongs to the same category as the blue of the flower or 
the smoothness of the wall. Tone, on the other hand, is not a property of things. Zuckerkandl 
deems the localization of sound sources as “the faculty of the ear in which it comes closest to the 
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other senses, especially the eye,” but “it is tones in which…hearing comes to itself; and what 
hearing come to itself creates is music.”220 
Zuckerkandl’s treatment of the problem of audible spatiality allows us to critique Schütz’s 
approach. Schütz addresses the problem in terms of visual space. He therefore concludes that 
while the ear is able to provide some orientation in space, however impoverished, this ability is 
ultimately derivative of our various kinaesthetic capacities. Schütz does not consider whether 
there may be a sense of space that is unique to the ear. 
This does not mean, however, that there are no similarities between visual and auditory 
space. The visual spatial experience of looking at the cloudless sky “shares an essential 
characteristic with the space experience of the ear – undivided totality.”221 More generally, visual 
and auditory space are both experienced as “the ‘whence of encounter.’”222 Things in the 
external world encounter me in space, as do the tones that present themselves to my ear. 
However, in keeping with Zuckerkandl’s presentation of auditory space as placeless, visual and 
auditory space present different degrees of specificity. The experience of visual space involves 
three dimensions – height, width and depth. Auditory space, on the other hand, involves a single 
dimension: “‘from…’.”223 Furthermore, this ‘from…’ “does not mean ‘from there or from 
elsewhere’ but ‘out of depth from all sides’; and ‘out of depth’ is not a direction in space but a 
(nay, the) direction of space.”224 
Understanding the unique nature of auditory space entails that space be conceived in terms 
other than place. For Zuckerkandl, the relevant concept for auditory space is force. The nature of 
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this force can be approached through a consideration of tone as an acoustical and a musical 
phenomenon. As an acoustical phenomenon, tone is “a specific aural sensation characterized by 
pitch, timbre, loudness, and duration, produced by vibrations in a physical medium…”225 But as 
any phenomenologist knows,226 these characteristics belong to a theoretical type of tonal 
experience as opposed to the specifically musical experience, in which the salient characteristic 
of tones is their “dynamic quality.”227 The dynamic quality of a tone is its character of striving or 
stability that results from its position within a musical context. In short, functional harmony 
yields a tonal field in which the different members of the scale are experienced as possessing 
different degrees of tension. It is a simplification, albeit not inaccurate, to say that the tones 
comprising the triad of the predominant tonality (i.e. the first or root, third and fifth notes of the 
scale) are stable, while the other members of the scale – especially the major seventh, which is 
just a half step away from the root – seem to strive to resolve to one of the stable tones. The 
dynamic quality of a tone is not of the same order as its pitch, timbre, loudness, and duration, 
although, claims Zuckerkandl, “We hear it just as we hear pitch or tone color…”228 Dynamic 
quality is not a property of the tone itself: 
A tone must belong to a musical context in order to have dynamic quality. Within a 
musical context no tone will be without its proper dynamic quality. Outside the musical 
context, however – for instance, in the laboratory – tones have no dynamic qualities. 
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Thus, the dynamic quality of a tone is its musical quality proper. It distinguishes the 
musical from the physical phenomenon.229 
 Auditory space as a placeless space of force cannot be understood in terms of the spatial 
experience of the eye or the hand or in terms of the spatial concept of geometry. Conflating 
different spatial experiences is what has traditionally led thinkers to interpret the spatial 
experience of music in terms of the spatial experience of the ear, which in turn was viewed as 
impoverished and derivative vis-à-vis the spatial experience of the eye and hand.   
 
4. Time in Art 
  As was the case with space, a consideration of time in art leads to a distinction between 
the arts of time and the arts of space. Self-evident as this distinction may seem, its 
pervasiveness in thinking about the arts comes on the heels of Lessing’s Laocoön. Among 
Italian humanist thinkers “the assumption that a basic parallelism prevailed between painting 
and poetry, between the literary and the visual arts, was almost an article of faith.”230 
Whereas the ancients and Italian humanist thinkers emphasized the unity of the arts,231 
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Lessing was the first to influentially argue for their diversity. Art historian Moshe Barasch 
presents the distinction in temporal terms: 
The arts of space, as common wisdom had it, represent only what can be seen at a 
given moment, that is, a slice of time so tiny that, in human perception, it has neither 
past nor future. The arts of space, then, are arts of the ‘present’ only, whenever the 
particular present represented in the picture may have occurred. The arts of time, on 
the other hand, represent the entire gamut of time; that is, the continuity of past, 
present, and future is essential to them.232 
Although music and poetry, along with the other literary arts, are similar by virtue of 
being arts of time, it can be argued that music is the temporal art par excellence. This is due 
to the absence of conceptual or representational content from a musical work. Although both 
a poem and a musical work unfold in time and cannot be perceived, so to speak, in a single 
glance, like a painting, once a poem has been heard it can be summarized according to what 
it is about. A musical work, on the other hand, is essentially unable to be summarized, 
distilled or translated.233 This state of affairs has led those who understand music’s essential 
temporal, a-conceptual nature to perform acts befitting a Zen master: “Once, somebody asked 
Robert Schumann to explain the meaning of a certain piece of music he had just played on 
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the piano,” recounts David Markson in Wittgenstein’s Mistress, “What Robert Schumann did 
was sit back down at the piano and play the piece of music again.”234  
 
4a. Time in Visual Art 
 A few words on time in the visual arts are in order. We have already seen that the visual 
arts are so-called ‘arts of space’ and, given this spatial mode of being, are also ‘arts of the 
present.’ However, this status has not prevented artists from striving to reconcile the non-
temporal status of the visual arts with the temporal nature of events, which the visual arts 
frequently take as their subject matter. In his monograph The Language of Art: Studies in 
Interpretation, Barasch dedicates a chapter to a discussion of the chief ways that visual artists 
have historically negotiated a temporal dimension into their work. Let us briefly consider the 
three methods discussed by Barasch. 
 The most modern manner of temporalizing the static art of painting is Cubism’s use of 
multiple perspectives. This method involves depicting an object as an assemblage of the way 
that it appears from different viewpoints. In doing so, the use of multiple perspectives 
suggests the time-dependent acts of the viewer moving around the object or the object itself 
moving. Barasch quotes Cubist painter Jean Metzinger who characterized the advancement 
of Cubism in temporal terms: “[Cubist painters have] allowed themselves to move round the 
object, in order to give…a concrete representation of it, made up of several successive 
aspects. Formerly a picture took possession of space, now it reigns also in time.”235 It should 
be noted that the introduction of multiple perspectives does not, strictly speaking, give 
painting the possession of time. Rather, the simultaneous presentation of multiple 
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perspectives collapses the fruits of a spatial process, which unfolds over time, into an instant. 
Additionally, Cubism’s breakthrough also involves a drawback; namely, the use of multiple 
perspectives oftentimes battens on the identity of the depicted object. That is to say, in 
offering a more panoptic visual grasp of the object, Cubism paradoxically leads the viewer to 
lose sight of what the object itself is. 
 The “narrative cycle” or “narrative strip” is of a more ancient provenance than Cubism’s 
use of multiple perspectives, but it similarly strives to represent temporal unfolding.  As their 
name suggests, narrative cycles are depictions of narratives, i.e. events, which by their nature 
unfold over time. In order to represent a sequence of time, narrative cycles demand the 
performance of what we have been calling kinaesthesias on the viewer’s part. These 
kinaesthesias may be as minor as merely moving one’s eyes from panel to panel of a comic 
strip, or they may involve movements of the viewer’s whole body. The latter is the case with 
one of Barasch’s examples, the Column of Trajan. The enormous column is nearly one 
hundred feet tall and, using more than 2,500 carved figures spread out over 155 episodes,236 
tells the story of Trajan’s victorious participation in the Dacian Wars. Since the relief winds 
around the column twenty-three times,237 experiencing the narrative requires the viewer to 
physically move around the column, which insures that the experience of the work will be an 
event in time. The relief itself temporally distinguishes between events by various means, for 
instance “the insertion of natural elements (trees, rocks) or the reversal of the direction of the 
figures.”238 
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 The third method for temporalizing the visual arts is, in Lessing’s famous formulation, 
“the pregnant moment.”239 This device consists in the artist’s depiction of a moment, so well-
chosen and containing such appropriate details that they “provide the spectator’s imagination 
with sufficient clues to make it possible for him or her to complete in his or her mind what 
happened before that instant, and what is going to take place afterwards.”240 Paintings of 
pregnant moments do not depict entire events, as do narrative cycles, nor do they represent 
the Cubist’s quasi-God’s eye view of objects that can only be achieved through movement 
and thus time; rather, paintings of pregnant moments interact with the viewer in such a way 
as to either remind a viewer, who already knows the narrative, of what has already occurred 
and what is in the offing or to suggest possibilities of what has and will happen to the viewer 
unacquainted with the narrative. The viewer’s contribution, however, is in fact common 
across the different manners of representing time in the visual arts: “In all pictorial traditions 
of rendering the Nacheinander [one after another] in the medium of Nebeneinander [one next 
to each other], it is always the basic assumption that the spectator looking at the picture or 
relief will complete in his mind what the artist could suggest but was unable to actually and 
fully embody in the tangible matter of his medium.”241 
 
4b. Time in Music 
 Although Barasch also recognizes a category of composite ways of representing time in 
the visual arts, our account of the pregnant moment is a helpful transition to a discussion of 
time in music, since here the tripartite character of temporal consciousness that became clear 
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in the pregnant moment come clearly to the fore. The unique character of musical time can 
be best represented in comparison with the scientific and mythical conceptions of time. 
 The mythical experience of time is characterized by Cassirer, in comparison with 
objective time, as “timeless.”242 By positing an “absolute past, which neither requires nor is 
susceptible of any further explanation,”243 mythical consciousness demonstrates a willingness 
to institute barriers between the trichotomy of past, present and future; barriers that are 
absent from scientific as well as musical time, in which the three dimensions of time cannot 
be strictly separated but instead always already bleed into one another. 
 Similar to its intuition of space, mythical consciousness’ intuition of time is “qualitative 
and concrete”244 in comparison with theoretical consciousness’ quantitative and abstract 
intuition of time. The qualitative aspect of time for mythical consciousness is well illustrated 
by the determination that only specific times were appropriate for certain activities.245 The 
concreteness of the mythical intuition of time is founded upon a biological basis in phases of 
life such as birth, death, puberty and pregnancy. According to Cassirer, mythical 
consciousness first apprehends “the periodicity of the planets…the change of day into night, 
the flowering and fading of plants, and the cyclical order of the seasons only by projecting 
these phenomena into human existence, where it perceives them as in a mirror.”246 
 The theoretical intuition of time, on the other hand, has been thoroughly liberated from 
any connection with biological instantiations and has become quantitative and abstract. 
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Cassirer, PSF II, 108. 
246 Cassirer, PSF II, 109. 
  
75 
Theoretical time marches on at a uniform pace quite separate from lived experience. Like 
theoretical space, theoretical time is characterized by continuity, infinity and uniformity.247 
Time, from a theoretical standpoint, is an unceasing onrush. While people speak with poetic 
liberty of ‘time standing still’ during unusually intense experiences, theoretical time 
recognizes only a continuous, even-handed, mono-directional flow of time. Whereas 
mythical thinking institutes absolute boundaries into the totality of time, the theoretical 
perspective understands time as having no absolute beginning or ending, instead being 
infinite.  
 Especially with respect to its uniformity, theoretical time differs from the intuition of 
musical time, which is essentially bound up with lived experience. Schütz describes this 
difference well in FPM:  
I have here a box of different kinds of 78 rpm records. If you look at your watch, you 
will find that it takes about three minutes to play one side of a twelve-inch record. 
This is an important fact for the person in charge of making up a radio program. It is 
entirely immaterial to the listener. To the listener, it is not true that the time he lived 
through while listening to the slow movement of a symphony was of equal length to 
the time he lived through while listening to its finale, although each movements 
needed the playing of two sides of a twelve-inch record.248 
It is the qualitative character of the intuition of musical time that accounts for the difference 
between the objective length of a musical work and its felt length. This same 
incommensurability of lived time and objective time is evident in non-aesthetic experiences; 
for instance, in the felt difference between an hour spent in agreeable conversation with an 
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old friend versus an hour spent leafing through magazines while awaiting the results of a 
consequential biopsy. The qualitative character of the intuition of musical time can be 
understood analogously with the relationship between the qualitative character of mythical 
space and aesthetic space. The latter, we saw above, is rich in expressive values – the 
expanses of indeterminate, placeless landscapes favored by Salvador Dali may strike the 
viewer as melancholy or mysterious or discomfiting, but they will not leave the viewer 
affectively indifferent. The difference with mythical space seems to be qualitative. The 
feeling values of mythical space are described by Cassirer as far more intense and violent 
than their aesthetic counterparts, which have been mellowed by the contemplative distance 
that separates the subject and the world in the aesthetic experience.  
  The intuition of musical time also differs essentially from the fragmentation of mythical 
time. We have seen that mythical time posits absolute divisions between past, present and 
future. This division is entirely foreign to the experience of musical time. The acts of 
consciousness that are conditions of the possibility of the musical experience – retention and 
protention – in fact demonstrate the indivisibility of musical time (at least in lived 
experience, reflection is a different matter).  
Schütz’s analysis of an unfolding sequence of six tones (c-d-e-c-d-d) illustrates this 
indivisibility of musical time. The first tone perceived is c. This single tone is experienced as 
continuous, its initial phase and enduring phase are contained in its final phase through the 
functioning of retention, which furnishes the listener with the experience of having heard a single 
tone extended over time. The first tone, c, is followed by the sounding of the second tone, d. This 
tone is given in the vivid present, and, although the first tone (c) has ceased to sound, the listener 
experiences the interval c-d. Given that the perception of the second tone (d) contains the 
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perception of the interval between the first tone (c) and the second, the first tone is itself retained, 
albeit “indirectly.”249 The perception of the second tone (d) mirrors that of the perception of the 
first tone, save that the perception of the second tone is augmented with the perception of the 
relationship between the first and the second tone. The retention of elements that are no longer 
experienced in vivid presence explains why the musical theme is apperceived as a unit. Just like 
a three-dimensional spatial object, a musical object is by its very nature unable to be experienced 
in a single ray. 
With the perception of the third tone (e), the contents of consciousness have rapidly 
accumulated and include: “(1) the third tone (e) in actual experience; (2) the second one (d) 
retained; (3) the interval (d-e) between the second and the third; (4) the first one (c) as a 
retentional element of (2) (d); the interval (c-e) between the actually experienced third (e) and 
the first one (c).”250 The fourth and fifth tones (c and d, respectively) are isomorphic with the 
first and second tones, giving rise to a protention of the subsequent tone as e.  
This protention suggests to Schütz that the sequence of the first three tones has been 
constituted as a theme. However, the fulfillment of this protention is dashed when the sixth tone 
emerges in vivid presence as d instead of e. This frustrated protention gives the listener to 
understand that what we had expected to be the musical theme (c-d-e) is in fact only a part or 
“moment”251 of the actual theme, which is now understood to be the entire six note sequence c-d-
e-c-d-d. 
Retention and protention demonstrate that the musical ‘present’ is shot through with the 
context of tones that have ceased to sound and colored by the expectation of the tones that are 
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likely to follow. In other words, there are no strict dividing walls between the past, present and 
future in the experience of musical time, the experience of which is qualitative, concrete and 
continuous. 
 
5. Symbolic Forms and the Experience of Subjectivity 
 To each symbolic form is correlated a specific experience of the self. In PSF II Cassirer 
refers to this dimension as constituting a “life form.”252 In addition to giving shape to the 
external world through particular styles of intuition (i.e. particular experiences of space and 
time), as a life form, a symbolic form gives shape to the experience of the self. For instance, in 
the context of the symbolic form of language, Cassirer emphasizes how a study of a diversity of 
languages demonstrates that “at first the concrete feeling of self is entirely bound up with the 
concrete intuition of one’s own body and limbs.”253 
 The discovery of subjectivity for mythical consciousness is a useful point of departure for a 
consideration of the experience of subjectivity for artistic consciousness, since, as we have seen, 
myth functions as the fount for the other symbolic forms. According to Cassirer, it is action that 
“constitutes the center from which man undertakes the spiritual organization of reality. It is here 
that a separation begins to take place between the spheres of the objective and subjective, 
between the world of I and the world of things.”254 In the course of activity, as the external world 
pushes back against our efforts, there is a progressive determination of the boundaries between 
the I and the not-I. Cassirer claims that this emphasis on action accounts for salient 
characteristics of mythical intuition: “Here lies the core of the magical world view, which is 
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saturated with this atmosphere of efficacy, which is indeed nothing more than a translation and 
transposition of the world of subjective emotions and drives into a sensuous, objective 
existence.”255 As this quote makes clear, for mythical consciousness, despite its origin in the 
subject’s consciousness, the efficacy of reality is not attributed to the self, but is rather 
understood to exist in the external world. It is this dialectical reversal that explains the supposed 
potency of names and images over the objects to which they refer.  
 Mythical consciousness thus involves a more fluid relationship between the self and the 
world. While this fluidity certainly does not mean that the self and the world are not 
distinguished, certain boundaries taken for granted by the theoretical stage of consciousness have 
not been instituted: “Above all, [mythical consciousness] lacks any fixed dividing line between 
mere ‘representation’ and ‘real’ perception, between wish and fulfillment, between image and 
thing.”256 The musical experience, we shall see, also involves a relationship between inner and 
outer that is foreign to theoretical consciousness. 
 
5a. Music as a Life Form 
 As a form of intuition, a symbolic form gives shape, so to speak, to the external world. As a 
life form, a symbolic form involves the “discovery and determination” of subjectivity, of the “I.” 
Thus, as a symbolic form, art will demonstrate a particular experience of the self and music, as a 
form of art, will also involve an experience of the “I.”  
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 Independently of Cassirer’s framework, Zuckerkandl speaks to the particular self-experience 
involved in listening to music.257 He describes this life form by distinguishing “the ‘I’ of 
objective hearing” from “the ‘I’ of musical hearing,”258 a distinction that hinges on different 
varieties of auditory experience: 
‘To hear’ does not always denote the same act. I hear the marching of troops, and I hear 
the march they are playing: here language obscures the true state of affairs, for it has only 
one word to signify two very different functions. In the first case, to hear is to perceive a 
physical event; the function involved is essentially comparable to the functions of other 
senses. In the second case, hearing is something entirely different, completely sui generis. 
If one tries to understand hearing on the basis of any sound sensations, as most 
psychologists do, one can never get beyond what hearing has in common with seeing and 
touching. What hearing really is, what we really are as listeners, can be understood only 
on the basis of hearing music.259 
 Understanding specifically musical hearing, and thereby the life form correlated with music, 
demands achieving an understanding of hearing that goes beyond the merely physiological 
explanations that have monopolized discussions of the sense modality. 
 Hearing as such reaches out beyond the given sense datum. In workaday life, hearing reaches 
out to grasp the origin of the sensation. Thus, as phenomenologists have noted, we never hear 
abstract sensations; rather, we hear a knock at the door, or a car driving by, or a shout in the 
                                                        
257 Zuckerkandl does cite Cassirer at one point in Man the Musician, the text in which he 
discusses the “I” of musical hearing. However, the reference is unrelated to systematic 
matters, referring instead to remarks that Cassirer makes in Essay on Man on how the 
question of whether animals possess language centers on the way that “language” is 
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distance. Musical hearing differs from this objective hearing in that “what is heard here is self-
contained,” while objective hearing hears the source of sound. Self-contained though it is, 
musical hearing does reach out beyond the sense datum. But instead of hearing the source of the 
sensation, musical hearing grasps the relationship between the given tone and those which have 
ceased to sound or have not yet sounded, which Schütz refers to as the processes of retention and 
protention.  
 The hearing that characterizes the I of musical experience reveals a different subject-object 
relationship than its objective, everyday counterpart. The traditional position has long been that 
since tones do not refer to objects in the external world, they are in one way or another revelatory 
of or connected with the inner life of human beings. This conclusion is born of the perplexing 
meaningfulness of musical tones: “Such a musician [as Beethoven] stirs us deeply, but what is he 
saying, what is he talking about? Not about this, not about that, not about anything that can be 
named, not about any object – he is speaking about nothing; yet this ‘nothing’ is an ‘all.’”260 This 
perplexing all-containing nothing finds an analogue in pure subjectivity, which is similarly 
“‘nothing’ so far as things, objects, are concerned, nothing that can be pointed to, called by 
name…And yet it is ‘all’ at the same time, because the objective existence of all objects 
presupposes it.”261 
 Such considerations, however, tacitly rely on a conception of music as absolute – i.e. without 
the participation of words or a preexisting narrative that the music represents. Thus, theories that 
reach the aforementioned conclusion on such grounds have done so with an impoverished, 
historically contingent conception of music. When tones are considered in their relationship to 
words, different conclusions present themselves. 
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 Zuckerkandl argues that if words pointed to things in the world, while tones pointed inward 
to states of the soul, then the conjunction of the two would conflict. This is disproven by actual 
singing, which demonstrates that words and tones are mutually enhancing. The tone 
“accompanies the word on its way to the thing, to the object. Only, unlike the mere word, it does 
not stop at the object: it breaks through the dimension of objective existence, thus making it 
impossible for what the word denotes to be nothing but object... The tone does not blur the 
word’s meaning but rather deepens it.”262 The singing of celebratory words, for example, adds 
more celebration to the mere denotation of the words. The ability of tones to deepen the meaning 
of words, to add contour to the meaning presented, suggests that the non-objectivity of tones “is 
not that of the ‘other side,’ of inwardness devoid of an object, or pure subjectivity; it is a non-
objectivity behind the objects.”263 While there does appear to be a meaningful connection 
between tones and inner life, this connection does not exclusively point to the inner life of the 
self. “This is precisely why the singer experiences inner life as something he shares with the 
world, not as something that sets him apart from it,” writes Zuckerkandl, “As he sings (and hears 
himself sing) he discovers that the things of the world speak the language of his own inwardness 
and that he himself speaks the inner language of things.”264 Thus, concludes Zuckerkandl, the 
musical experience of the self problematizes the subject-object distinction that is frequently 
taken as common sense.  
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6. Thinking in Music 
 In addition to an experience of the self and a form of intuition, a symbolic form entails a 
specific form of thought. The following presentation of music as a form of thought will follow 
the model of PSF I, in which Cassirer considers “Language as [an] Expression of Conceptual 
Thought.”265 With assistance once again from Zuckerkandl, we shall consider in this section 
whether, and in what respect, music is an expression of thinking. In contradistinction to 
Cassirer’s account of language and thought, we shall omit the qualification “conceptual” from 
our discussion. It is generally accepted that one of the chief characteristics of absolute music is 
its non-conceptual character. In fact, this is the first claim made by Schütz in FPM: “Music is an 
instance of a meaningful context without reference to a conceptual scheme and, strictly speaking, 
without immediate reference to objects of the world in which we live, without reference to the 
properties and functions of those objects.”266 Zuckerkandl – in what amounts to a very 
‘Cassirerean’ and phenomenological move – argues that this lack of conceptuality does not entail 
that music and thinking are mutually exclusive, but rather that an unbiased study of certain 
musical processes sheds light on an expanded understanding of thinking that is truer to the 
evidence of experience. Let us consider in more detail Zuckerkandl’s account of thinking in 
music. 
 In his views on both space and thinking in music, Zuckerkandl echoes Cassirer’s claims 
about the tendency of symbolic forms to claim exclusive rights over certain concepts. The denial 
of spatiality in music “was based on the assumption that what is currently known of space is all 
that there is to space. So far as geometric space is concerned, the assumption works well enough, 
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and music has indeed very little to do with it.”267 The claim that music is of a non-intellectual 
character derives from a similar argument: “It would appear that skepticism concerning the role 
of thinking in music springs from a similar prejudice, namely, that the nature of thought has been 
defined once and for all by logicians.”268 In other words, geometric space and logic – or, in 
Cassirer’s parlance, the symbolic form of science – have arrogated to themselves the ‘true’ 
senses of space and thought, rendering other applications of these concepts to an, at best, 
metaphorical status.269 
 Nevertheless, just as he did with spatiality, Zuckerkandl argues that there is indeed a 
meaningful intellectual character to music, which, when properly understood, leads us to expand 
our understanding of thinking as such. Zuckerkandl’s reflections on the intellectual character of 
music also provide an entrance into a consideration of how music manifests a unique form of 
thought, which Cassirer argues belongs to all symbolic forms. Zuckerkandl characterizes his 
approach in a manner that sounds akin to both phenomenology and Cassirer’s philosophy of 
symbolic forms: 
We should stop forcing the facts to fit the concept, so that essential features of music are 
relegated to the domain of the irrational: that is, rendered unintelligible by definition. 
Rather, we should let the facts guide us toward a broader concept of the rational – a 
concept that more truthfully reflects the real power of thought, the true scope of the 
intelligible.270 
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 The view that denies an intellectual character to music is based on a dichotomy between 
thinking and inspiration. Music, in the ‘traditional’ account that Zuckerandl sets up to knock 
down, may derive from two creative sources – intellect and inspiration. The application of the 
rules of music theory, which can be taught and even codified in such a way as to be programmed 
into computers271, are viewed as “knowledge and skill.”272 But the material to which the rules of 
music theory is applied – a musical theme – is not constructed by means of music theory. “How 
to treat a theme, what can be done with it, is learnable, teachable,” writes Zuckerkandl of this 
prevalent view, “but not how to compose a theme; the explanation for this is that a theme is not 
made, but simply found – it ‘occurs to one,’ all at once.”273 While the composition of music is 
traditionally held to involve the intellect in the application of the rules of music theory in 
devising variations on the theme, there is an implicit value judgment that the composition’s true 
aesthetic value lies not in the workmanlike application of rules but in the inspired creation of a 
theme. 
 Zuckerkandl refutes the two-creative-sources view by identifying compositions that flout the 
involvement of either intellect or inspiration. The Andante of Bach’s A-minor Sonata for 
Unaccompanied Violin, for instance, unfolds like a work of unadulterated inspiration, in which 
the rote rules of music theory would not allow the beholder to anticipate what comes next should 
the progress of the piece be arrested at any point. Thus, concludes Zuckerkandl, there seem to be 
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musical works that are ‘pure theme,’ deriving wholly from inspiration and betokening mastery so 
profound that technical know-how gives way to the other creative source. 
 Similarly, there are compositions that are theme-less. Polyphonic music from the fourteenth 
to the seventeenth century, for instance, confounds modern views about the construction of a 
composition in terms of theme and variations. Zuckerkandl cites Palestrina’s four-part motet 
Super flumina Babilonis as an example in which speaking of themes is misleading. “Palestrina’s 
melody,” he writes, “seems to be little more than a saying of the words in tones.”274 No theme 
emerges that orients the construction of the composition, which, therefore according to the two-
source view would be bereft of inspiration; if, that is, inspiration is characterized strictly in 
thematic terms. 
 Zuckerkandl concludes through such examples and detailed analyses of compositions275 that 
the view that music derives from two creative sources is, in many cases, misleading and, in other 
cases, adds nothing to our understanding of music and the creative process of composition. 
Consequently, he posits a single creative source, which better accounts for the musical facts 
under consideration. Zuckerkandl’s argument for a single creative source takes the form of a 
defense of an expanded concept of “thinking,” which is able to incorporate the putatively 
paradoxical notion of “nonlogical thinking.”276 
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 What then is nonlogical thinking and what is its relationship to the more familiar notion of 
logical thinking? Logical thinking is the manner of regarding the world in terms of “concepts and 
propositions, the latter defining concepts and linking them according to rigorous rules.”277 The 
construction of logical knowledge proceeds by way of its “supreme law” of “implication,”278 that 
is, ensuring the validity of further concepts and propositions by deriving them as necessary from 
one’s initial concepts and propositions. Logical thinking is also analytic, meaning that it adds to 
our store of knowledge by teasing out what is already contained in the axioms and definitions 
that begin one’s investigation. Thus, for instance, mathematical theorems are implicit in the 
fundamental concepts of mathematics such as point, line, right triangle, etc. “The whole force of 
a logical argument consists precisely in this,” writes Zuckerkandl, “that it never says anything 
really new, that it only makes us see what we have not seen before.”279  
 Musical thinking differs from logical thinking in all of these respects. As opposed to 
concepts and propositions, the grist of musical thinking is patterns, which it links into patterns. 
And whereas logical thinking is analytic, musical thinking is synthetic, a form of invention. 
Musical thinking brings something new into existence, which was “not implicit in the given, but 
demanded by it.”280 Zuckerkandl’s demonstrates the existence of nonlogical thinking through 
observation rather than argumentation, finding it to be writ large in Beethoven’s Sketchbooks. 
 Beethoven’s Sketchbooks allow Zuckerkandl to establish several points, which show musical 
thinking to be different than the common conception of inspiration (in which a complete work is 
revealed to the creator in a flash) and different from the logical process of uncovering a single 
“right” answer contained in the material with which the composer is working. The Sketchbooks 
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militate against the everyday notion of inspiration insofar as they show a laborious process rife 
with false starts and missteps. Time and time again, when confronted with an incomplete phrase, 
Beethoven will write the phrase anew, putting down on paper measures that he has already 
solidified as if it were necessary to be carried along by the momentum of the phrase itself, like 
repeating a sentence over and over in search of an elusive final word. For Zuckerkandl, this 
repetitious activity serves to show that “inspiration,” if one can speak of such a thing, comes not 
from on high but from the tones themselves, which over time suggest possibilities for furtherance 
that could not be computed a priori. This notion that “inspiration” comes from the tones 
themselves is in keeping with Zuckerkandl’s unwillingness to formulate the philosophical 
problems of music as subjective (in which case, psychology would be the proper field to 
investigate the problems) or objective (in which case, physics would be the proper field). By 
classifying its dynamic quality as a tone’s uniquely musical characteristic, and by claiming that 
this dynamic quality is neither an acoustical property of a tone (and hence inaccessible to the 
physicist) nor imputed to the tone by the listener’s mind (and hence inaccessible to the 
psychologist), Zuckerkandl delimits music as a sui generis field, existing outside of human 
beings and thus furnishing resistance that necessitates thought.  
Moreover, this process of invention does not uncover the single, inevitable solution to a 
compositional conundrum. Whereas logical thinking operates with hard and fast notions of right 
and wrong, in musical thinking, the “difference between right and wrong remains, but admits of 
degrees.”281 It is the composer’s perennial struggle to establish a coherent work that nevertheless 
confounds expectations with a satisfying lack of predictability. Although possibilities for 
continuation are suggested by the tones themselves, the ‘right’ answer is not contained in the 
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tones. The composer “starts from the given, but is directed toward something beyond the given, 
toward a void. The given is behind rather than before him; he seeks not within it but together 
with it – together with the given he seeks something which is not in the given.”282 This also 
distinguishes musical thinking from logical thinking, which is directed towards what is given. 
Mathematical thinking, for instance, is directed towards the phenomenon of a triangle in order to 
elucidate the particular laws that are contained within it, so to speak.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter has been to begin an explication of what it means for art to 
be a symbolic form, as Cassirer claims it is. While this project has involved a consideration of 
numerous different art forms, our focus has been on music. Perhaps more than any other art 
form, music poses challenges for an account that would position it as a unique mode of 
experiencing reality. Certain categories that Cassirer believes to be essential to symbolic forms 
as such do not seem readily applicable to music. In fact, these problematic categories – spatiality 
and an intellectual character, in particular – have been traditionally denied to music. In the 
course of this chapter, with the assistance of certain thinkers, Victor Zuckerkandl above all, we 
have been able to reclaim a meaningful sense in which music reveals often overlooked aspects of 
the experience of space and the nature of thinking. Thus, music does not only represent a 
particular type of experience; properly understood it enlarges our everyday understanding of 
experience. 
Phenomenological accounts of music have proven indispensable to the foregoing chapter. 
However, it will have been noticed that there is divergence even among adherents of 
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phenomenology concerning questions pertaining to music. For this reason, the next chapter will 
take up a critique of phenomenology’s ontology of music with an eye towards determining the 
implications of an ontology of music on an attendant account of the musical experience.  
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Chapter Two: The Phenomenology of Music: a Historical Overview and 
Ethnomusicological Critique 
 
While phenomenologists have traditionally directed their efforts towards the visual and 
literary arts – when they deign to detour from lofty epistemological and ontological projects at 
all – a number of these thinkers have applied the phenomenological method to music. This 
chapter will present a historical overview of phenomenological treatments of music, guided by 
reference to two overarching themes: the ontology of music and the nature of the musical 
experience. It will be argued that certain phenomenological treatments of these themes, while 
valuable, are ultimately vitiated by an ethnocentric bias; that is, a tendency to conflate music as 
such with the tradition of Western classical music. The introduction of ethnomusicological 
literature into the phenomenological fold not only demonstrates the myopia of existing 
phenomenological thinking about music, but on a more constructive level, provides theoretical 
insights born of concrete ethnographic studies that call for a phenomenological analysis. In this 
way, phenomenology and the philosophy of culture can be set on a mutually beneficial course 
while avoiding the pitfalls described by Cassirer when he describes the methodological relation 
between phenomenology and “a purely objective philosophy of the human spirit:” 
The two are so closely linked and necessarily interdependent that not only are their 
positive results closely related but, conversely, every false move in the one direction 
makes itself felt forthwith in the other. An inadequate appreciation of the objective 
meaning of the particular symbolic forms always involves the danger that the phenomena 
in which this meaning is grounded will be misunderstood – and on the other hand, every 
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theoretical prejudice that injects itself into the pure description of phenomena endangers 
our evaluation of the meaning of the forms that result from it.283 
This chapter will unfold in three major sections. In the first section, an overview of 
phenomenological treatments of music will be presented. Alfred Schütz, Roman Ingarden, 
Thomas Clifton and Don Ihde will be considered in turn with an eye on their views concerning 
the ontology of music and the nature of the musical experience as well as the ways that these 
positions harmonize and conflict with their phenomenological predecessors. While the father of 
phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, does not warrant a section of his own, given his fleeting and 
unsystematic interest in music, a number of concepts that Husserl introduced are central to 
subsequent phenomenologists who took a more active interest in music and therefore benefit 
from being considered in their original context. 
The second section levels a two-pronged critique of phenomenology’s ontology of music, 
which generally conceives the phenomenon as an ideal object. The first prong of the critique is 
directed at the alleged ideality of music. This critique of ideality will itself have two prongs. 
First, it will be argued that conceiving of music as ideal derives from a misleadingly reductive 
understanding of the multiple possible ways that a listener can constitute a musical work. This 
line of argument will culminate in the charge that phenomenology presents a “digital” ontology 
of music. Secondly, it will be argued that the conception of music that has led phenomenologists 
to view music as ideal is not only historically contingent but also wholly inadequate to 
conceptualizing other forms of music and music making. 
                                                        
283 Cassirer, PSF III, 74. Schütz addresses this methodological relationship in an essay 
entitled Phänomenologie und Kulturwissenschaft (Schütz, “Phenomenology and the 
Social Sciences,” 118-139) as well as a short outline of the same name (Schütz, 
“Phenomenology and Cultural Science,” 106-109). 
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The second prong in the critique of phenomenology’s ontology of music is directed at the 
second term characterizing phenomenology’s view of music, namely as an object. Once again, 
ethnomusicology will come to our assistance, giving the lie to conceiving of music in terms of 
static works and showing such a conception to be both reductive and historically contingent.  
The third section will untangle the implications that the foregoing critique of 
phenomenology’s ontology of music has for its account of the musical experience. In short, one 
would expect that an unduly restricted account of what a thing is cannot help but result in an 
unduly restricted account of our experience of it. In other words, speaking of “the” musical 
experience is misleadingly reductive. It will be demonstrated that there are in fact a multiplicity 
of musical experiences, each of which warrants its own phenomenological account. 
 
1. Alfred Schütz’s Essays on Music 
Schütz’s work on music unfolds across a number of essays, the most systematic of which 
went unpublished during his lifetime. The essays that he saw published utilize music as an 
illustration or test case for some non-musical phenomenon that constitute the essay’s thematic 
interest. For instance, in Making Music Together, music serves as a paradigmatic instance of “the 
‘mutual tuning-in relationship’ upon which alone all communication is founded.”284 However, 
Schütz could just as well have elected any number of forms of interaction as a means of 
accessing the mutual tuning-in relationship. He lists, for instance, “the relationship between 
pitcher and catcher, tennis players, fencers, and so on,” going on to note that, “we find the same 
features in marching together, dancing together, making love together.”285 Mozart and the 
Philosophers once again is not concerned with music as such, but rather with “a consideration of 
                                                        
284 Schütz, MMT, 161. 
285 Schütz, MMT, 162. 
  
94 
the purely musical means by which Mozart solved the problems of the philosophers in his own 
way, thereby proving himself to be the greatest philosopher of them all.”286 Moreover, according 
to Schütz’s own lights, both Mozart and the Philosophers as well an another treatment of music, 
the chapter on “Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera” from Life Forms and Meaning 
Structures, are vitiated by a claim that Schütz makes in his most systematic work on music, 
Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music. In FPM, Schütz is interested in pure music, i.e. what 
is left when “we abstract from the special use of music to accompany certain events in the outer 
world – music for dancing, music for marching, music in combination with the drama…”287 Both 
Mozart and the Philosophers and “Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera,” on the other hand, 
pertain to music in a programmatic context, that is with the addition of dramatic elements that 
vie for the listeners’ attention and structure their perception with visual and conceptual ballast. 
In FPM, which never saw publication during Schütz’s lifetime, Schütz offers a 
phenomenological analysis of music as such and for its own sake. Despite its fragmentary 
character, which leaves a number of questions incompletely addressed, the essay touches on a 
wide variety of important themes pertaining to a phenomenology of music. Let us now consider 
two of these important themes: the ontology of music and the musical experience. 
 
1a. Schütz’s Ontology of Music 
The decisive phenomenological claim regarding music is that it belongs to the class of ideal 
objects. “Music has a non-empirical status,”288 asserts later phenomenologist Thomas Clifton. 
Schütz likens a musical work to a mathematical theorem. “To be sure, the score, the 
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performance, the book, the lecture, are indispensable means for communicating the musical or 
scientific thought,” writes Schütz. “They are not, however, the thought itself. A work of music, 
or a mathematical theorem, has the character of an ideal object.”289 Clearly, the perdurability of a 
musical work is dependent on being bound to material objects and, as Schütz argues: 
any kind of communication between man and his fellow man and therefore the 
communication of musical thoughts presupposes an event or a series of events in the 
outer world…Musical thoughts can be transmitted to others either by the mechanics of 
audible sound or by the symbols of musical notation.290  
Yet we are mistaken to identify the musical work per se with the necessary conditions for its 
communication. Schütz is not terribly prolix on this point, seeming to take ontological 
characterization of the musical work as an ideal object as a relatively uncontroversial assertion 
and buttressing his claim with references to Mozart’s legendary ability to compose works in his 
mind. Schütz’s line of thought is well illustrated by his claim that “he who knows a piece of 
music ‘by heart’ does not need any reference to print, to any musical instrument or to 
performances heard or previously made, in order to reproduce the piece of music from beginning 
to end for his inner ear.”291 
Like other ideal objects, music is founded on real objects in the outer world; for instance, in 
some cases, musical notation and, in all cases, sound waves. But, Schütz has argued, music 
                                                        
289 Schütz, FPM, 247. It must also be noted that Schütz and many of the thinkers to be 
discussed are thinking of music in terms of musical works, a topic to which we will 
return later. Anticipatorily, it should be realized that conceiving of music in terms of 
works is by no means exhaustive of the ways that humans engage with music and, 
furthermore, it is a historically-contingent phenomenon in the Western classical music 
tradition, as will be argued by Christopher Small and Lydia Goehr. 
290 Schütz, MMT, 165. 
291 Schütz, FPM, 247. In a footnote in MMT, Schütz also quotes Brahms: “If I want to 
listen to a fine performance of ‘Don Giovanni,’ I light a good cigar and stretch out on my 
sofa” (MMT, 92, fn. 24). 
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cannot be reduced to its notated form or its actualization in performance. In phenomenological 
terms, an appresentational situation obtains between the real object (or, occurrence) of the 
performance and the ideal object of the music proper. The appresenting object (e.g. the 
performance) belongs to the realm of physical things existing in the spatial time of the outer 
world while the appresented object (i.e. the music proper) belongs to the realm of ideal things 
existing in inner time. The appresenting object serves the function of wakening or calling forth292 
the appresented object. Music, then, is not merely sounds, but “meaningful arrangement of tones 
in inner time,”293 which means in the conscious experience of a listener. Conceiving of music in 
this manner helps to explain why Schütz feels that we can disregard the score and performance, 
since the appresentational relationship is governed by what Schütz names “the principle of the 
relative irrelevance of the vehicle.”294 Just as there are various means for calling forth an ideal 
object like the number two (which may be adequately appresented by signs such as “2,” “deux,” 
“zwei,” etc.), if a musical work is understood as polythetic process, then any means for 
effectuating these acts is an equally adequate appresenting object. Listening to a masterful live 
performance of a musical work, listening to a poorly recorded reproduction of the work, listening 
to a work that one knows by heart ‘in one’s head’ – all of these are valid ways of intending a 
musical object. 
That, in brief, constitutes Schütz’s discussions of music’s status as an ideal object. Given the 
importance of this claim for phenomenological conceptions of music and the rich history of ideal 
objects in phenomenological thought and work in aesthetics, let us revisit some of the 
aforementioned claims as they appear in the work of other philosophers. We will begin with 
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some of the reasons why philosophers have been motivated to conceive of music as an ideal 
object in the first place.  
One way of explaining why many philosophers have concluded that musical works are ideal 
objects takes a negative approach; that is, demonstrating the problems of reducing a musical 
work to either its score or its instantiations in performance. Schütz spends no time doing so, but 
other thinkers have reflected at length on the problems that follow upon such ontologies of 
music.  
What is problematic about identifying a musical work with its score? Roger Scruton gestures 
towards some of these problems in his monograph The Aesthetics of Music. One such problem 
concerns the underdetermined nature of musical scores. According to Scruton, “we should 
recognize that works of music, whatever they are, originate in human actions, and are understood 
as intended objects.”295 The inability of the score to exhaustively account for the composer’s 
intention should therefore give us pause about conflating the score and the work. “Whether we 
count an arrangement as a version of the original or as a new work, will depend in part on the 
intention of the arranger,” explains Scruton. “And the difference between a performance and a 
travesty lies in our sense of the distance between the composer's intention and the performer's 
product.”296 The decisions that conductors and performers must make in the course of 
performance cannot be assumed to be entirely adequate to the composer’s intention. In this 
respect, the performance and the score that provided its imperfect orientation cannot be 
considered co-extensive with the work itself, which exists in the composer’s mind.297  
                                                        
295 Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music, 107. 
296 Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music, 107. 
297 In The Recording Angel: Music, Records and Culture from Aristotle to Zappa, Evan 
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Scruton also offers an argument from analogy, comparing a work of music with a painting. A 
painting is defined by what the viewer sees in the work. Were a painting to be submitted to a 
rigorous, scientific description that charted every inch of the canvas describing what colors and 
textures occur, we would have a specification of the painting’s design but not the intentional 
object that constitutes the viewer’s experience. Such a description finds an analogy in a musical 
score, which outlines with some rigor the sonic design of the musical work, but not the 
intentional object that is the viewer’s object of experience.298 Christopher Small makes a similar 
point when he writes that a musical score is merely “a set of coded instructions that, when 
properly carried out, will enable performers not only to make sounds in a specific combination, 
called a musical work, but also to repeat that combination as many times as they desire…the fact 
that [a] title appears on the cover of the score does not mean that the musical work resides in its 
pages. We find there only a set of instructions for performing.”299 
Furthermore, the ontological identification of the musical work with the score yields some 
counter-intuitive consequences. In this model, a performance constitutes an instantiation of the 
work if the performer follows all the instructions outlined by the score. As a result, strictly 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Marks on paper can be misinterpreted. A composer with unorthodox ideas about 
rhythm and sonority, whose work does not rest snugly within the German tradition of 
ideal music but has a strong sensuous element, will not want to give his performers 
too much rein…When the composer is the performer, what the recording records is 
nothing less than the composer’s intentions (assuming he’s a good performer). He 
becomes a phonographer; if he is not composing in the recording studio, he might as 
well be. He is free to disregard his own markings but compelled to specify them – to 
indicate phrasing, dynamics and the like by demonstration rather than description 
(Eisenberg, Recording Angel, 105). 
298 Evan Eisenberg also compares the situation of the composer and the painter: “Suppose 
one wished to make music as directly as a painter paints. A painter would be outraged if 
he were asked to create a work by listing the coordinates of dots and the numbers of 
standard colors, which we could then interpret by connecting the dots and coloring by 
number. But that is what a composer is asked to do” (Eisenberg, Recording Angel, 106). 
299 Small, Musicking, 112. 
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speaking, it could be argued that a performance containing mistakes is in fact not a performance 
of the work. Similarly, a performance in which the performer indulges in artistic liberties that run 
afoul of what the score dictates has ventured sufficiently far from the work’s stringent identity 
conditions that, contrary to the performer’s intention and the audience’s perception, the work has 
not been instantiated.   
Different problems emerge from identifying a musical work with its concrete instantiation in 
performance. R.A. Sharpe addresses the theme in his Philosophy of Music: An Introduction; 
however, as we shall see, part of his argument does flirt with question begging. Sharpe dismisses 
the reduction of the work to its performance on the basis of “a few truisms.”300 First, a musical 
work “can exist unperformed, as long as the music has been written out and preserved in a 
library or a study. It might, as well, be remembered accurately by somebody even if no notated 
copy exists.”301 Supposing the work is not currently being performed and there are no 
performances of the work, it would follow from the ontological work-performance adequation 
that the work does not exist; a conclusion, which according to Sharpe, no one would accept.  
Sharpe also argues that the ability to make judgments about the accuracy of a performance 
and musical interpretation presupposes a concept of musical work that transcends its 
performance. A score is an essential aid to memory in the realization of a complicated, large-
scale work, as well as to the work’s survival over long spans of time. But a score is not without 
ambiguities and both the conductor and the performers share in the creation of a work to the 
extent that they cannot avoid interpretive decisions. Evaluating interpretations, however, tacitly 
presupposes a notion of the work that precedes the performance such that the performance can be 
compared with this ontologically prior work. 
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Doubtless there are ways of massaging both the above ontological positions that would twist 
free of the criticisms leveled at them, but that is neither our purpose nor our interest.302 As has 
already been noted, Schütz and fellow phenomenologists conceive of musical works as ideal 
objects, irreducible to their score and their instantiation in performance. In order to evaluate this 
position we must seek a richer understanding of what an ideal object is.  
Husserl generally discusses ideal objects in the context of the mathematical sciences and the 
achievement of objectivity. In this context, the ideal object stands opposed to the ineluctably 
imperfect, albeit always more perfectible, object of the experiential world. Through repeated 
acquaintance with an experiential thing, the experiencing subject attains an ever more accurate 
understanding of the thing. By seeing all of a thing’s sides, I remove a degree of indeterminacy 
from my knowledge of it. By seeing up close a thing I have hitherto only known from a distance, 
I may achieve a more precise notion of the thing’s color, texture and shape. However, it belongs 
to experiential things that they may never be known with unwavering exactitude since there is 
“belonging modally to the experiencing itself, always something like coming nearer to the thing, 
getting to know it more exactly; and this involves, under the title of ‘more exact determination,’ 
a continually possible process of correction.”303 
                                                        
302 While Schütz and other phenomenologists agree with defenders of aesthetic 
formalism that the musical work cannot be reduced to its score or its performances, 
phenomenology’s ontology of music is not for that reason identical with that of 
formalism. Eduard Hanslick the father of the formalist conception of music, understands 
“music’s essential aspect as a stable structure that can be notated in a score [albeit not the 
score itself]” (Higgins, The Music of Our Lives, 10). Phenomenologists, on the other 
hand, focus less on some objective stable structure and more so on the constitution of a 
coherent musical experience by the music’s beholder. Whereas formalists conceive of 
music as something objective, phenomenologists conceive of music as something that 
happens through the correlation of ‘subject’ and ‘object.’ 
303 Husserl, Crisis, 343. 
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In contradistinction to this unconquerable “horizon of open, possibly closer determination”304 
stands the exactly determined ideal object. This experientially impossible ideal object is an 
achievement of thought wherein the endless series of a thing’s possible subjective 
representations are imagined as having been experienced. Thus emerges the notion of an ideal 
property “as the unity of the conceived infinity of thinkable and exact, relatively perfect 
exhibiting, through which, idealiter, harmonious identification would proceed.”305 The thing 
itself is conceived as the sum of its ideal properties, which thereby permits knowledge of the 
thing not as something actual but as the imagined object of ideally possible experience. As the 
imagined exhaustive experience of a thing, the ideal object transcends the particularity of an 
individual subject’s perspective as “absolutely identical for anyone who practices the method, no 
matter how much his empirically intuitive representation may differ from what serves others in 
their intuition-based idealization;”306 or, in a word, as objective. 
Seeing as there are different types of ideal objects307, what should we identify as the essential 
features of ideal objects as such? One feature shared by ideal objects is their inessential material 
existence. As is implied by Schütz’s principle of the relative irrelevance of the vehicle in 
appresentational relationships, the material manifestation of musical works in performance or on 
a score certainly contributes to the perdurance of the work, but these material manifestations are 
not the work itself. Husserl writes “The idealizing mental accomplishment has its material in the 
‘thing-appearances,’ the ‘thing representations.’ In perceiving, with its flow of appearances 
having vital ontic validity, these appearances are found in the mode of performance and are not 
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appearances as ‘material.’”308 That is to say, the authentic existence of ideal objects does not 
reside in their inessential material form – for instance, the Pythagorean theorem is itself not “a2 + 
b2 = c2” and Beethoven’s Fifth is not the score or any particular musical performance of the work 
– rather, these ideal objects exist in the performance of the polythetic processes through which 
they are constituted – the demonstration of the Pythagorean theorem or the imbrications of 
retentions and protentions constituting Beethoven’s Fifth as a coherent musical event.  
Ideal objects are also united in sharing “an existence which is peculiarly supertemporal and 
which – of this we are certain – is accessible to all men…[of] all ages.”309 This characteristic 
bears some consideration. With respect to the ideal objects of mathematics, the supertemporality 
of ideal objects does not elicit any consternation. It seems self-evident that the Pythagorean 
theorem should remain identical when expressed in different languages and that its meaning is in 
no way altered whether it is grasped in ancient Greece or present day America. However, 
Husserl insists that the supertemporality and pan-accessibility of ideal objects holds also for “a 
whole class of spiritual products of the cultural world…for example, the constructions of fine 
literature.”310 This position has proven more contentious, with some phenomenologists unable to 
countenance it. Indeed, it is on this score that Roman Ingarden rejects the classification of 
musical works as ideal objects: 
Some philosophers accept the existence of ideal objects, immutable and atemporal, 
having no origin and never ceasing to exist. The objects of mathematical investigations 
are supposedly belonging to this class. Are Chopin’s B Minor Sonata and other musical 
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works such ‘ideal’ objects? We cannot agree to this, for who would deny that the sonata 
in question was created at a particular time by Chopin?311 
It is the origination of the musical work that is the sticking point for Ingarden, since he 
acknowledges that, once created, a musical work endures indefinitely.  
Further consideration suggests that the distance between Ingarden’s position and that of his 
fellow phenomenologists may not be as drastic as it initially appears. Ingarden ascribes to the 
musical work the status of an “intentional object.”312 To exist as an intentional object means that 
“a musical work remains something that we can create only intentionally and not in reality.”313 
With this statement, Ingarden sides with Schütz in the view that a score or a performance do not 
a musical work make; it is not the mere externalization of sound that creates a musical work, it is 
the work’s being intended, or, stated differently, the constitution of the work in the 
consciousness of the beholder. We shall have occasion to discuss this process in greater detail 
when we turn to the phenomenological account of the musical experience. 
What are we to make of Ingarden’s refusal of the status of ‘ideal object’ to a musical work in 
light of Husserl’s and Schütz’s acceptance of it? Perhaps we can chalk it up to the different types 
of ideal objects that Husserl adverts to. Some ideal objects – such as numbers and mathematical 
theorems – possess a bi-directional supertemporality; they have no origin and no expiration. 
Other ideal objects – such as literary works and musical works –undeniably have an origin, but 
once brought into being, take on an independent existence and thus become supertemporal.  
For a musical work to be an ideal object indicates that, in its essence, it is untethered to a 
material substrate and exists supertemporally. In fact, Ingarden takes this position to be one of 
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the “unsystematized convictions that we encounter in daily life in our communion with musical 
works before we succumb to one particular theory or another.”314 Ingarden characterizes the 
conviction as follows: 
The composer fashions his work in a creative effort, over a certain period of time. This 
labor fashions something – the musical work in fact – that previously did not exist but 
from the moment of its coming into being does somehow exist quite independently of 
whether anyone performs it, listens to it, or takes any interest in it whatever. The musical 
work does not form any part of mental existence, and, in particular, no part of the 
conscious experiences of its creator: after all, it continues to exist even when the 
composer is dead nor does it form any part of the listeners’ conscious experiences while 
listening, for the work of music continues to exist after these experiences have ceased.315 
 
1b. Schütz’s Account of the Musical Experience 
In FPM, Schütz characterizes the phenomenological approach to music negatively. The 
phenomenological approach is not oriented by considerations that are immaterial to the listener’s 
experience of music. A physicist studying music might regard music in terms of sound waves. 
The physiologist would make reference to structures of the human auditory system that 
constitute conditions for the possibility of experiencing sound. The neuroscientist may identify 
different parts of the human brain and nervous system that are activated by music. The 
mathematician would uncover the numerical relationships that undergird the construction of 
consonant and dissonant intervals. 
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The phenomenologist, on the other hand, is first and foremost concerned with what is given 
in experience, which our own encounters with music reassure us is not sound waves, not the 
vibration of our inner ear’s tympanum, not the lighting up of the frontal lobe, not a series of 
mathematical relationships. “[The listener] responds neither to sound waves, nor does he 
perceive sounds,” writes Schütz, “he just listens to music.”316 The physiologist, neuroscientist, 
mathematician et al. are not fundamentally misguided in studying music as they do, but each of 
these individuals operates from what may be called derivative standpoints. Only the 
phenomenologist seeks to describe music as experienced. Beginning from this fundamental 
experience (hence the designation “derivative”), the physicist et al. offer different perspectives 
that add contour to our understanding of the complex phenomenon that is music. 
To reiterate, the phenomenologist claims to offer a description of music that is most basic, 
that precedes all other secondary descriptions of music as a physical, physiological, neurological 
or mathematical phenomenon. How then does the phenomenologist describe this musical 
experience that we all allegedly have, which has nevertheless been obscured by derivative 
descriptions clamoring for their own misguided claims of priority?  
It is important to note that, in FPM, Schütz explicitly focuses on absolute or pure music. As 
he did with the phenomenological approach to music, Schütz delineates the phenomena of pure 
music negatively; namely, as what we are left with when “we abstract from the special use of 
music to accompany certain events in the outer world – music for dancing, music for marching, 
music in combination with the drama…”317 Not only is the music that Schütz is concerned with 
in FPM theoretically divorced from all cultural activity, Schütz explicitly advises 
phenomenologists that “to attempt a truly phenomenological analysis of the listener’s experience 
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of music, we must try to bring about those elements which are common to all kinds of music and 
we must disregard – temporarily at least – all the features characteristic of a particular musical 
culture only.”318  
Music regarded as a phenomenological or merely perceptual object thus sets aside lyrics and 
other conceptual ballast as well as the various functions that the music may accompany in a 
subservient role and the many contexts in which the music may be experienced. According to 
Schütz, the musical experience consists in the “meaningful arrangement of tones in inner 
time.”319 Music as a phenomenological object does, however, take into account the existence of a 
frame of reference, which functions as a condition for the possibility of experiencing music as 
meaningful: “Our analysis will, therefore, have to take into account the fact that, while listening, 
the listener uses previous experiences of the kind of music he is listening to. He has a certain 
knowledge of its general type and style.”320 Clearly then Schütz must be credited with the claim 
that culture is at play even in our most basic experience of music. Nevertheless, further 
consideration of the role of a frame of reference is absent from his analysis in FPM and it is 
unclear from Schütz’s analysis of a sequence of six tones321 how the knowledge of a particular 
type or style of music would not merely contribute to but enable a listener to follow the flux of 
music. In fact, Schütz’s analysis gives no indication as to why a specific frame of reference 
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would be necessary for the understanding of a listener being “confronted for the first time with 
Gothic music or a modern composition written in the twelve-tone system.”322 
We considered Schütz’s analysis of a six-tone sequence in chapter one, but this does not 
suffice for a complete consideration of Schütz on the musical experience. The reason we cannot 
rest content with this analysis is not because it is tendered from the theoretical standpoint, but 
because it seeks to justify how the musical experience is possible, not to describe what the 
musical experience entails. It is more accurate, albeit inadequately descriptive, to say that the 
musical experience involves the experience of music’s finite province of meaning. This 
Schützian concept requires unpacking. 
Schütz argues for the existence of multiple realities. Such a statement is liable to suggest 
unphilosophical assertions for the existence of spiritual worlds or even modal logic’s 
philosophical, but ultimately misleading, interest in possible worlds. Rather, what Schütz has in 
mind is more in line with what Husserl refers to as “attitudes” (Einstellungen) and what Cassirer 
names “symbolic forms.” To assert the existence of multiple realities, in Schütz’s sense, is 
merely to observe that human beings have different ways of relating to the world, which generate 
different schemes of relevance, show objects in different lights, demand and prohibit different 
types of behavior and interaction and generally are accompanied by their “own special and 
separate style of existence.”323 More specifically, each reality (also referred to as a “finite 
province of meaning,” or, following William James, a “subuniverse”324) is “characterized by a 
specific tension of consciousness…by a specific time-perspective, by a specific form of 
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experiencing oneself, and, finally, by a specific form of sociality.”325 An example should help 
clear this up.  
Schütz identifies “the reality of our everyday life” as “the paramount reality.”326 The tension 
of consciousness associated with workaday life is wide-awakeness, which can be contrasted with 
the lack of alertness to the material world that characterizes the dreaming individual (whether 
that is REM cycle dreaming or, to a lesser extent, daydreaming). In daily life we engage with the 
world in a practical manner, as “something that we have to modify by our actions or that 
modifies our actions.”327 Thus our daily life is oriented by projects, which, in turn, determine the 
particular time-perspective holding sway in this paramount reality. 
The activity of daily life involves a number of time perspectives that are unified in the acting 
individual. When projecting an action to be undertaken, I grasp the act in the future perfect tense 
or modo futuri exacti, i.e. as “the thing which will have been done, the act which will have been 
performed by me.”328 When, in the course of activity, I turn a reflective glance to the phases of a 
project that have been completed, they appear in the past tense or the present perfect tense or 
modo praeterito, i.e. as something that was done or that has been done. When I am neither 
explicitly anticipating the future nor reflecting on the past and instead live in the ongoing flux of 
activity, I experience my action in the present tense or modo presenti, i.e. as something being 
done.  
 In addition to these three time perspectives, activity is experienced on two planes. On the one 
hand, insofar as activity entails bodily engagement, I experience my movements as events taking 
                                                        
325 Schütz, Symbol, Reality, and Society, 341; also cf. Schütz, OMR, 230 where Schütz 
adds “a specific epoché” and “a prevalent form of spontaneity” to his list of “the basic 
characteristics which constitute [a finite province of meaning’s] specific cognitive style.” 
326 Schütz, Symbol, Reality, and Society, 341. 
327 Schütz, OMR, 209. 
328 Schütz, OMR, 215. 
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place in space and time. On the other hand, from the point of view of consciousness, I experience 
these movements as “manifestations of [my] spontaneity pertaining to [my] stream of 
consciousness.”329 As such, my activity in the world also takes place in inner time or, in a 
Bergsonian term that Schütz favors, “durée.”330 Schütz claims that inner and outer time are 
unified in the actor, thereby yielding a “single flux which shall be called the vivid present.”331 
Action is an event in the outer world and, as such, takes place in spatial (a.k.a. objective, cosmic 
or clock) time. However, it is in inner time that ongoing experience, through retention and 
recollection, comes into contact with the past and, through protention and anticipation, comes 
into contact with the future. Thus the body is a sort of schema that unites inner and outer time.332 
Vivid presence is an essential element of the specific time-perspective of everyday life, but one 
other component is still missing. 
 It is a useful, albeit artificial, theoretical perspective that conceptualizes the individual 
independently of other people, since “the world of daily life into which we are born is from the 
outset an intersubjective world.”333 This consideration introduces a third dimension of time. 
Schütz uses verbal communication as an example. As the other speaks to me, she experiences the 
communication in vivid presence. The thought being conveyed is unified through retentions and 
protentions in the speaker’s stream of consciousness and thus in inner time. The actual 
occurrence of speaking, however, partakes of the objective time of the outer world. As the 
listener, I also experience the process of communication in vivid presence. The physiological 
                                                        
329 Schütz, OMR, 215. 
330 Schütz, OMR, 215. 
331 Schütz, OMR, 216; cf. Schütz, OMR, 219 for the process of communication as an 
example. 
332 Cf. Schütz, FPM, 260-261 for this same point, albeit discussed with reference to 
music’s connection with objects and events in the outer world.  
333 Schütz, OMR, 218. 
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processes of hearing take place in objective time, while the unification of the meaning of the 
utterance is a process in inner time. Thus, the speaker and I share a vivid presence, which 
establishes a “We-relation” or a “face-to-face relationship.”334 “All the other manifold social 
relationships,” claims Schütz, “are derived from the originary experiencing of the totality of the 
Other’s self in the community of space and time.”335 I may grasp the Other as the one responsible 
for such and such an act, but I thereby only grasp the Other partially. As we shall see in Schütz’s 
analysis of making music together, listening to a piece of music establishes a “quasi 
simultaneity” with the composer of the piece, but in such a case there is no co-presence of the 
partners. In everyday life, all the different time perspectives that are derived from the face-to-
face relationship are “apprehended as integrated into a single supposedly homogenous dimension 
of time,” which Schütz calls “civic or standard time.”336 This is the time perspective specific to 
the paramount reality of everyday life. 
As we have already intimated, everyday life is but one reality in which human beings act. 
The musical experience is also correlated to its own finite province of meaning, the presentation 
of which will entail enumerating the tension of consciousness, time-perspective, form of self-
experience and form of sociality comprising the “cognitive style”337 that animates the experience 
of musical reality. 
The tension of consciousness of an individual listening to pure music exhibits important 
differences from the tension associated with the paramount reality of everyday life. Such an 
individual “stops living in his acts of daily life, stops being directed toward their object.”338 
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Schütz is slightly inconsistent in his discussion concerning this tension of consciousness insofar 
as he claims that listeners “accept the guidance of music in order to relax their tension and to 
surrender to its flux” after having just claimed that the change in the listener’s tension of 
consciousness “has nothing to do with the intensity of his listening. He may be engaged and, for 
the most part, he will be engaged, with greater intensity in listening to music than in the 
performance of his daily routine work.”339 It seems more accurate to say that instead of a 
necessary slackening of the tension of consciousness, the experience of listening to pure music 
involves a redirection from the world of space and spatial time to that of inner time. On the other 
hand, there do seem to be reasons for regarding the listener’s tension of consciousness as less 
taut than that of someone involved in their daily routine work. The aesthetic experience that 
Schütz describes in FPM is not fraught with consequences in the same way as the work world. 
Consider someone at work in the paramount reality of everyday life; for instance, a surgeon. If a 
surgeon’s focus lapses the consequences are grave and an implicit awareness of these 
consequences keeps the surgeon’s consciousness tense and directed. But the type of listening that 
Schütz is discussing has no such consequences, and if it does (perhaps in the case of a 
composition student analyzing a piece of music during an examination) then the listener is back 
to living in the acts of daily life as opposed to the disinterested aesthetic experience. Stated more 
generally, our attention to the more trivial tasks of everyday life is differently motivated than our 
attention in aesthetic experience. In everyday life we are motivated to carry out uninteresting 
tasks in order to accomplish more distant aims. Typical students, for example, memorize facts 
and formulas not because they believe this information will prove useful, but because they wish 
to get good grades in order to get a good job. Their present tension of consciousness derives its 
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tautness from some future aim. A truly aesthetic experience, however, is not tied up with larger 
projects. A work of art holds our attention by virtue of its own merits. Future goals and 
consequences do not enter into the equation. 
 The tension of consciousness associated with the musical experience would thus seem to be 
somewhere in between that of workaday life and that of dreaming. Aesthetic engagement with 
music (which we recall is an ideal object in Schütz’s view) is not concerned with material things 
in the world and is not extended into the future to the same extent as is consciousness in the 
execution of a project. On the other hand, the listener is not as distant from the world of practical 
life as is the dreamer. To this extent, the tension of consciousness correlated to music resembles 
that of the world of phantasms to the extent that “we have no longer to master the outer world 
and to overcome the resistance of its objects. We are free from the pragmatic motive which 
governs our natural attitude toward the world of daily life, free also from the bondage of 
‘interobjective’ space and intersubjective standard time.”340 
The time perspective proper to the musical experience is inner time, which follows from the 
ontological characterization of the musical work as an ideal object. We have seen that the lived 
experience of listening to a musical work does not necessarily map on to the objective time 
required for the tones of that work to be run through. This is the central point that locates music’s 
time perspective as inner. We have also seen that Schütz is indifferent to the means of 
effectuating the polythetic processes distinguishing a particular music work – hearing a live 
performance, enjoying a recording in the privacy of one’s headphones, listening to a familiar 
work in the mind’s ear: all of these are valid modes of constituting a musical work. In many 
cases, music may be experienced in vivid presence. However, this would only apply to instances 
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in which our intending of the ideal object is mediated by an event in the outer world (e.g. a 
performance). In such a case, there is an intersection of inner time and spatial time, whose 
unification into a single flux is an experience of vivid presence. But since Schütz believes that 
one can access the ideal object by reproducing the work in her mind, spatial time is not a 
condition for the possibility of the musical experience and thus cannot be characterized as the 
time-perspective that is specific to the musical experience. 
What is the form of experiencing oneself specific to the musical experience? Clearly it will 
differ from the experience of “the working self as the total self”341 that characterizes the form of 
experiencing oneself specific to the paramount reality of everyday life. The self of the musical 
experience has ceased to be oriented by work relating to objects in the outer world. Thus the self 
of the musical experience is not the working self that experiences itself as the author of ongoing 
actions. In fact, there does not seem to be an explicit experience of the self in the musical 
experience Schütz describes in FPM and MMT. This is fitting since I suggest that the aesthetic 
experience of FPM and MMT involves precisely the temporary effacement of the self. The 
beholder of a musical work is not pragmatically involved in the world; nor is the beholder 
pragmatically involved in the fictitious worlds of phantasy or dreams. This temporary effacement 
of the self brought about by the musical experience is described by Friedrich Nietzsche as 
music’s Dionysian character. 
Schütz thematizes the musical experience’s specific form of sociality in MMT and names 
this form of sociality “the mutual tuning-in relationship.”342 In MMT, Schütz focuses on the 
social relationship that obtains between the composer of a musical work and its beholder, a 
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category that includes “the player, listener, and reader of music.”343 This relationship consists in 
the beholder participating “with quasi simultaneity in the former’s [i.e. the composer’s] stream of 
consciousness by performing with him step by step the ongoing articulation of his musical 
thought.”344 Stated differently, in listening to a piece of music, the beholder performs the same 
retentions and protentions that were performed by the composer in the composition of the 
musical work. While the musical work outlives the composer, and thus the beholder and 
composer may not be contemporaries sharing the same external, objective dimension of time, the 
two parties are nevertheless “united…by a time dimension common to both,”345 that is, inner 
time – hence the “quasi simultaneity” of the social relationship. This “quasi simultaneity” is 
derived from the experience of face-to-face partners sharing a vivid presence, which is 
experienced in a musical setting, for instance, in the case of a beholder listening to a performer 
reproduce a musical work. As opposed to the derived relationship of composer and beholder 
sharing a single dimension of time (viz. inner time), the performer and beholder undergo “the 
common experience of living simultaneously in several dimensions of time.”346 
Thus Schütz’s phenomenological view of the musical experience involves a disregard for 
objects of the world (i.e. a slackened tension of consciousness), the effacement of the self 
effected by disinterested contemplation and a retreat from the objectivity of external time. 
However, this combination of factors does not preclude the social experience of a quasi-
simultaneity of consciousness established with co-listeners and the work’s creator. 
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2. Critique of the Phenomenological Ontology of Music 
 Phenomenology, we have seen, conceives of music as an ideal object. There may be concerns 
from some phenomenological camps about whether a musical work can be conceived as ideal 
considering its origin in time and in culture. But in all essentials, phenomenology presents a 
fairly unified ontology of a musical work as something that is neither to be equated with its score 
nor any one performance or even the set of all its performances. A musical work, many 
phenomenologists agree, is the sum of the processes that constitute the experience in the 
consciousness of the beholder. 
 This section will present a number of arguments and observations that cast aspersions on 
understanding music as an ideal object. We will begin with a critique of the putatively ideal 
character of music. It will be demonstrated that conceiving music as ideal is essentially bound up 
with conceiving of music as an object or a work.  
 
2a. Critique of Phenomenology’s “Digital” Ontology 
 Conceiving of music as an ideal object yields what we shall call a digital ontology. In brief, 
what this means is that the conception of musical works as ideal objects problematically 
presupposes a definition of “signal” and thereby relegates everything else to the status of 
inessential “noise.” Analog, digital, signal, noise – these terms are familiar, yet elusive, and thus 
call for explication. Damon Krukowski’s monograph The New Analog: Listening and 
Reconnecting in a Digital World is a wide-ranging investigation of the cultural implications of 
the transition from analog to digital technology. To Krukowski’s way of thinking, the analog-
digital divide applies more broadly than traditional technological discussions would suggest:  
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Analog refers to a continuous stream of information, whereas digital is discontinuous. 
This distinction predates electronics, let alone integrated circuits. Any division of 
information into discrete steps is a digital process: from counting on our fingers, to 
calculating using an abacus, to (at least in some musicians’ view) plotting notes on a staff 
of music. Yet our senses remain resolutely analog. When we hear numbers counted 
aloud, see the beads of an abacus, or feel the vibration of a string, those sensations 
happen on a continuous scale.347 
The concepts of “signal” and “noise” have their place within this analog-digital paradigm of 
information transference. Noise is a relational concept. It has no existence in itself, but is rather 
defined in terms of its counterpart: “Noise…is whatever is not regarded as signal.”348 Similarly, 
signal also has no stable identity but is context-dependent, denoting whatever information is 
taken to be salient. 
In the context of music, the signal-noise distinction would seem to be unproblematic. The 
signal constitutes the sound created by the musicians, while noise stems from unsanctioned 
sound sources such as the whirr of the central air, the whispered conversation of our neighbors or 
an unfortunately unsilenced cell phone. Granted, there have been musical works whose explicit 
purpose is to problematize the signal-noise dichotomy. Most famously, John Cage’s infamous 
4’33” calls for a performer to take the stage, sit at a piano and periodically turn the pages of a 
score while remaining otherwise motionless and silent. The dashed expectations of the audience 
                                                        
347 Krukowski, The New Analog, 9. Noted historian and sound scholar Jonathan Sterne 
disputes the contrast of analog as continuous, digital as discrete. “[Stewart Brand, who 
introduced this definition in his 1987 monograph The Media Lab: Inventing the Future at 
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with vinyl records or optical sound-on-film but not with sirens, magnetic tape, or player 
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calls attention to the sounds that would usually be heard as intrusive, rendering this “noise” as 
the “signal.” However, the effect of Cage’s provocation does not so much undo the traditional 
signal-noise hierarchy as initiate a breakdown situation in which the dichotomy becomes 
exceptionally clear. In this respect, 4’33” has a philosophical analog in Heidegger’s celebrated 
example of the worldliness of the world being revealed through the breaking of a hammer. 
I argue that the signal-noise distinction in music is not as clear as past phenomenologists 
would have us believe. Schütz’s example of a six-tone sequence, for example, is misleadingly 
simple. What Schütz has offered is an instance of the constitution of signal in the consciousness 
of a beholder through the processes of retention and protention. In order to do so, Schütz has 
omitted a number of other considerations that are ineluctably involved in the auditory situation. 
The six-tone sequence is, so to speak, pure melody that is ostensibly not being heard in a 
harmonic context provided by other instruments.349 Because there is nothing else to hear, Schütz 
has offered an example of pure signal. But it must be acknowledged that such a situation is 
decidedly an exception rather than the rule. Usually there are other sounds to be heard, which 
may well be the listener’s focus. While the phenomenological perspective recognizes that 
music’s existence is intimately bound up with a listener’s constituting consciousness, Schütz’s 
analysis overlooks the fact that there are an indeterminate number of ways that a listener may 
constitute a musical work. Thus, in implying that there is a single ‘right’ way to constitute a 
musical work, Schütz presupposes a definition of “signal” and, by extension, a definition of 
“noise.”  
                                                        
349 That being said, as we shall see below in the discussion of Tumbuka drumming, even 
an unaccompanied six unit musical phenomenon can undergird multiple possible 
constitutions in the consciousness of a listener. 
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What the listener hears and thus how the work is constituted is a function of interest and 
attention. In his monograph Listening to Jazz, musician/critic/historian Ted Gioia offers insights 
meant to assist the inexperienced listener in understanding the foreign and forbidding world of 
jazz. One suggestion concerns what might be called ‘directed listening,’ that is, listening to one 
recording a number of times and, with each subsequent listening, directing one’s attention to a 
different member of the ensemble. While the first listen may highlight the main melodic 
instrument – thus allowing the listener to constitute the melody in the manner that Schütz would 
expect – the next listen may foreground the drummer, thereby constituting the piece as a 
predominantly rhythmic phenomenon. To take an example from the Western classical tradition, 
consider one of Bach’s inventions. These compositions are two-part counterpoint exercises in 
which the pianist’s right and left hand trade off the roles of melodist and accompanist. The 
listener is thereby provided with different perceptual possibilities. The listener may follow the 
melodic line as it transitions into different registers, or may continue directing their attention to 
the register to which they have been listening. But – importantly – they cannot do both at once. A 
thorough ‘understanding’ of the work will necessarily require multiple listenings, allowing the 
listener to constitute the work in its different aspects. A musical work, like a pregnant phrase or 
certain visual illusions, admits of being diversely constituted.  
This plurality of possible constitutions is especially evident in the phenomena known as 
“multistable acoustic phenomena,”350 a phrase coined by ethnomusicologist Steven Friedson. 
                                                        
350 Friedson, Dancing Prophets, 143. Ingrid Monson discusses this type of auditory 
experience under the rubric of what she calls “perceptual agency – the conscious focusing 
of sensory attention that can yield differing experiences of the same event.” (Monson, 
“Hearing, Seeing, and Perceptual Agency,” 37) Monson teaches students to become 
aware of a perceptual agent’s perceptual possibilities by encouraging them to listen to a 
group of jazz musicians “from the bottom of the band up,” which is to say that they 
should “focus their listening first on the bass line, then on the ride cymbal of the drum 
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Likening the phenomena to the well-known visual illusions of Gestalt psychology such as a 
Necker cube or the face/goblet illusion, Friedson adopts the phenomenological method of 
imaginative variation in order to lay bare the multiplicity inherent in a central rhythmic pattern of 
the Tumbuka people of Malawi. 
The rhythmic pattern involves a cycle of six strokes, made alternatingly by the right and left 
hand on the knees and thighs of their respective legs. For purposes of illustration, the pattern can 
be understood in a somewhat simplified manner.351 The pattern begins with a right hand knee hit, 
followed by a left hand thigh strike and then a right hand thigh strike. These first three hits are 
mirrored to complete the rhythmic cycle: left hand hits at the knee, right hand hits the thigh, left 
hand hits the thigh. This straightforward simplicity of this rhythmic pattern harbors unsuspected 
depths, akin to the polymorphous structure of a Necker cube. By accenting the first and fourth 
strikes (right hand hits knee, left hand hits the knee), one highlights the “duple pattern generated 
by applying a triple grouping to the strict duple alternation of right-left hand hits.”352 
Alternatively, focusing one’s attention to the activity of one hand and disregarding its 
relationship to the other generates “a triple two-pulse grouping with each hand playing this figure 
                                                                                                                                                                     
set, and then on piano comping patterns – the typical elements that go into establishing 
the rhythmic feel or groove of the piece”  (Monson, “Hearing, Seeing, and Perceptual 
Agency,” 38-39). From there, attention can be focused on the chief melodic instrument, 
which presents the object of primary focus; namely, the melody. In phenomenological 
terms, Monson is leading the students through an awareness of the elements that 
constitute their experience of the music, in its bodily and intellectual aspects. Monson’s 
focus on the bodily, or groove-based aspect of the experience is a welcome complement 
to Schütz’s analysis of the six-note sequence, which would describe the listener’s 
experience of the melodic instrument’s contribution.  
351 For a detailed analysis of this rhythmic pattern and its role within Tumbuka musical 
practice, see chapter five of Friedson’s Dancing Prophets. 
352 Friedson, Dancing Prophets, 145. 
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(knee, thigh, thigh) in a staggered time relationship.”353 In other words, the pattern is then 
constituted as three units of knee-stroke/thigh-stroke. 
While there are more perceptual possibilities inherent in this rhythmic pattern, the co-
existence of the two are sufficient to demonstrate a flaw in phenomenological thinking about 
musical ontology. Schütz and others who promote a conception of a musical work as an ideal 
object presuppose that there is one way to constitute a musical work, while the aforementioned 
examples of two-part inventions and Tumbuka drumming serve as paradigmatic instances of 
multistability in acoustic phenomena. A more general point is that foregrounding some aspect of 
a musical event necessarily entails backgrounding others, and that by assuming different 
perceptual standpoints, the listener yields what amounts to different musical works – if, 
following Schütz, we understand a musical work to be a particular polythetic process of 
constitution.  
By presupposing that there is one way of constituting a musical work, phenomenology’s 
ontology of music also presupposes a static definition of a work’s ‘signal.’ I have suggested that 
phenomenology, for this reason, puts forth a ‘digital ontology,’ since this state of affairs bears 
some similarity to contemporary recorded music. “A microphone amplifies not only what we say 
through it – the signal – but everything around that signal, which sound engineers call noise,” 
writes Krukowski. “And the engineers for digital signals have developed a suite of tools to 
eliminate it.”354 As a corollary to presupposing a definition of signal, a digital ontology will also 
overlook the constitutive role of noise in auditory perception. Phenomenology’s tendency to do 
just this will become clear in the following argument, which will demonstrate that our perception 
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of sound is always contextualized by noise and therefore that a viable ontology of music and 
account of the musical experience must account for the function of noise. 
The function of noise in musical experience can be analogized with the processes of retention 
and protention, which we saw in Schütz’s analysis of the six-tone sequence to be central to the 
phenomenological account of a listener’s constitution of music. Retention and protention 
demonstrate that a listener’s perceptual present is saturated with the temporally absent. The tone 
that I hear now contains, or is heard in relation to, the preceding tone that has ceased to sound. 
The tone that I hear now also possesses a certain dynamic quality that suggests possible ensuing 
tones. Similarly, noise contextualizes what is heard while flying under the perceptual radar. 
Whereas retention and protention show the perceptual present to be affected by the temporally 
absent, an argument for the musical function of noise demonstrates that the perceptual present is 
colored by the thematically absent. In phenomenological terms, these background tones 
constitute a horizon against which the signal is perceived. 
In The New Analog, Krukowski argues convincingly for the importance of noise in various 
auditory functions taken for granted in workaday life. Our ability to locate sounds in space, for 
instance, implicates the concept of noise: 
If I want to listen to the person across the table from me in a restaurant, I block out the 
noise from the rest of the room. If I want to listen in on the conversation at the next table, 
I tune out the talk at my own. In other words, spatial hearing is dependent of the presence 
of noise as well as signal. If everything were signal, the restaurant would be a screaming 
mass of sound, and we wouldn’t be able to focus our attention on anything at all.355 
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The critical role of noise in spatial hearing is further demonstrated by the inefficacy of hearing 
improvement technology in certain scenarios. “Hearing aids are notoriously bad at cocktail 
parties and crowded restaurants because amplifying volume doesn’t improve spatial hearing – it 
only makes the same clump of indistinguishable noises louder,” writes Krukowski. “Localization 
is not a function of hearing sensitivity; it’s the result of our ability to detect difference in what we 
hear from each ear.”356 In other words, localization involves the ability to distinguish signal and 
noise; it involves our ability to render some stimuli signal and other stimuli noise through the 
direction of our attention. 
 Noise communicates more than just where a sound is coming from. How something is said is 
often as communicative as what is being said. This is demonstrated by the drawbacks of 
advances in telephonic technology. Perceptual coding has made it possible for cell phone 
developers to eliminate “not merely the noise framing a signal, but those parts of the signal itself 
that are unnecessary for communicating data…The rest of the voice – those aspects that do not 
help a listener understand the words – can then be separated out and reclassified as noise.”357 As 
a consequence, words become clearer, but how they are delivered is obscured. This ostensibly 
desirable state of affairs had led to certain losses in communicativeness. For instance, the 
microphones in cell phones are designed to minimize what audio engineers call ‘proximity 
effect’: “the simple fact that the closer a sound source is to a mic, the mellower its tone; and the 
father a sound source, the thinner its sound.”358 As Krukowski points out, the expressive use of 
proximity effect is epitomized by the “intimate mikeside manner”359 of Frank Sinatra, who lent 
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359 To borrow a phrase from the back cover of Sinatra’s Close To You (Capitol Records, 
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depth to his interpretation of lyrics by leaning in close and singing softly to convey intimacy and 
vulnerability or stepping back and singing loudly for opposite effects. As noted, cell phone 
microphones intentionally minimize the proximity effect in the service of relaying a consistent 
signal. In so doing, it becomes easier to understand an interlocutor’s words, but more difficult to 
glean their manner of communicating. In Krukowski’s poetic formulation, “Digital media allow 
for clear communication across great distances, but communicating distance itself becomes a 
challenge.”360 
If we bring the musical experience itself to bear on our views concerning the ontology of 
music then we find that noise claims an ineradicable place. Stated differently, there is no 
experience of music that is not contextualized by noise. One the one hand, if the musical 
experience takes place in vivid presence – i.e. where the listener is being confronted with 
externalized tones – then the fact that the listener is embodied and situated will have an effect on 
perception. Perhaps the listener is seated directly in front of the brass section; in this case, the 
listener is more likely to constitute the brass’ sequence of tones as central, not in the least 
because the loud brass would likely drown out the string section. On the other hand, if the 
musical experience takes place in the listener’s mind, so to speak, then the centrally constituted 
tonal sequence still owes its character to the tones that are merely implicit in the listener’s 
conscious processes of retention and protention. These tones are not the signal itself, thus they 
are noise, but the signal would not be the signal it is were it not for this noise. 
Because there is no musical experience that does not involve the interplay of signal and 
noise, any characterization of what music is (i.e. any ontology of music) must reflect this 
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essential aspect of music’s existence. This inclusion becomes increasingly necessary when we 
remember that, according to the phenomenological conception, the coming into being of a 
musical work involves a subjective pole. In accordance with its ideal status, it may be sensible to 
Schütz to regard a musical work as existent even if it is nowhere being realized at the moment. 
But the proper mode of existence of a musical work only comes about when it is constituted in 
consciousness – whether this be through being heard, remembered or read on a score.  
 
3. Critique of Work-Paradigm 
 Many scholars have critiqued conceptualizing music in terms of ‘works.’ This section will 
consider the different critiques of the work-paradigm of music, as well as the way that this work-
paradigm is implicated by viewing music as an ideal object. In keeping with our approach thus 
far, we will consider not only the arguments of philosophers, but also the ethnographies of 
ethnomusicologists and the historical reflections of musicologists. We will first consider the 
historical contingency of the work-paradigm before considering some ethnomusicological 
models suggesting alternative paradigms for thinking about the ontology of music. 
 
3a. Historical Contingency of Work-Paradigm 
 It only makes sense to construe music as an ideal object if one is trying to account for the 
mode of being particular to a musical work; that is, a musical event that admits of multiple 
instantiations over time. To attribute ideal status to an extemporized musical expression does not 
have the same intuitive force as thinking of musical works in these terms. An extemporization is 
precisely the type of thing that has no existence outside of the moment. In fact, its radically 
situated nature is often taken to be what is unique and valuable about improvisation; it is a 
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reflection or consequence of the performers’ state of mind, the atmosphere of the audience, the 
acoustic properties of the room and other such individuating factors.  
 A musical work, on the other hand, is thought to be in some respect ‘the same thing’ each 
time it is performed. This conviction gives rise to the need to explain how it is that ‘the same 
thing’ can exist in multiple instantiations that are not only geographically and temporally 
distinct, but may also differ from one another in details such as tempo, dynamics and accuracy. 
Ideality is, pardon the pun, an ideal solution, which permits the positing of an existence beyond 
the multiple instantiations and can, with a Platonic imprimatur, explain why each of the 
instantiations never attains the perfection of the work itself. 
 But the ‘work itself’ is a latecomer to the world of music making. Recall Schütz’s 
delimitation of the type of music in which he is interested in FPM: that which remains when “we 
abstract from the special use of music to accompany certain events in the outer world – music for 
dancing, music for marching, music in combination with the drama…”361 It would be more 
accurate to view all music as, in one way or another, functional and to understand pure or 
absolute music as embodying a particular function that arises out of certain social, economic and 
cultural conditions.362 With this promissory claim in mind, let us consider the functional nature 
of music throughout history with an eye on the ways in which this history problematizes the 
work-paradigm that undergirds the ontology of music as an ideal object. Since the work-
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paradigm is most prevalent in the Western classical tradition, and because the philosophers who 
defend the conception of music as an ideal object do so on the basis of considerations arising out 
of the Western classical tradition, we will limit our historical reflections to this tradition. 
 The autonomous composer is a relatively recent phenomenon. This fact alone ought to 
suggest that their creations did not prioritize contemporary notions of artistic integrity, but 
instead were above all intended to be serviceable: 
Before the late eighteenth century, ‘serious’ music was truly a performance art. It was 
mostly produced in the public arena to perform extra-musical functions. Performances 
were geared towards the temper and needs of the persons and institutions who determined 
the functions. Musicians, who were normally in the latter's employ, had little control and 
power of decision regarding matters of instrumentation, form, length, and text. They 
obeyed the wishes of their employers.363 
   The musical implications of this subservient role are far ranging. The accompanying role that 
music played meant that it was not the music itself that was the center of attention. Music in 
centuries past was not primarily encountered in a concert setting wherein it was recognized as 
the gathering’s raison d’être. Instead, music accompanied other activities that were the center of 
attention and, as a consequence, “music was not so much listened or attended to, as it was 
worshipped, danced, and conversed to. It was quite to be expected that audiences would applaud, 
chatter during, and sing along with a performance.”364 
As a consequence of the utilitarian nature of music, in conjunction with the fact that 
composers were not accorded ownership of their compositions, recycling (or, from a 
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contemporary vantage point, plagiarizing) pieces of compositions was common artistic 
practice.365 But this piecemeal approach also served an important function; namely making 
music highly adaptable to the different needs that a composer may encounter in the form of 
commissions. Insofar as composers were essentially freelancers with no shortage of work 
opportunities,366 recycling portions of compositions was an occupational necessity. “Reusing 
music…was just part of what it meant to compose music,”367 writes Lydia Goehr of eighteenth 
century compositional practice.  
It follows from the functional, commissioned nature of music during this period of time, that 
“Musicians did not see works as much as they saw individual performances themselves to be the 
direct outcome of their compositional activity.”368 One consequence of the de-emphasis, or even 
absence, of the work-concept in guiding composers was a relationship to notating music that is 
drastically different than the contemporary approach, which is itself a child of music in the age 
of the work-concept. Musical notation in centuries past assumed that performer’s possessed 
adequate improvisational ability to flesh out a relatively schematic score. Performers were held 
responsible for embellishments and making determinations where the composer left matters un- 
or underdetermined. In Goehr’s presentation, it was not until the turn of the nineteenth century 
                                                        
365 The ability to recycle pieces of existing compositions did not mean, however, that 
there were no notions of ownership and intellectual theft. Cf. Goehr, The Imaginary 
Museum of Musical Works, 183-185. 
366 Bach’s contract for services in Halle dictated that he compose works to be 
performed “on all high holidays and feast days, and any others as they occur, and on the 
eves of such days, and every Sunday and Saturday afternoon, as well as at the regular 
Catechism sermons and public weddings . . . in furtherance of divine service to the best 
of [one's] ability and zeal” (Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 182). 
367 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 181. 
368 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 186. 
  
128 
that “notation became sufficiently well specified to enable a rigid distinction to be drawn 
between composing through performance and composing prior to performance.”369  
The emergence of a regulative concept of the musical work cannot be easily explained and 
neatly dated. Many factors over a lengthy period of time have brought us where we are, 
musically speaking. It is not impossible, however, to identify different shifts that produced the 
beliefs, relationships and practices characteristic of contemporary musical culture. One such shift 
was the artistic and social emancipation of composers. “As the eighteenth century drew to a 
close,” writes Goehr of the correlation between the autonomy of the composer and the autonomy 
of their productions, “musicians were no longer thought about predominantly as in service to 
extra-musical institutions. Like their musical compositions, they were fast being liberated from 
the traditional power and restraint of ecclesiastical and aristocratic dignitaries.”370 This newfound 
autonomy altered how musical originality and ownership were thought about, as is reflected by a 
number of new laws put into place at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
nineteenth.371 These laws, in turn, necessarily had to determine what constituted a musical work, 
or a piece of a work, in order to forbid illicit reproduction. The emergent view that the musical 
work is an inviolable entity brought about a more determined score that, instead of asking for the 
performer’s creative contribution, now demanded absolute fidelity. Christopher Small sees the 
thoroughgoing score as a major factor in the prevailing conception of musical works as ideal 
objects: “Concert life today…is dominated by the idea that musical works have a continuous 
reality that transcends any possible performance of them…This idea stems partly from the 
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undeniable continuous existence of scores as permanent objects, which gives musical works the 
illusion of solidity…”372 
 In addition to the emancipation of composers from the restrictions imposed by the system of 
patronage, changes in performance practice also contributed to the dissemination of the work 
paradigm. It is not surprising that the autonomy of composers, and consequently their works, was 
coincident with the rise of a professional class of musicians tasked with their faithful realization 
in performance. Before the first half of the nineteenth century, it was taken for granted by 
composers and audiences alike that many if not most of the musicians performing a piece of 
music would be so-called amateurs. “The coming of the traveling virtuoso-entrepreneur ended 
that situation,”373 according to Small. In Small’s presentation, these virtuosi realized the 
economic rewards to be reaped from the newly formed middle class, whose expendable wealth 
came at the cost of an inability to develop their own musical abilities, thus relinquishing the 
labor of performance to the unprecedented prowess of virtuosi. With the stratification of the 
world of music into professionals-amateurs, Small identifies an epochal “change of attitude”: 
“Musical works were made for playing, and now they are for listening to, and we employ 
professionals to do our composing and playing for us. A piece of music is written not to give 
performers thing to play but in order to make an impact on a listener, who is its target.”374 In 
brief, music becomes less as an activity that people engage in, and more something that people 
listen to with the expectation of being affected.  
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3b. Conceptualizing Music Beyond the Work Paradigm 
The changes that took place in the conceptualization of music during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century have remained in place to the present day, determining not only musical 
practice but also philosophical treatments of music. At the heart of this musical Weltanschauung 
is the idea that music is something that one listens to. And what one listens to are musical works.  
Self-evident as these ideas may seem, it is the task of the present section to problematize them – 
or at least to demonstrate that these ideas represent only a minuscule piece of the rich and unruly 
world of human music making. We will do so by considering several alternative conceptions of 
music. We will begin with dichotomies drawn by Victor Zuckerkandl and Christopher Small that 
problematize some of the chief assumptions about music that have oriented philosophical 
reflection and led to the phenomenological conception. We shall then turn to ethnomusicologist 
Thomas Turino’s argument that music is not a unified art form and his proposal of four distinct 
fields of music making. 
Victor Zuckerkandl begins the second volume of Sound and Symbol, which treats Man the 
Musician, with a reflection on two concepts of musicality. The “familiar”375 concept understands 
musicality in terms of contemporary Western musical practice and beliefs, which Zuckerkandl 
refers to as “the culminating phase”376 of music history. This view of musicality distinguishes 
between the musically gifted individuals and unmusical persons, puts forth a division of musical 
labor where the composer, performer and audience each has their proper realm and equates 
music with musical works. The alternative conception of musicality regards it as an “overall 
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human endowment,”377 which belongs not to an elite class of artists and connoisseurs, but to 
human beings as such. 
Zuckerkandl implies that the familiar concept of musicality has obscured the existential 
concept of musicality as constitutive of being human due to the overwhelming magnificence of 
the tradition of Western art music. Speaking of the “epochal discovery of polyphony,”378 
Zuckerkandl does seem to accord the Western tradition a special status, but his project requires a 
more inclusive reach. “How,” he asks, “…can we hope to understand the innermost essence of 
music, including that of the culminating phase, unless we consider its entire trajectory and take 
into account both the beginning and the culmination?”379 However, “beginning” in this context is 
not a temporal designation. Zuckerkandl is not proposing to undertake a history of music. Rather, 
it implies an examination of the primordial, as opposed to the familiar, conception of musicality 
that Zuckerkandl endorses.  
The impetus to consider music outside of the context of its culminating phase is motivated by 
points of divergence between music in its culminating phase (i.e. Western art music) and music 
in other stages of its development as well as other musical traditions. Gregorian chant, for 
instance, represents a stage in which music was not conceived as works to be disinterestedly 
contemplated by an audience. This tradition undoes some of the assumptions that orient music in 
its culminating phase. Here roles such as “composer,” “performer” and “audience” are 
inappropriate. The so-called composer has not created anything, he has “been graced with the 
gift of being able to hear the angels singing; all he does is set down the sounds vouchsafed him 
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by heaven.”380 Strictly speaking the music is performed, but modern assumptions about what 
performance entails are wholly inappropriate with respect to Gregorian chant. The music is 
neither entertainment nor art. The music is not something to be listened to, but part of the process 
of worship.  
Folk music also problematizes the traditional notion of music. Until recent days, folk music 
was never notated and set down into compositions; it was an oral tradition, passed down through 
generations and undergoing all the alterations that one expects from such an informal mode of 
transmission. Performance also takes a different form in the folk tradition; it is, to anticipate a 
term used by Turino, participatory. “The situation is that of an all-together,” writes Zuckerkandl, 
“not of a confrontation,”381 in which there is a strict separation between performers and listeners. 
The evidence of music other than the Western art music of the past few centuries completely 
reorients Zuckerkandl’s aim vis-à-vis a philosophy of music: “Seen from the phase of the 
beginning, music appears as one of the main faculties of human consciousness in its advance 
toward even wider horizons. What we must do is take the problem of musicality out of the 
context of the culminating phase and place it back into the context of the beginning.”382 To 
consider musicality as a main faculty of human consciousness has methodological implications. 
Zuckerkandl’s approach is thus phenomenological: “The task simply is to have a close look at 
the facts, describe them faithfully, and interpret them correctly.”383 
Zuckerkandl’s task of studying the musicality of human beings resonates with the central 
claim made by Christopher Small in his monograph Musicking. Small’s basic claim is that music 
is fundamentally an activity, despite the fact that historical forces have led to the hypostatization 
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of music into works and have led us to conceive of music as a thing. Stated differently, both 
thinkers are interested in music as something that human beings do as opposed to the reified 
works of music that select human beings have created. 
In the previous section, we sketched Small’s narrative concerning the ascendance of the 
work-paradigm during the first half of the nineteenth century. This shift in priority between work 
and performance has consequences for answering two central questions about music: “What is 
the meaning of music? and What is the function of music in human life?”384 Small likens the 
ingenious answers that have traditionally been proposed to explanations of planetary movement 
offered by astronomers before Copernicus’ heliocentric universe yielded a simpler and more 
satisfying solution. Small proposes his own Copernican turn when he claims that music “is not a 
thing at all but an activity, something that people do.”385 
What, then, does it mean to consider music in terms of what we might call the activity 
paradigm? In Musicking, it takes the form of an ethnography, or a “thick description,”386 of a 
symphonic concert. Music as an activity or an event – which Small designates by coining the 
term “musicking”387 – is animated by the relationships that constitute, are created by and are 
reinforced by the happening. “To music,” writes Small, “is to take part, in any capacity in a 
musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by 
providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing.”388 Small even 
suggests that the activities of ticket-takers, roadies, people working the soundboard and the 
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janitorial staff may arguably be considered musicking insofar as they make a contribution to the 
event of musical performance. 
Already it is clear that a study of musicking does not subscribe to the characteristic 
convictions of the study of musical works. For one, the separation (even hierarchy) between 
participants that marked the work paradigm is absent from the study of musicking: “in making 
no distinction between what the performers are doing and what the rest of those present are 
doing, it reminds us that musicking…is an activity in which all those present are involved and 
for whose nature and quality, success, or failure, everyone present bears some responsibility.”389 
Conceiving of music as musicking also alters the perennial question concerning the meaning of 
music. Previously the question was posed in terms of the work – what is the meaning of this 
particular work, say, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony? Under the rubric of musicking the question 
changes: “What does it mean when this performance (of this work) takes place at this time, in 
this place, with these participants?”390 
A different question quite naturally yields a different answer. Similar to the myopic approach 
that locates the meaning of music (viz. a musical work) entirely in the relationships between the 
tones, Small’s answer to the question concerning the meaning of musicking is also concerned 
with relationships, albeit of a different order: “The act of musicking establishes in the place 
where it is happening a set of relationships, and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the 
act lies. They are to be found not only between those organized sounds…but also between the 
people who are taking part, in whatever capacity, in the performance…”391 
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To summarize, Small’s thesis is that music is primarily a process and only derivatively a 
product. As such, each instance of musicking is a radically individual event. Just because the 
same musical work was performed does not entail that the meaning of the musicking is the same. 
For instance, listening to Wagner’s Ride of the Valkyries during the Bayreuther Festspiele 
instantiates different relationships than the experience of hearing that piece in the context of the 
film Apocalypse Now while sitting in a movie theater. The relationships between the tones 
remain the same, and therefore so does some of the meaning of the musicking, but the de-
emphasizing of the work as the locus of musical meaning overwhelmingly alters how musical 
meaning is parsed out. 
Zuckerkandl and Small both propose conceptions of music that challenge the work paradigm. 
Zuckerkandl proposes an understanding of musicality that sees it as a universal human 
endowment, thereby rejecting the prevalent view of the so-called culminating phase of Western 
music history that musicality belongs to the elite, the educated or simply the fortunately 
endowed. By relativizing the culminating phase as just one tradition among others – indeed, as 
just one historical stage of one tradition – Zuckerkandl paves the way for a philosophical 
consideration of music that is not reliant on musical works. Small similarly recognizes the 
contingency, both historical and cultural, of the Western classical canon. His genealogy of the 
emergence of this tradition demonstrates to him that music is less about works than it is about 
musicking; and this holds equally well in the culminating phase, the blindness of which to 
priority of musicking is merely a characteristic of its particular, peculiar manner of musicking. 
Zuckerkandl and Small thus propose dichotomies – musicality is not something rare, it is part 
and parcel of the human condition; music is not a thing, it is an activity. Thomas Turino, on the 
other hand, offers a paradigm for thinking about music that accommodates the work paradigm 
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while refusing to accord it any special status. In lieu of dichotomies, Turino sets out a four-fold 
conception of music, which he even suggests may be open to further distinctions and refinement. 
Music “is not a unitary art form,” writes Turino, anticipating a central thesis of Music as 
Social Life: The Politics of Participation, “but rather…this term refers to fundamentally distinct 
types of activities that fulfill different needs and ways of being human.”392 Turino argues for this 
thesis with different tactics. On the one hand, because we generally speak of music simpliciter, 
Turino believes that the English language lends itself to conflating the different fields of music 
into a single art form. Turino also pursues a linguistic line of argumentation leading to 
observations reminiscent of Christopher Small’s thesis in Musicking. Not only do we use a single 
word – music – to speak of a wide range of phenomena, but this single word is a noun, a 
consequence of which is that we “generally tend to think of music as a thing – an identifiable art 
object owned by its creators through copyrights and purchased by consumers.”393 Turino 
contrasts this state of affairs with his knowledge of varied musical cultures, gleaned through 
ethnomusicological fieldwork. Indigenous Aymara musicians in Peru, we are told, regard 
musical recordings in a manner analogous with photographs. Just as we think of a photograph as 
a representation of a person, not the person itself, so do the Aymara regard recordings as 
representations of past musical events, a pleasurable tool for reminiscing about special 
experiences, but never to be confused with the social event itself, which the Aymara thought of 
as music as much as the purely acoustic recorded residue. Turino resists the normative 
dimension, found in Small’s Musicking, of the recognition of this “strange reversal.”394 Strange 
though it may be, this particular cosmopolitan-capitalist conception of music is just one 
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phenomenon among others. We should not, however, overlook the fact that this conception is not 
the only one available even within cosmopolitan-capitalist society: “in the United States, as 
throughout the rest of the world, there are a multitude of music-dance activities that do not 
involve formal presentations, the star system, or recording and concert ticket sales. These other 
activities are more about the doing and social interaction than about creating an artistic product 
or commodity.”395 
Following Small, it must be remembered that the reifying cosmopolitan-capitalist conception 
of music is itself tied up with idiosyncratic types of doing and social interaction, or, in Small’s 
parlance, musicking. Thus instead of conceptualizing music in terms of common categories such 
as styles, Turino opts for thinking about music “in relation to different realms or fields of artistic 
practice.”396 This notion of a field of artistic practice is modeled on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
social field. Both concepts delimit “a specific domain of activity397 defined by the purpose and 
goals of the activity as well as the values, power relations, and types of capital (e.g. money, 
academic degrees, a hit song, athletic prowess, the ability to play a guitar) determining the role 
relationships, social positioning, and status of actors and activities within the field.”398 Turino’s 
four fields can be subdivided into two fields pertaining to real-time performance and two fields 
pertaining to the recording of music. 
The two fields pertaining to performance are participatory performance and presentational 
performance. Participatory performance erases the artist-audience distinction to the extent that its 
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“primary goal is to involve the maximum number of people in some performance role.”399 The 
participatory performance field obtains, for instance, in singing at church or recreationally 
making music with friends. Presentational performance is arguably the predominant model in 
contemporary Western musical culture. In contrast with the participatory performance field, 
presentational performance draws a strict distinction between artist and audience. In this field, 
the artists “prepare and provide music for another group, the audience, who do not participate in 
making the music or dancing.”400 Presentational performance governs, for instance, the artistic 
practice of classical music. 
Turino names the two fields pertaining to recorded music high fidelity and studio audio art. 
Although they may take advantage of the artistic potential of the studio, high fidelity recording 
purports to be a representation of live performance. Studio audio art, on the other hand, 
unabashedly incorporates sounds that have been crafted or manipulated in the studio. So, for 
instance, while the early recordings of the Beatles sound like the types of performances they 
would put on in the basement venues of Hamburg, later albums such as Revolver use studio 
tricks such as running recorded tracks backwards (as on the guitar solo of I’m Only Sleeping). 
What are the implications of conceptualizing music outside the work paradigm for a 
phenomenological ontology of music that views it as an ideal object?  
 
4. Consequences for the Phenomenological Account of the Musical Experience 
 Our next question concerns the effect that conceptualizing music outside of the work 
paradigm has for our understanding of the musical experience. Doing so will involve, first, a 
recapitulation of Schütz’s account of the musical experience. Then we shall return to the 
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conceptions of music that we examined in the foregoing section. Treating in turn Zuckerkandl, 
Small and Turino’s conceptions of music, we shall ask in what ways and to what extent these 
views lead us to alter our account of what we experience when we experience music. 
Anticipatorily, we shall see that all three of these conceptions compel an expanded account of 
music that transcends purely auditory experience by emphasizing the social and embodied 
dimensions of music’s existence. 
 In previous presentations of Schütz’s account of the musical experience, we emphasized that 
this experience consists in a complex imbrication of retentions and protentions that unfold over 
time through the particular polythetic performance of constitution that characterizes a musical 
work in its singularity. This account is not false, but a further qualification must be made. Earlier 
in this chapter we saw that this account of the musical experience belongs to the reflective 
attitude. It is the retrospective experience of music, which comes into view not in the course of 
experience, but only after the experience has come to pass. While Schütz does not renounce the 
reflective account of musical experience, he deems it “very important to make it perfectly clear 
that the experience of listening itself has quite another structure.”401 The pre-reflective 
experience of listening knows nothing of retentions and protentions; no more than hearing 
speech first involves encountering syllables that are then worked into words or the experience of 
reading text first finds letters that are synthesized one by one into complete words. Setting aside 
the characteristics of music’s finite province of meaning that we examined above, it can be said 
that Schütz’s account of the pre-reflective experience of music has as its basic unit the theme: “a 
single impulse, as long as he [the listener] lives within the flux of the ongoing music.”402 But this 
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qualification does not take us far enough to easily accommodate the conceptions of music that 
derive from Zuckerkandl, Small and Turino.  
 With respect to Small’s theory, the problem hinges on Schütz’s account of the role of social 
relationships in the musical experience. For Small, what we experience when we engage in 
musicking is not simply an auditory, tonal event – although this is certainly a significant moment 
in musicking. Small emphasizes the non-auditory aspect of the experience, that is, its function as 
“an activity by means of which we bring into existence a set of relationships that model the 
relationships of our world, not as they are but as we would wish them to be…musicking is in fact 
a way of knowing our world…”403 It would be inaccurate to claim that Schütz is ignorant of the 
social dimension of music – indeed this is the explicit focus of Making Music Together – but it is 
an open question to what degree Schütz and Small are in accord regarding this social dimension. 
The adequacy of Schütz’s account of the music experience, vis-à-vis Small’s conception of 
music, will then hinge on the relationship between the two thinkers’ views on the social 
dimension of musicking. 
 Schütz discusses two aspects of the social dimension of music in MMT. One of these aspects 
concerns “the pluridimensionality of time simultaneously lived through by man and fellow-
man,”404 which is involved in making music together. This “pluridimensionality” refers, on the 
one hand, to the dimension of outer time – e.g., the ten minutes of measurable time required to 
perform a work – and, on the other hand, to the simultaneous performance of polythetic steps in 
inner time that are part and parcel of the constitution of a musical work by the listener. From 
Small’s position, this view of the social dimension of music does not go far enough. The 
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simultaneous living-through of a pluridimensionality of time on the basis of tones in the external 
world being articulated in consciousness does not transcend the tonal dimension of music that 
Small’s theory goes beyond. As Small writes, the meaning of the act of making music resides 
“not only between those organized sounds which are conventionally thought of as being the stuff 
of musical meaning but also between the people who are taking part, in whatever capacity, in the 
performance.”405 Can Schütz accommodate such a theory? 
 The second aspect of the social dimension of meaning articulated in MMT takes us at least 
part of the way there. This aspect concerns musical culture, which Schütz conceives of in an 
epistemic manner. Musical culture is present in the act of making music as a socially derived 
“stock of knowledge at hand.”406 Schütz’s presentation of the function of musical culture takes 
place from the perspective of a musician and is thus discussed in terms of the performer’s 
knowledge of typicalities of certain musical styles (e.g. the harmonies typical of nineteenth 
century piano sonatas, which allow the performer to sight-read an unknown work with some 
degree of fluency). In FPM, Schütz also gestures towards the function of musical culture, albeit 
here from the listener’s perspective. In this context, Schütz speaks of “a frame of reference”407 
that to some extent determines the listener’s protentions, insofar as the listener’s pre-knowledge 
of the type of music she is listening to leads her to anticipate how a work will unfold and 
therefore accounts for experiences of surprise and boredom. 
 At first blush, this epistemic perspective on the social dimension of music seems somewhat 
impoverished. The experience of music through one’s pre-reflective knowledge and expectations 
is social in the same way that walking alone along a well-trodden path is to go on a walk with 
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others. First impressions aside, to what extent does Schütz’s account of musical culture 
accommodate Small’s view of the musical experience as the instantiation of social relationships? 
 A closer look shows that, while Schütz is on the right track, Small’s analysis cuts deeper. In 
Musicking, the social relationships that Small considers include the economic kinship of self-
selected audiences and their shared knowledge of appropriate concert comportment, the meaning 
of performers’ mode of dress and behavior towards the audience, the mediating function of the 
conductor, the mythological status accorded to dead composers and the authority of the score.408 
Some of these relationships can indeed be translated into Schütz’s language of the stock of 
knowledge at hand. For instance, the authority of the score and thereby the performer’s 
relationship to the composer is implicated in the performer’s respect for the letter of the text, in 
the performer’s understanding that every musical decision made must be sanctioned by the score. 
The listener’s frame of reference can also be expanded in a manner that is not unfaithful to the 
spirit of Schütz’s text. Whereas Schütz writes of the frame of reference in purely tonal terms, 
there is no reason why it should not be understood to include the context in which the music is 
experienced. Thus, the frame of reference for the experience of a symphony differs from a heavy 
metal concert not only with respect to the sounds that the listener expects to hear, but also with 
respect to the behavior that she is likely to encounter and engage in. This is manifest in the type 
of clothing that the listener wears (a tuxedo versus a t-shirt), the listener’s comportment during 
the performance (remaining still and silent versus violently moshing) and also the leeway 
granted to the performers in their realization of their own previously recorded works and their 
covers of other musical works. 
                                                        
408 For Small on audiences cf. 41; on performers cf. 65ff; on the conductor cf. 79f; on the 
composer cf. 87ff; on the score cf. 115.  
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 Other aspects of Small’s theory of musicking do not fit so effortlessly into Schütz’s account. 
We have seen that Small includes putatively peripheral roles in the social relationships that 
constitute the meaning of musicking. For instance, ticket takers and custodial staff figure into 
Small’s theory. Ticket takers manifest relationships that mark the concert hall experience as “a 
microcosm of those [relationships] of the larger industrial society outside of its walls.”409 The 
custodial staff also point to a division of labor that is indicative of a particular type of social 
arrangement. It is a stretch to place these roles within the performer’s stock of knowledge, 
although, once again, they can be included in an expanded conception of the frame of reference. 
In final analysis, Schütz’s account of the musical experience is theoretically amenable to Small’s 
account, although doing so requires departing from the letter of Schütz’s texts on music.410 The 
divide between Schütz and Small is most evident with regards to their respective conceptions of 
music, which for Schütz is a matter of tonal relationships and for Small is a matter of social 
relationships (only some of which are mediated by tonal material). 
 How does Schütz’s account of the musical experience fare when placed in conversation with 
Turino’s four-fold conception of music? Recall that Schütz’s presentation of music most neatly 
corresponds with the field that Turino names “presentational performance.”411 This field of 
music making maps onto the situation that Schütz generally has in mind when writing about 
music: the experience of a concertgoer attending a performance. But to the extent that the co-
performance of polythetic acts constituting the work’s identity is what is essential to the 
Schützian view of musical experience, Schütz’s view is also amenable to Turino’s category of 
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“high fidelity,” which refers to “the making of recordings that are intended to index or be iconic 
of live performance.”412 A number of examples that Schütz offers demonstrate that the embodied 
co-presence of listener and musician is inessential to the musical experience. This is a corollary 
to Schütz’s “the principle of the relative irrelevance of the vehicle”413 pertaining to ideal objects. 
Thus it is not essential that the listener be present at a performance, or that the piece be 
performed on the instruments intended by the composer, or even that any tones be externalized. 
As previously quoted, Schütz unequivocally maintains: “he who knows a piece of music ‘by 
heart’ does not need any reference to print, to any musical instrument or to performances heard 
or previously made, in order to reproduce the piece of music from beginning to end for his inner 
ear.”414 
 Schütz’s view of the musical experience can also be discussed in terms of what Turino calls 
“studio audio art,”415 in which the creation of a musical work involves studio technology to such 
an essential extent that the work cannot be realized in live performance. However, “the principle 
of the relative irrelevance of the vehicle” also ensures that the inability to be performed in no 
way alters studio audio art’s ability to fit into Schütz’s framework. It is simply the case that, if 
we wanted to draw finer distinctions concerning types of musical works, we would relegate 
studio audio art to that type that is experienced outside the concert hall. 
 The most interesting questions arise from the juxtaposition of Schütz’s account of the 
musical experience with Turino’s field of participatory performance. The most salient 
characteristic of this field is the effacement of the distinction between audience and artist. In 
other words, the field of participatory performance does not presuppose the category of listener, 
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at least as it appears in FPM. In bracketing the so-called “special”416 uses of music for purposes 
other than abstract listening, Schütz has also excluded the listener’s participation from 
consideration. The Schützian listener does not dance or otherwise take part in the creation of the 
music.417 The listener simply listens. On the other hand, Schütz often speaks of the “beholder,” 
which encompasses “the player, listener, and reader of music.”418 The inclusion of the player 
offers some preliminary indication that Schütz’s account of the musical experience pertains to 
participants as well as mere listeners. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The accounts of the musical experience offered by Small and Turino offer two considerable 
challenges to Schütz’s view of the musical experience. In Small’s case, the challenge stems from 
an expanded conception of music that understands the phenomenon to consist in more than mere 
tonal relationships. In particular, Small focuses on the role of relationships in the constitution of 
the event of musicking, of which tonal relationships are but one sub-category. Turino’s field of 
participatory music challenges Schütz’s common picture of the musical experience taking place 
in the mind of an otherwise inactive listener. It is unclear whether Schütz’s writings on music are 
able to accommodate an action-based theory of what is involved in the phenomenon.  
 We shall address these challenges in the next chapter by re-reading Schütz’s essays on music 
in light of his essays on the phenomenology of the social world. We shall argue that musical 
meaning is an equivocal concept in need of disambiguation and that Schütz’s social 
phenomenology is a handy theoretical resource for doing so. Once we have teased out the 
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different aspects of the meaningfulness of music we will be in a position to assess the ability of 
phenomenology to meet the challenges posed by ethnomusicology and musicology alike.  
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Chapter Three: Musical Meaning, Musical Universals and the Reciprocal Benefits of 
Ethnomusicology, Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Music 
 
 While the phenomenological account of the musical experience cannot be described as 
solipsistic or asocial, the accounts offered by ethnomusicologists and musicologists alike have 
led us to question whether phenomenology has an adequately social understanding of the musical 
experience. The first aim of the present chapter is a closer consideration of the social dimension 
of the musical experience, albeit through the indirect route of the theme of musical meaning. My 
argument has several components. First, I contend that Schütz’s writings on music, which we 
have seen to be few in number and primarily oriented by non-musical questions, can be 
profitably supplemented with his better-known work on the phenomenology of the social world. 
Placing these aspects of his thought into conversation allows us to rectify what has appeared to 
be a lacking account of sociality in phenomenology’s account of the musical experience. By 
fleshing out the manifold meanings implicit in the equivocal concept of “musical meaning” we 
shall see that phenomenology finds sociality at every turn.  
 We shall then consider the reciprocal benefits of ethnomusicology and the philosophy of 
culture. After considering the bifurcated nature of ethnomusicology, we will consider the role 
that the search for musical universals has played in the history of the discipline. By translating 
ethnomusicology’s insights into musical universals into Kantian language, we will consider the 
relationship between this conception of musical universals with the role of the a priori in the 
philosophy of culture. Despite initially appearing to be at odds, the synthetic a posteriori 
information gleaned from ethnomusicology will prove to be exactly what the philosophy of 
culture’s interest in a priori knowledge calls for. 
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1. Distinctions Pertaining to Meaning 
 A phenomenological account of the musical experience is distinguished by its focus on the 
activities of consciousness that constitute music as a meaningful experience. Consequently, if it 
can be shown that music offers different types of meaningful experiences, then an equivalent 
number of phenomenological accounts will be called for. As a preparatory step towards 
considering whether music is indeed the source of different varieties of meaningful experience, 
we will now consider number of distinctions that run through Schütz’s treatment of the theme 
“meaning” as it appears in his The Phenomenology of the Social World (hereafter PSW). 
 
1a. Subjective Versus Objective Meaning 
In his chapter on “Meaning in Schütz,” Lester Embree distinguishes three different 
“species”419 of meaning that are tacitly at play in Schütz’s thought. The first species of meaning 
involves the distinction between subjective and objective meaning, which Schütz acknowledges 
to be adopted from Max Weber’s work. Subjective meaning, Schütz writes, “is the meaning 
which an action has for the actor or which a relation or situation has for the person or persons 
involved therein.”420 More expansively stated, the subjective meaning of an action refers to 
“what he [viz. the actor] does, why he does it, and when and where his action starts and ends.”421 
For instance, an individual who is running may be doing so for exercise, or to flee a real or 
imagined danger, or to minimize his tardiness for a soon-to-begin appointment. Only the actor is 
entirely privy to the meaning that he “‘bestows upon’ or ‘connects with’ his action.”422 Thus the 
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subjective meaning of an action involves the epistemic privilege that actors have to their own 
motivations and goals.423 Suppose I am out for a walk and happen to witness the aforementioned 
individual running. Any explanation I now offer for what I see is an instance of the action’s 
objective meaning, which concerns “the meaning the same action, relation, or situation has for 
anybody else, be it a partner or observer in everyday life, the social scientist, or the 
philosopher.”424 Schütz acknowledges the inaptness of the term “objective” since “so-called 
‘objective’ interpretations are, in turn, relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreters and, 
therefore, in a sense ‘subjective.’”425 Perhaps I have lately been brooding on my idle lifestyle and 
have been chastising myself for my lack of an exercise routine. In this case, I may be more likely 
to interpret the running individual’s action as exercise. Or perhaps I am a pathologically anxious 
person. In this case, the individual’s action is more likely to appear to me as fleeing than running. 
Since objective meanings are to some extent unavoidably subjective one might be inclined to 
characterize the witness’ interpretation of another’s action as the subjective meaning that this 
person attributes to the actor’s action. Schütz, however, unmistakably rejects this interpretation: 
“it is obvious that an action has only one subjective meaning: that of the actor himself.”426 To 
mitigate such misunderstandings, Embree proposes the qualifiers “insider” and “outsider” in lieu 
of “subjective” and “objective” meaning, respectively.427  
                                                        
423 One might wish to level a psychoanalytic critique of the notion of subjective meaning, 
charging that, to some degree, individuals are not entirely the authors of their actions but 
are driven by unconscious desires. This critique, however, misses the mark. While such a 
line of thinking would be valid within the psychological sphere, the cultural scientist is 
precisely concerned with the meaning that an action has for its actor, regardless of 
whether other explanations of the action are available or whether the actor is ultimately 
mistaken to some degree about why she did what she did. 
424 Schütz, “Some Equivocations in the Notion of Responsibility,” 275. 
425 Schütz, “Some Equivocations in the Notion of Responsibility,” 275. 
426 Schütz, PSW, 32. 
427 Embree, The Schutzian Theory of the Cultural Sciences, 137. 
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Just as objective/outsider meanings are colored by the observer’s attitude, Schütz also 
recognizes that the understood meaning of an action is also a function of the individual’s cultural 
context. This leads us to the second species of meaning in Schütz’s thought, according to 
Embree: “‘personal’ (or ‘individual’) and also ‘collective’ (or ‘communal’)” meaning.428 The 
aforementioned distinction between subjective/insider and objective/outsider meaning now falls 
under the rubric of personal or individual meaning, since the subjective/insider meaning an 
action has, as well as the objective/outsider meaning granted to the action by an observer, 
concerns meanings as they are understood and characterized by individuals. Insofar as the 
meaning of an action is determined by its position within a cultural context, the meaning 
attributed to an action by the group performing the action will differ from the meaning attributed 
to the action by another group. Thus, “collective” or “communal” meaning can be further parsed 
into the meaning attributed to an action by the “in-group” (i.e. the group performing the action or 
the culture to which the actor belongs) and an “out-group” (i.e. a group with a different cultural 
background).429 
 
1b. Merely Perceptual/Phenomenological Object Versus Socio-Cultural Object 
The second meaning distinction operative in Schütz’s thought concerns what we shall call 
merely perceptual, or phenomenological, objects versus socio-cultural objects. We have already 
touched on the nature of an object considered merely perceptually in our previous discussion of 
Schütz’s treatment of music in FPM. To state it negatively, a merely perceptual object is what 
remains when all socially-culturally derived significance is stripped from the object. In the 
context of FPM, Schütz’s analysis of music has bracketed lyrics, other conceptual material such 
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as titles, the many functions that the music may serve other than contemplative listening and, 
relatedly, the various contexts in which music may be experienced. Once all the socio-cultural 
significance has been removed to reveal the merely perceptual or phenomenological object, 
Schütz finds that we are left with the “meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time.”430 
We encounter music as a socio-cultural object when we restore the elements that were 
bracketed in order to access music as a phenomenological object. Thus, regarding music as a 
socio-cultural object will take into account the fact, amply proven by ethnomusicology, that most 
music is of a functional nature and that an exhaustive account of the meaning of this music 
cannot omit the meaning granted by its place within a cultural context: “Traditional societies use 
music in innumerable ways across nearly all domains of life,” writes Timothy Rice. “Musical 
performances accompany nearly every important activity of cultural and social life, from birth to 
death and from work to rituals, religious ceremonies, leisure, and play.”431 
 
1c. Object Versus Activity 
 The final distinction important for a phenomenological account of musical meaning concerns 
the question of whether music is regarded as an object or as an activity. Distinguishing between 
the meaning of an object and an activity is vindicated by the differing accounts that Schütz offers 
in PSW. 
 We have already discussed meaning as it pertains to activities in section 1a under the rubric 
of subjective versus objective meaning. In this presentation, the meaning of an activity was 
understood in relation to a project, of which the activity was a constituent part. The project is the 
context in which the activity gains its meaning for the actor, its subjective meaning that 
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encompasses “what he [viz. the actor] does, why he does it, and when and where his action starts 
and ends.”432 The understanding of the same action by an observer is the objective meaning of 
the action. In short, the meaning of an activity is bound to the actor’s motivations, whether these 
motivations were the actor’s own (i.e. the subjective meaning) or the observer’s speculations (i.e. 
the objective meaning). 
Meaning as it pertains to products in not cashed out in terms of projects, since, in 
contradistinction to an activity, a product does not bear the inextricable relationship to its 
producer that an action bears to the actor. Of course, a product may indeed be understood as 
evidence of its producer’s motivations, as, for instance, an archaeologist would regard an 
uncovered prehistoric artifact. Such an interpretation strives for the subjective meaning of a 
product: “the meaning-context within which the product stands or stood in the mind of the 
producer.”433 However, when the interpreter disregards the production of the product and instead 
interprets the product as a constituted objectivity existing within a broader context, we are here 
dealing with the objective meaning of a product. Concern for the objective meaning of a product 
yields new fields of investigation. For instance, in Schütz’s example, instead of studying “the 
subjective meaning which the word takes on in the usage of a particular author or of a particular 
circle of speakers,” the philologist can study “the objective meaning of a word at a definite time 
within a definite language area.”434 To take another example, an originalist stance on 
constitutional interpretation, which attempts to determine the meaning of the Constitution in the 
minds of its authors, sets its sights on the subjective meaning of the product. This stance is 
illustrated by former Attorney General Edwin Meese III’s call for judges to embrace a 
                                                        
432 Schütz, “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences,” 60. 
433 Schütz, PSW, 133. 
434 Schütz, PSW, 138. 
  
153 
“jurisprudence of original intention.”435 When a judge, lawyer or legislator interprets the 
Constitution in terms of legal precedent, and thus the history of constitutional interpretation and 
the principle of stare decisis436, then these individuals have the objective meaning of the product 
in view. 
 The aforementioned meaning-distinctions demonstrate that “meaning” is a highly equivocal 
concept. Thus when we ask about the meaning of music we must be specific as to which meaning 
we are pursuing: is it the subjective meaning of music regarded as a merely perceptual product, 
the objective meaning of music regarded as a socio-cultural activity, etc.? In the following 
sections we shall take a closer look at each of the sub-species of the broad category of musical 
meaning. 
 
2. Subjective Meaning of Music Qua Merely Perceptual Product 
We will begin with the species of musical meaning that is most comprehensively treated by 
Schütz. If we were to gloss “subjective meaning of a merely perceptual object” on the basis of 
previous discussions it would seem that this type of meaning concerns the sum of polythetic acts 
undertaken by the producer of the object without reference to any specific cultural context. 
Although Schütz does not use the term, it is the subjective meaning of music qua merely 
perceptual product that is thematized in FPM. 
 We have discussed in a previous chapter Schütz’s analysis of a sequence of six tones.437 In 
what respect is this sequence meaningful? What does it in fact mean? 
                                                        
435 The Heritage Foundation, “The Originalist Perspective,” accessed March 14, 2017, 
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According to Schütz, music is, by definition, meaningful. In MMT, Schütz defines music – 
albeit “very roughly and tentatively” – as the “meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time.”438 
Music, for Schütz, trades in tones as opposed to words and he delimits the difference at the 
outset of FPM by first considering the meaningfulness of language. “Each term,” writes Schütz, 
“is a symbol of the concept which it conveys, and the concept itself refers to the real or ideal 
objects of our thoughts, to the qualities of these objects, to what happens to them with or without 
our interference.”439 Language is a meaningful context that makes reference to a conceptual 
scheme. Music, on the other hand, is “a meaningful context without reference to a conceptual 
scheme.”440 Music also does not have a representative or referential function, which is to say, 
music is a meaningful context “without immediate reference441 to the objects of the world in 
which we live, without reference to the properties and functions of those objects.”442 
The meaningfulness of music is not granted by reference to things beyond itself. But the 
meaningfulness of music is a function of consciousness reaching beyond what is immediately 
given in experience. In Schütz’s formulation, the musical experience “is based upon the faculty 
of the mind to recollect the past by retentions and reproductions and to foretaste the future by 
protentions and anticipations.”443 In other words, the meaningfulness of music is a function of 
the listener’s present perception of tones being saturated with past perceptions of tones as well as 
containing anticipations of future tones, which yields the unified experience of a musical object. 
As Thomas Clifton points out, “each successive instant is not created out of nothing only to be 
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again cast into nothingness. Such a situation could never lead to the experience of succession.”444 
Instead, retention and protention undergird the unity of a piece.  Music means, then, by referring 
back to dimensions of itself that it has already revealed and by suggesting how it might continue 
to unfold. We have seen how retention and protention are at work in the constitution of the six-
note theme, but the respect in which “meaning” enters into the picture is still somewhat unclear. 
The concept of coherence is important here. 
Schütz introduces the concept of coherence in his discussion of continuance as a basic 
category of the musical experience. In Schütz’s account, coherence names the “virtual unity 
[that] may be established even between intermittent notes of different pitch.”445 The different 
pitch of the tones is what distinguishes coherence from continuance, which pertains, strictly 
speaking, to “the same enduring tone.”446 A few words concerning continuance and repetition are 
in order so that we may lay the ground to distinguish coherence. 
Continuance and repetition comprise a single category of musical experience since Schütz 
understands repetition simply as “a special case of the intermittence of a continuance.”447 The 
experience of a single tone as enduring is the experience of continuance. Consider the initial 
chord struck in Schubert’s String Quintet in C, D 956, which is held for two bars. The dynamic 
markings indicate that the musicians should begin by playing piano, i.e. softly. By the first beat 
of the third bar, when the second violin and viola begin to play different tones, the instruments 
are supposed to be playing forte, i.e. loudly. The experience of a musical crescendo, of 
recognizing the transition from relative softness to relative loudness, involves retention. If our 
perception of uninterrupted tones did not retain earlier phases of the sonority in our perception of 
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later phases then there could be no experience of crescendo, of becoming louder. Schütz 
describes repetition as “merely a special case of the intermittence of a continuance. It is 
intermittence of a sameness.”448 For instance, in the famous opening phrase of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony, the first three notes of the four-note phrase are the same tone, albeit repeated as 
opposed to sustained.  
The examples we have used to discuss continuance and repetition have only pertained to 
single tones. However this category is also at play on what we might call higher levels of musical 
construction. Entire themes or motifs, for instance, may be repeated. In such cases, the 
experience of repetition requires more than mere retention, which was sufficient to ground the 
repetition of a single tone. In the case of a repeated theme, “the repetition originates in a 
synthesis of recognition between the reproduced past experience of the theme with its actually 
experienced recurrence.”449 So, continuance and repetition may be considered with respect to 
either a single tone or functional units. And when applied to functional units, continuance and 
repetition require acts of consciousness that go beyond mere retention, viz. memory and 
syntheses of recognition. 
Is the situation the same vis-à-vis coherence? We must first note that, unlike continuance and 
repetition, coherence does not apply to a single tone. An intermitted tone of the same pitch is not, 
in Schütz’s terminology, coherent; it is repeated. Minimally, then, it would seem that coherence 
requires two successive tones of differing pitch. However, this claim warrants closer 
consideration. Do we really hear two tones experienced without context (such as hearing these 
two tones against a harmonic background or within the unfolding of a musical theme) as 
coherent? I argue that we do not. When a mere ‘two tones’ are heard as coherent, this coherence 
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is granted by context, be it explicit or implicit (implicit context could be, for instance, previous 
experience of having heard the two tones sung for “Amen” in their proper harmonic context). 
The smallest unit of musical coherence would seem to be the theme, which is constituted as a 
theme precisely by virtue of being recognized as coherent. 
“The basic element of all music,” claims Schütz, “is a unique configuration called the 
theme.”450 This is a significant claim; on its basis we may deduce the following claim: sound 
“becomes” music when it is perceived as a theme; that is, as a coherent structure or a 
“meaningful arrangement.”451 When applied to the constitution of the six-note theme we now see 
that what was meaningful about the experience was the recognition of coherence in the sequence 
of tones. We are also able to draw the conclusion from Schütz’s analysis of the six-tone sequence 
that coherence emerges retrospectively. This becomes clear in many of Schütz’s discussions of 
the concept of meaning.452 “The flux of tones unrolling in inner time is an arrangement 
meaningful to both the composer and the beholder,” writes Schütz, “because and in so far as it 
evokes in the stream of consciousness participating in it an interplay of recollections, retentions, 
protentions, and anticipations which interrelate the successive elements.”453 
To sum up, the meaning of music qua merely perceptual object concerns the experience of 
coherence of non-representational, non-referential, a-conceptual tones. Such an experience of 
coherence is a function of recollection, retention, protention and anticipation, which unifies the 
unfolding of the tones in inner time. What makes this meaning “subjective” is the fact that the 
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experience of this coherence brings about a quasi-simultaneity in the activities of consciousness 
performed by the beholder in listening to the piece of music and those performed by the 
composer in the composition of the music. The meaning of the music is subjective insofar as the 
coherence of the music originally belonged to the composer who, through the externalization of 
the tones, offers beholders access to the activities of consciousness that first yielded a 
meaningful experience in the composer’s mind. 
We go astray when we try to be more specific about what a piece of music, regarded as a 
merely perceptual object, means. As an essentially polythetic process, the activities of 
consciousness that constitute the coherence of a piece of music, cannot be distilled or 
abbreviated. And regarded as a merely perceptual object, the meaningfulness of the music cannot 
be translated into language (which is by its very nature conceptual) that would express what 
music means. In other words, while musical objects have subjective meanings that can be 
known, these meanings will not be able to be translated into a statement of the sort “Musical 
object x means…” In fact, it should be noted that in the foregoing account we have not explained 
what music means but rather how music means. However, when we pivot to a consideration of 
music qua socio-cultural object, new possibilities emerge for discussing the meaning of music in 
conceptual, linguistic terms. 
 
3. Objective Meaning of Music Qua Merely Perceptual Object 
 With respect to music that has been shorn of all socio-culturally dependent meaning, the 
subjective-objective distinction disappears. In other words, the subjective meaning of music qua 
merely perceptual object is, in Schütz’s framework, the same as the objective meaning of music 
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qua merely perceptual object. Thus our discussion of this category is already contained in the 
previous section. Nevertheless let us take a closer look at why this is the case. 
 If we regard music simply as the meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time, as does 
Schütz, then the beholder’s experience of music will always reduplicate, with varying degrees of 
adequacy, the polythetic acts that constituted the experience of the producer – i.e. the subjective 
meaning of the music. Stated differently, when the only meaning-context at play in the musical 
experience is the self-referentiality of the work of music itself (i.e. the complicated imbrications 
of retentions, recollections, protentions and anticipations), then the variance in possible 
experiences is drastically reduced. Shorn of all its extra-musical associations, my experience of a 
piece of music is no different from that of its producer and the distinction of subjective versus 
objective meaning breaks down. 
 In what respects can the experience of the composer and the beholder differ? One factor that 
would alter the experience is what Schütz refers to as the beholder’s “frame of reference.”454 A 
frame of reference is a collection of knowledge derived from previous experience that is 
subconsciously at play in my present experience. It may seem at first blush that with the 
introduction of the concept of a frame of reference Schütz has violated the epoché that he 
instituted in order to access those “features which are essential for the experience of music as a 
phenomenon of our conscious life,”455 or what we have been calling merely perceptual music. 
For surely the knowledge that much American popular music of the twentieth century is 
constructed according to a 32-bar AABA form runs afoul of Schütz’s call to “disregard – 
temporarily at least – all the features characteristic of a particular musical culture only.”456 
                                                        
454 Schütz, FPM, 259. 
455 Schütz, FPM, 259. 
456 Schütz, FPM, 258. 
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However, we evade the criticism by pointing out that a frame of reference is itself one of those 
features that is essential for the experience of music; and so long as the specific contents of a 
frame of reference are bracketed, such that the frame of reference is considered only formally, 
then we remain within the finite province of meaning of music considered merely perceptually. 
 How can the concept of the frame of reference account for a divergence between the 
composer and beholder’s experience of a musical work? It can do so on account of the frame of 
reference’s effect on the richness of a beholder’s protentions and anticipations. The greater the 
beholder’s knowledge of what is typical, the more concrete and assured her protentions and 
anticipations will be. For instance, if a beholder has a familiarity with a substantial body of the 
Great American Songbook (the body of popular music largely hewing to the 32-bar AABA form) 
then she will anticipate resolutions and repetitions that will surprise a beholder with no stock of 
knowledge concerning Western popular musical conventions. To this extent the beholder’s 
experience may be less rich than that of the composer, but an impoverished frame of reference 
would not prevent a beholder from the sorts of constitutive activities that yielded the coherent 
six-tone sequence that Schütz analyzes. In other words, the beholder would still undergo a 
simultaneous or quasi-simultaneous experience of the polythetic acts that took place in the mind 
of the producer.  
 
4. Subjective Meaning of Music Qua Socio-Cultural Object 
 Like the subjective meaning of the musical product qua merely perceptual object, the account 
of the subjective meaning of music qua socio-cultural object concerns the meaning-context in 
which the object stood in the mind of the producer; and our ability to experience this meaning 
requires our simultaneous or quasi-simultaneous performance of the polythetic acts that took 
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place in the mind of the producer. While this dimension would be founded upon the subjective 
meaning of the musical product qua merely perceptual object, it will also include all the extra-
musical resonances that the work had for the producer since we are here concerned with music as 
a socio-cultural object instead of as a merely perceptual object. 
 
4a. Finite Province of Meaning Correlated to Socio-Cultural Music in General 
 As previously discussed,457 Schütz argues that different realms of experience are 
characterized by different finite provinces of meaning. We have seen that glossing a finite 
province of meaning entails an account of the tension of consciousness, time-perspective, form 
of experiencing oneself and form of sociality that is unique to a particular type of experience. 
What type of experience is that of music in its socio-cultural character? On the one hand, it 
seems to bear some resemblance to our earlier account of the work world as the paramount 
reality. As with the work world, the socio-cultural world is an intersubjective world in which 
construing the subject in a solipsistic manner is, at best, a helpful theoretical starting point and, at 
worst, a gravely misleading mistake. On the other hand, the experience of music qua socio-
cultural object bears some resemblance to the experience of music as a merely perceptual object. 
In this case as well, insofar as we are not directed towards the manipulation of objects in the 
world and carrying projects out, our tension of consciousness resembles the relaxed surrender of 
the tension correlated to merely perceptual music. 
 We shall see that the search for a single finite province of meaning to encompass all socio-
cultural considerations of music is misguided. Some musical phenomena of the socio-cultural 
world will elicit the sort of disinterested aesthetic attitude that accompanied the musical 
                                                        
457 Cf. Chapter 2, section 1c. on Schütz’s account of the musical experience. 
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experience that Schütz describes in FPM. Other musical phenomena will be more closely tied to 
pragmatic functions that situate the musical experience within the work world of everyday life. 
In short, socio-culturally-informed music embraces a diversity of finite provinces that stand in 
stark contract to the single finite province of merely perceptual music. If we wish to determine 
the finite province of meaning correlated to socio-cultural music we shall have to consider the 
phenomena on a case-by-case basis. 
 
4b. Peter Kivy on Pure Music 
 Since subjective meaning is in question, we are concerned with the meaning for the creator of 
the work. And since we are construing music as an object that stands within a socio-cultural 
meaning-context, we are no longer bracketing the layers of meaningfulness that derive from a 
musical work’s place within tradition, ritual, history, discourse, etc. Thus the subjective meaning 
of a musical work qua socio-cultural object makes reference to the meaning that the work has for 
the producer, including those dimensions of meaning that go beyond the interplay of 
recollection, retention, protention and anticipation. While the socio-cultural meaning of a 
musical work goes beyond the species of musical meaning discussed in the previous section, 
socio-cultural meaning will be build upon the meaningful (i.e. coherent) arrangement of tones in 
inner time. After all, as we saw in the previous section, what distinguishes music from mere 
noise is the experience of coherence. Thus in order for socio-cultural associations to be part of 
the musical experience, we must first have a musical substrate to which they may be appended.  
 What sorts of meanings do we have in mind when referring to music as a socio-cultural 
object? In delimiting his area of interest in FPM, Schütz focused his attention on music not 
utilized “to accompany certain events in the outer world – music for dancing, music for 
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marching, music in combination with the drama…”458 However, insofar as we are still concerned 
with music qua object as opposed to qua activity, we continue to bracket the use of music to 
accompany events in the world.  
We will now turn to Peter Kivy’s discussion of pure music as a means of introducing these 
socio-cultural dimensions of meaning as they pertain to subjective meaning and the epistemic 
problems surrounding them. In his attempt to define “pure music,” Kivy touches on issues 
pertaining to subjective meaning and its significance for the beholder’s experience. Kivy’s 
interest is 1) whether authorial intention to represent or accompany some extra-musical object or 
event destroys the purity of the music the beholder hears and 2) whether the objective meaning 
of the phenomenon (viz. the extra-musical associations the beholder hears into, so to speak, the 
musical object) alters the status of pure music. These are not our questions, but Kivy’s discussion 
of authorial intention is a useful way to orient the discussion of the subjective meaning of music 
qua socio-cultural object. 
In his book Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience, Peter 
Kivy spends fourteen pages trying to define the concept. Schütz’s definition (if we can call it 
that) of pure music begins to appear problematic when Kivy writes “just because [musical 
works] have no accompanying text, title, program, or other literal hint that they are not to be 
taken as pure musical structure, it does not follow that these things are ‘pure music,’ what I have 
been and will be calling ‘music alone.’”459 The composer’s intention is for Kivy the sticking 
point. Musical works that we now tend to regard as pure musical structures may in fact have 
initially possessed some extra-musical functions: “Mozart’s wind band divertimenti were 
functional compositions for social occasions. And a great deal of Bach’s best-known keyboard 
                                                        
458 Schütz, FPM, 258. 
459 Kivy, Music Alone, 15. 
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music had a quasi-didactic intent.”460 To countenance this consideration, Kivy proposes a 
provisional definition of pure music that demands only “one of the leading intentions being that 
it be responded to in such and such a way.”461 Translating Kivy’s concerns into our terms, he is 
asking about the effect of subjective meaning on objective meaning. More specifically, he is 
asking whether the subjective meaning of music qua socio-cultural object prevents a beholder 
from experiencing a musical work as a merely perceptual object (i.e. as pure music). But by and 
by, Kivy rejects authorial intention as a necessary or sufficient condition for either destroying or 
establishing the ‘purity’ of a musical work. Two examples allow him to do so. 
Kivy cites Arthur Honegger’s Pacific 231 as an instance of a work in which authorial 
intention goes against our perception that the work in question is not pure music. As the title 
suggests, and Honegger’s introductory remarks to an edition of the work’s score make clear, 
Pacific 231 bears some relation to a railway engine. And yet, Honegger states in no uncertain 
terms that he has not “aimed to imitate the noise of an engine.”462 Nevertheless, Kivy takes it for 
granted that it is well-nigh impossible not to hear the composition as a representation of railway 
noises. Kivy’s point here is that the listener’s perception of representation, even where the author 
did not intend to represent, will render the experience of a musical object as something other 
than pure music. In our terminology, the experience of Pacific 231 yields an objective meaning 
that is difficult, if not impossible, not to hear as the subjective meaning of the composer. Stated 
differently, the composition seems so evidently to represent the sounds of a train that it is 
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461 Kivy, Music Alone, 16. 
462 Kivy, Music Alone, 17. 
  
165 
difficult for the beholder463 to conceive that such a representation was not the intention of the 
composer. 
The second example that Kivy uses to deflate the significance of authorial intention is the 
case in which the composer avows that a representation is intended while the listener experiences 
no such representation. Kivy here cites the second movement from Beethoven’s String Quartet in 
F, Op. 18, No. 1, which was allegedly written with the vault scene from Romeo and Juliet in 
mind. Arguing that in an aesthetic register, representation should be understood as a “success 
concept,”464 and citing the experience of Beethoven expert Joseph Kerman along with his own 
experience, Kivy is content that the unsuccessful intention of a composer to represent is not to be 
accorded priority over the listener’s experience. To once again translate Kivy into our terms, the 
question here is how we are to regard a musical work that is regarded by the beholder as a 
merely perceptual object while having been conceived by the composer as a socio-cultural 
object. 
Kivy claims that these considerations point to the position that “what determines our 
decisions is the music itself. What can sustain our interest as pure music, as music alone, is, ipso 
facto, music alone, the composer’s intentions notwithstanding.”465 Regarding the question from a 
phenomenological perspective we are partially in agreement with Kivy. However, instead of 
pointing to the noematic pole of the relationship (i.e. the music itself), it is more accurate to 
regard the noetic pole (i.e. the acts of the beholder’s consciousness; the beholder’s “cognitive 
                                                        
463 Of course this is somewhat subject to the background of the beholder. An individual 
with no knowledge of railroads would not recognize Pacific 231 as representational. In 
Schütz’s terms, the ability to make the connection between the music and a train turns on 
the beholder’s “stock of knowledge at hand.” 
464 Kivy, Music Alone, 22. 
465 Kivy, Music Alone, 23. 
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style”466 in constituting the musical object) as the decisive factor. Recall that, from the 
phenomenological standpoint, music does not exist apart from a subject that constitutes it as a 
meaningful arrangement. Thus it is not the tones themselves, but rather the subject’s relationship 
to them that yields the experience of music. Furthermore, it is the subject’s particular attitude or 
cognitive style that determines what type of musical experience is had – that of music qua merely 
perceptual object, music qua socio-cultural object, etc. 
Although Kivy refers to the music itself to resolve disputes over its status as pure or 
programmatic, he sees dangers in the unqualified acceptance of this position. The problem, 
argues Kivy, is casting the net too widely. If we accept that something’s ability to be heard as 
pure music is sufficient to characterize it as pure music, then we are forced to include 
phenomena such as bird songs, foreign languages, mechanical noises, etc. under the rubric 
“music.” Such a consequence, however, runs afoul of Kivy’s most basic understanding of music 
as something possessing “syntactic properties”467 that could not be found in a phenomenon that 
is not the product of human consciousness. Similarly, the “winds and tides may, by chance, 
produce on the beach an arrangement of pebbles that looks like letters spelling out a well-formed 
grammatically correct English sentence. But it cannot be one.”468 
Once again, from a phenomenological perspective, we don’t run into the same problem as 
Kivy; although questions in need of addressing do arise. Recall that, in MMT, Schütz defines 
music – albeit “very roughly and tentatively” – as the “meaningful arrangement of tones in inner 
time.”469 Defining music in this manner does not prima facie deny bird songs and mechanical 
noises the status of music. Nor does this definition make any reference to the author or origin of 
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the tones. What is important for Schütz, and the phenomenologist more generally, is the 
listener’s experience, more specifically, the assumption of the cognitive style constitutive of the 
musical attitude. Such a position entails that subjective meaning is not a condition for the 
possibility of objective meaning. 
Let us return to an aforementioned example to get a better understanding of subjective 
meaning as it pertains to music qua socio-cultural object. The type of meaning in question here is 
the connection that the second movement of Beethoven’s String Quartet in F, Op. 18, No. 1 had 
for Beethoven with the vault scene from Romeo and Juliet. This connection exists in the mind of 
the composer, hence it is a subjective meaning, and the connection transcends what is strictly 
given in the tones comprising the musical work and makes reference to a wider cultural 
meaning-context.  
To simplify matters, let us take as a test case the connection between Arthur Honegger’s 
Pacific 231 and a locomotive train.470 This variety of socio-cultural subjective musical meaning 
involves the association of tones and a material object in the outer world. Just as the constitution 
of the subjective meaning of music qua merely perceptual object was illustrated with a 
phenomenological account of the constitution of a musical theme, the constitution of the 
subjective meaning of music qua socio-cultural object can be grounded in an account of 
association. It should be noted, however, that associative connections are also at play in the 
constitution of subjective meaning of music qua merely perceptual object, namely in 
remembering and expectation.471 But a different sort of association grounds the connection 
                                                        
470 However, this is not to suggest that the subjective meaning of music qua socio-
cultural object would be exhausted by such a connection. 
471 Cf. Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, 164. 
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between tones and, say, a train. At its most basic, this phenomenon is referred to by Husserl as 
appresentation. 
 
4c. The Concept of Appresentation  
The concept of appresentation472 has already, albeit briefly, been addressed in the context of 
Schütz’s ontology of music.473 It was seen that an appresentational relationship exists between 
the object of the musical score or the occurrence of performance and the ideal object that music 
essentially is. Let us consider the concept more closely. Appresentation can be clarified with the 
distinction between perception and what, in Ideas I, Husserl terms “depictive-symbolic or 
signitive-symbolic objectivation.”474 In perception, or an immediately intuitive act, something is 
given “in itself:” “perception makes present, seizes upon an it-itself in its presence ‘in 
person.’”475 But in the case of depictive-symbolic or signitive-symbolic objectivation “we intuit 
something in consciousness as depicting or signitively indicating something else; having the one 
in our field of intuition we are directed, not to it, but to the other, what is depicted or designated, 
through the medium of a founded apprehending.”476 Thus although it belongs to the essence of 
the perception of physical things that it be adumbrative perception, and therefore that my 
perception of a box include sides that are not immediately intuited and yet are apperceived, this 
                                                        
472 It should be noted that appresentation and apperception are commonly used 
interchangeably; a tendency in which Husserl himself is complicit: “Husserl tends to use 
the term ‘appresention’ [sic.] as synonymous with ‘apperception’ or indeed 
‘presentification’” (Husserl Dictionary, 40). Schütz follows this tendency in his 
discussion of “that particular form of pairing or coupling, which Husserl calls 
‘appresentation’ or ‘analogical apperception’” (Schütz, “Symbol, Reality, Society,” 295).  
473 Cf. Ch. 2, section 1b. 
474 Husserl, Ideas I, 93. 
475 Husserl, Ideas I, 93. 
476 Husserl, Ideas I, 93. 
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would not constitute depictive-symbolic or signitive-symbolic objectivation because I am still 
directed towards the box in itself. 
The appresentational pairing comes in different forms. In Cartesian Meditations (CM) and 
Ideas II, Husserl shows how appresentation is involved in the constitution of others as psycho-
physical beings through the experience of empathy, and in Experience and Judgment (EJ), 
Husserl discusses a further variety of possible appresentational relationships.477 The different 
forms that appresentation takes can be glossed with reference to the notion of orders of objects: 
Each object is an object within a field; each experience carries along its horizon; both 
belong to an order of a particular style. The physical object, for example, is 
interconnected with all the other objects of Nature, present, past, and future, by spatial, 
temporal, and causal relations, whose sum-total constitutes the order of physical 
Nature.478  
Mathematical objects, artistic objects, religious objects and so on could be similarly glossed. 
This plurality of appresentational situations compels Schütz to search for the commonalities 
underlying appresentational relationships as such, and he proposes four orders involved in every 
instance of appresentation. Let us consider these four orders, using socio-culturally meaningful 
music as an illustration. 
Schütz names the first order the apperceptual scheme, which concerns “the order of objects 
to which the immediately apperceived object belongs if experienced as a self, disregarding any 
appresentational references.”479 If we construe appresentation at its most basic as a situation in 
which one thing refers or directs consciousness to something other than itself (whether this 
                                                        
477 Cf. Husserl, CM § 50-51, Ideas II § 45-47 and EJ § 34-43. 
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‘something other than itself’ be an aspect of the thing not immediately given to perception, a 
recollection, an idea, etc.), then the apperceptual scheme brackets the ‘something other than 
itself’ to which the first thing refers and merely considers what kind of thing the first thing is.480 
In the case of socio-culturally meaningful music, the apperceptual scheme would concern the 
tones being sounded, which could be construed as belonging to the order of perceptual objects.  
When we take the immediately apperceived object not as a self “but as a member of an 
appresentational pair, thus referring to something other than itself”481 we have the order of the 
appresentational scheme. The appresentational scheme is most powerfully present in those 
curious instances when one knows that an object refers to something beyond itself yet lacks the 
context to understand what is being appresented; for instance, in encountering an ancient 
Egyptian hieroglyph I am aware that the symbol has a meaning, but do not know what it means. 
Thus I am still directed towards the immediately apperceived object, but as a question mark of 
sorts. Returning to our test case of socio-culturally meaningful music, the appresentational 
scheme would come into view, for instance, when listening to a field recording of ritualistic 
music. If we were to be conscious of the indications that this music was accompanying an event 
from which it drew its significance, then the awareness of this ambiguous reference situates us 
within the appresentational scheme. 
                                                        
480 Schütz’s terminology lends itself to misunderstanding since, in his definition of the 
apperceptual scheme, he speaks of an “apperceived object” where “perceived object” 
seems to be more appropriate. Evidence that these terms may be read synonymously can 
be found earlier in his discussion of appresentation, when he writes of the unseen 
backside of a red wooden cube, “the unseen side will have some shape, some color, and 
consist of some material. At any rate, we may say that the frontside, which is apperceived 
in immediacy or given to us in presentation, appresents the unseen backside in an 
analogical way” (Schütz, “Symbol, Reality, Society,” 295). Clearly, Schütz is using the 
phrase “apperceived in immediacy” as synonymous with “given to us in presentation.” 
481 Schütz, “Symbol, Reality, Society,” 299. 
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To construe the phenomena according to “the order of objects to which the appresented 
member of the pair belongs which is apperceived in a merely analogical manner,”482 is to be 
oriented by the referential scheme. For instance, in the aforementioned case of the second 
movement of Beethoven’s String Quartet in F, the referential scheme would be oriented towards 
the order of fictive objects to which theatrical scenes (in this case, the vault scene from Romeo 
and Juliet) belong. 
Finally, the contextual or interpretational scheme concerns “the particular type of pairing or 
context by which the appresenting member is connected with the appresented one.”483 We have 
already noted the plurality of types of appresentational situations – cases in which the 
apperceived object and appresented object belong to different realms (for instance, the 
relationship between the American flag and the United States of America) or cases in which they 
belong to the same realm (for instance, the relationship between smoke and fire). The contextual 
or interpretational scheme makes clear which type of appresentational relationship holds between 
the apperceived object and appresented object. 
On this note, let us return to the question of the contextual or interpretational scheme 
undergirding the connection of tones and socio-cultural meanings. How is it that an arrangement 
of tones can be connected with a scene from dramatic literature (e.g. the second movement from 
Beethoven’s String Quartet in F, Op. 18, No. 1), or a material object in the outer world (e.g. 
Arthur Honegger’s Pacific 231), or the ideals of a nation (e.g. The Star-Spangled Banner)? 
These three examples suggest that there is in fact not one answer, but rather a multiplicity of 
manners by which music may be laden with socio-cultural meanings. 
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As was suggested by the case of Beethoven’s String Quartet, which Peter Kivy and 
Beethoven scholars were unable to hear as a reference to the vault scene from Romeo and Juliet, 
the appresenting of a musical work may be entirely a function of the producer’s individual 
associations. The private and idiosyncratic nature of Beethoven’s belief that the second 
movement of his string quartet bore a connection to the vault scene is no refutation of this socio-
cultural meaning. After all, what we are concerned with here is the subjective meaning of music 
qua socio-cultural object; that is, the meaningfulness of the music as a phenomenon of the 
producer’s mental life.  
The example of Arthur Honegger’s Pacific 231 demonstrates that the appresentational 
relationship may be founded upon auditory resemblance, through the use of the acoustic 
resources of instruments to imitate the sounds made by another object. The connection between 
The Star-Spangled Banner (excluding its lyrics) and the ideals of the United States is an 
appresentational reference that possesses the same degree of arbitrariness as the connection of 
Beethoven’s string quartet with Romeo and Juliet – one would be hard-pressed to explain how 
The Star-Spangled Banner sounds like the ideals of the United States, not to mention to explain 
how ideals ‘sound’ at all. However, unlike the case of Beethoven’s string quartet, the 
appresentational character of The Star-Spangled Banner is not founded in the producer’s 
whimsy, but rather in the intersubjective, socio-cultural category of tradition. 
In sum, the contextual or interpretational scheme undergirding the appresentational 
relationship between an arrangement of tones and a socio-cultural meaning that these tones have 
for their producer may be of various types. 
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5. Objective Meaning of Music Qua Socio-Cultural Object 
 The objective meaning of a product concerns the product’s situation in a meaning-context 
within the mind of the beholder. No reference is made to the producer or the production. 
Omitting the producer and production from the process of interpretation neither implies nor 
entails that the beholder is unaware that the object was produced, as if the cultural object had 
been confused for a natural object. In fact, the beholder may interpret the object in terms of a 
meaning-context that makes reference to a producer; for instance, to interpret an object as “art” 
implies an artist. However, instead of recognizing the work of art as painted by Picasso and 
thereby interpreting the painting in accordance with our knowledge of Picasso’s different 
stylistic periods, his personal life and his posthumous influence, all knowledge of the artist is 
omitted from our interpretation. The artist “is hidden behind the impersonal ‘one’ (someone, 
someone or other). This anonymous ‘one’ is merely the linguistic term for the fact that a Thou 
exists, or has once existed, of whose particularity we take no account.”484 Similarly, insofar as 
the work is recognized as an object created by someone, the beholder is not unaware that the 
object is the result of a process of creation. But this awareness does not play a role in the 
beholder’s interpretation of the object. 
 Structurally speaking, the objective meaning of music qua socio-cultural object appears to be 
isomorphic with the subjective meaning of music qua socio-cultural object. The difference 
concerns the meaning-context in question. Knowing the subjective or objective meaning would 
in both cases entail our ability to experience in simultaneity or quasi-simultaneity the polythetic 
acts that constituted the experience of the producer or the beholder. We have seen that this is an 
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achievable goal with respect to music construed as a merely perceptual object, but that the 
situation becomes more complicated when we introduce socio-cultural layers of meaning. 
 Nevertheless, the structural similarity concerning the subjective and objective meaning of 
socio-culturally meaningful music pertains to the nature of the contextual or interpretational 
scheme that describes the particular type of connection between the appresenting pole of the 
music and the appresented pole of the meaning. Just as in the case of subjective meaning, this 
connection may be a function of some correlation that would have to be explained with reference 
to individual idiosyncrasy or individual past experience, auditory resemblance or tradition. 
 
6. Subjective Meaning of Music Qua ‘Merely Perceptual’ (Formal) Activity 
 At the end of the section devoted to an examination of the category of the subjective meaning 
of music qua merely perceptual object, we found that we had offered an account of how music, 
construed as a phenomenon of our consciousness, could yield a meaningful experience. The 
essentially non-conceptual character of music prevented us from ever saying what music means, 
but we have established that there is nothing problematic in the assertion that “meaning” does 
not necessarily entail verbal communicability.485 
 As we transition to a consideration of music as an activity as opposed to an object it appears 
that the category of the meaningfulness of music as a ‘merely perceptual’ activity resembles that 
of music as a merely perceptual object; although it seems more accurate to say that we are 
speaking of activity in formal terms than ‘merely perceptual’ activity. In other words, what we 
have in mind here is a description of the different activities of consciousness that underlie the 
                                                        
485 Thomas Turino argues that music’s ability to express meanings that are incapable of 
being verbalized is part of its significance for human life. Cf. Turino, “Signs of 
Imagination, Identity, and Experience: A Peircian Semiotic Theory for Music,” 249-250. 
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concept of action, i.e. a formal account of the concept of activity, such that all socio-cultural 
content is separated out from the basic categories that belong to activity as such. Thus we will 
come to an understanding of how activity can be meaningful, while bracketing the question of 
what any given activity actually means. And since in this section we are concerned with 
subjective meaning, we shall focus on the constitution of meaningful activity for the actor. We 
will begin with an overview of Schütz’s understanding of the concept of action and how this 
conceptualization poses a difficulty for understanding a particular species of activities to which 
music itself belongs, namely autotelic activities. 
 
6a. Schütz on the Concept of Action 
 Like the term “meaning,” the term “action” is equivocal. Removing the equivocation requires 
distinguishing between “action” and an “act.” Presently I am sitting in my office and find myself 
desirous of a cup of tea. Satisfying this desire would require the completion of a sequence of 
events: I must stand up, gather my mug and a tea bag, open my office door, walk to the kitchen, 
fill the kettle, heat the water, steep the tea bag and walk back to my office. Thus when I speak of 
the action of getting a cup of tea, I may be referring to “the action in the very course of being 
constituted, and, as such, a flow, an ongoing sequence of events, a process of bringing something 
forth, an accomplishing.”486 On the other hand, when I speak of the action of getting a cup of tea 
I may alternatively have in mind “the already constituted act [Handlung] considered as a 
completed unit, a finished product, an Objectivity.”487 To differentiate between these two 
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common uses of the term “action,” we may speak of “the action in progress (actio) and the 
already finished and constituted act (actum) which has been produced by the former.”488 
 It belongs to the concept of action that it be based on a preconceived project. The actor has a 
sort of mental picture of what is to be done, which guides the carrying out of the act. Schütz 
argues that what the actor projects before acting is the act, not the action. In terms of our 
previous example, what I project is the completed act of having procured a cup of tea, not the 
discrete steps that constitute the action of procuring a cup of tea. Schütz preempts the objection 
that a more fine-grained analysis would in fact reveal a projection of the individual steps of 
action by pointing out that, if this were so, then what we are in fact projecting are themselves 
completed acts. In other words, projection “is given only to reflective thought, not to immediate 
experience or to spontaneous Activity,”489 which is to say that projection is the projection of 
discrete units as opposed to a stream of experiential flow. Because an action is by definition 
based on a preconceived project and the execution of the projected act makes the action 
meaningful, “the meaning of any action is its corresponding projected act.”490 Elsewhere Schütz 
refers to the “pre-phantasied state of affairs to be brought about by the future action” as the “in-
order-to motive.”491 This is to be contrasted with the “because motive,” which, with reference to 
the actor’s past experiences, explains the choice of action. Schütz gives the morbid example of 
someone committing murder to obtain money. Getting money would be the murderer’s in-order-
to motive. But there are innumerable ways of procuring money. Instead of murder, for example, 
the individual could have sought a job. In this case, a “because motive” would refer to the 
individual’s past in order to explain why a particular course of action was chosen; perhaps 
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because the murderer grew up in an abusive setting and was taught from an early age that 
violence was an acceptable means for getting what one desires. 
 This because/in-order-to distinction has consequences for an account of meaning as it relates 
to action. An in-order-to motive is a subjective meaning. It is accessible to the actor in the course 
of acting as “what he has actually in view as bestowing meaning upon his ongoing action.”492 
Once the action is completed – once it has become an act – then the actor can retrospectively 
investigate the circumstances that led him to act as he did. The “because motive,” then, is an 
objective category that cannot be viewed from within the lived stream of experience and only 
becomes accessible from an observer’s standpoint, even if this observer is the actor himself 
looking back at his past act. 
 The because/in-order-to distinction has further significance for our understanding of the 
meaning of an action when we consider the relation between motivational context and meaning-
context. We have seen, if mostly implicitly, that meaning is not an inert entity. For instance, in 
our discussion of subjective versus objective meaning we saw that the objective meaning of an 
activity was largely a function of what we can call the observer’s particular attitude or 
orientation or, better yet, interpretive scheme. Interpretation, defines Schütz, is “the referral of 
the unknown to the known, of that which is apprehended in the glance of attention to the scheme 
of experience.”493 That is to say, interpretation involves the understanding of a present 
experience in terms of past experiences, which have been synthesized to create a unity that exists 
as an object for consciousness. Previously we used the example of art to explicate the notion of 
                                                        
492 Schütz, “Choosing Among Projects of Action,” 70-71. 
493 Schütz, PSW, 84. Schütz, in turn, defines a scheme of experience as “a meaning-
context which is a configuration of our past experiences embracing conceptually the 
experiential objects to be found in the latter but not the process by which they were 
constituted” (Schütz, PSW, 82). 
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meaning-context, which makes it perfectly suited for a discussion of schemes of experience and 
the process of interpretation. A scheme of experience is present in the course of lived experience 
“in the form of ‘what one knows’ or ‘what one already knew.’ They consist of material that has 
already been organized under categories.”494 So, for instance, as I turn my attention to an object 
hanging on the wall, I refer it to the category of ‘painting,’ which I have built up out of my 
previous experiences of paintings. The category to which I refer the present object of experience 
may be even more specific – perhaps I have sufficient previous experience to categorize the 
present painting as ‘painting by Picasso.’ These schemes of experience, which seem to be more 
or less synonymous with what Schütz calls “stock of knowledge at hand,”495 are thus schemes for 
interpretation.  
 Clearly the example we have just discussed pertains to the interpretation of objects. 
However, in this section we are concerned with the interpretation of activity, in which case we 
refer the action not to a meaning-context, but rather to a motivational context. The significance 
of the because/in-order-to distinction can now be made clear. What we now must demonstrate is 
that the meaning of an action is different according to whether it is interpreted in light of the in-
order-to motivational context or the because motivational context. 
 The in-order-to motive, we have seen, appears to the actor to be the meaningful ground of her 
activity. When the actor undertakes the action (the polythetic series of steps or constituent acts) 
that ultimately yields the completed act of getting a cup of tea, she is most likely to account for 
the meaning of her act in terms of the act’s in-order-to motive. Stated differently, if we were to 
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495 “Let us therefore limit the term ‘stock of knowledge at hand,’” writes Schütz, “to the 
store of already constituted objectivities of experience in the actual Here and Now, in 
other words, to the passive ‘possession’ of experiences, to the exclusion of their 
reconstitution” (Schütz, PSW, 78). 
  
179 
ask her “why did you do that?” (or, more awkwardly, but more explicitly, “what did you mean 
by doing that?”) the answer we are likely to receive is something like “in order to get a cup of 
tea.”496 It is this projected act that constitutes the meaning-context in which her action is to be 
understood. Why did she stand in the first place? To prepare to move to the kitchen. Why did she 
move to the kitchen? To get a tea bag and to boil water. In short, the in-order-to motive explains 
an action in terms of its project. 
 A genuine because-motive, on the other hand, represents a different sort of meaning-context 
that cannot be translated into an in-order-to motive. Suppose, when we ask the actor why she got 
the tea, she were to answer “because I have drunk to much coffee today.” Firstly, we note that 
this statement cannot be translated into the future perfect tense that characterizes the in-order-to 
motive. Instead, this explanation refers the act in question that an act further back in time – the 
genuine because-motive has the temporal character of pastness. Thus the genuine because-
motive is a meaning-context essentially different from the in-order-to motive. Although the 
because-motive and in-order-to motive represent different meaning-contexts, Schütz only speaks 
of the in-order-to motive as “the meaning of [the actor’s] action.”497 
 
 
                                                        
496 Colloquially, she would probably say “because I wanted a cup of tea.” According to 
Schütz, however, this is an improper use of language, not proof that we are dealing here 
with a because motive. To make this clear, Schütz calls such statements a “pseudo 
because-statement” (Schütz, PSW, 89). Pseudo because-statements are defined as any 
because-statement that is logically equivalent to an in-order-to statement. What marks the 
because-statement as a veiled in-order-to statement is its temporal structure of futurity, 
which belongs to in-order-to statements. Although the aforementioned pseudo because-
statement may appear to have the temporal structure of pastness (as “wanted” seems to 
suggest), the explanation it offers refers to a “project with its still empty protentions” 
(Schütz, PSW, 89). 
497 Schütz, PSW, 94. 
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6b. “Problems” Pertaining to the Relation of Schütz’s Concept of Action and Meaning 
 Schütz’s account of the meaning of an action should give us pause. When we discussed 
meaning in the context of the subjective and objective meaning of music as a merely perceptual 
object, meaning was seen to emerge retrospectively. At the cessation of the experience, the 
reflective glance rendered the experience discrete, which was seen to be a condition for the 
possibility of meaning. But there is a forward-looking relationship between an action and the 
project of which it is a component; that is, a particular action is chosen because of its suitability 
for yielding some projected end. Thus it would seem that the meaning of an action is known to 
the actor in advance, which seems to run afoul of Schütz’s characterization of meaning as 
something backwards-looking. “Only a defined experience has meaning;” writes Luigi Muzzetto, 
“and, given the temporal nature of experience, a defined experience is a past experience.”498 To 
follow a more orthodox reading of Schütz and claim that the meaning of an action only emerges 
after the completion of the action yields its own confusions. This would problematize the 
purposive nature of action and suggest that our intentions are in fact justifications pinned onto 
our actions ex post facto. 
 The nature of projective consciousness demonstrates that there is, in fact, no contradiction in 
maintaining both positions, that meaning emerges retrospectively and that the actor knows the 
meaning of his action in advance. Determining an effective course of action entails anticipatory 
imagining, an orientation “to an act phantasied in the future perfect tense as already executed.”499 
In the case of easily achieved goals and commonly undertaken actions, this orienting phantasy is 
sufficiently negligible that the actor is unaware of it. In cases of goals that are difficult to attain 
or unfamiliar or that permit of a wide variety of possible courses of action, the actor is more 
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likely to thematize the preparatory stages of the action. The phantasying of the act is what allows 
the meaning of an action to be known in advance without contradicting Schütz’s understanding 
of meaningful lived experience in which the “reflective glance singles out an elapsed lived 
experience and constitutes it as meaning.”500 In the phantasy, the completed act comes before, as 
it were, the constitutive action. I know what is to be done before I have decided how to do it. The 
action is oriented by the act that has been phantasied in the future perfect tense (i.e. as something 
that I will have done). In phantasy, from the standpoint of completed act, I look back on 
projected actions. Thus, phantasying involves the same sort of retrospection that we have seen to 
be involved in the concept of meaning. 
 Schütz’s concept of action yields another problem when considering the meaning of music as 
an activity. If we continue to operate with the concept of music that Schütz presents in FPM and 
MMT then we recall that the meaning of music is tantamount to the execution of the various 
polythetic acts that constitute the musical work. No degree of familiarity with a musical work 
and no amount of musical talent can obviate the need to re-perform these polythetic acts in order 
to experience the meaning of the musical work. When we introduce these insights into our 
discussion of action then a problem appears to arise; namely, music seems to belong to those 
class of activities that are autotelic, that is, activities that are not goal-oriented, or rather, whose 
goal is the carrying-out of the constitutive steps as opposed to completed state of affairs. For 
instance, ‘taking a walk’ is another auto-telic action. One who is taking a walk is not doing so in 
order to arrive at some final destination, walking is itself the goal of the action. Finding the 
meaning of an action in the completed act seems to suggest that the meaning of the action 
permits monothetic characterization. For example, I undertook a sequence of actions in order to 
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get a cup of tea. “Getting a cup of tea” would then be the meaning of my action. But how would 
we characterize the monothetic meaning of having performed a piece of music?  
 Recall that the meaning of a piece of music is grasped retrospectively. As the musical work 
unfolds, themes are constituted and thus emerges the experience of coherence and meaning. It is 
only at the completion of the musical work when all the polythetic acts have been performed that 
the meaning of the musical works as a whole can emerge. To this extent we can say that the 
meaning of the activity of playing a musical work is having played the musical work. 
 
7. Objective Meaning of Music Qua ‘Merely Perceptual’ (Formal) Activity 
Grasping the meaning of a musical activity makes reference to an actor responsible for the 
activity. Just as “[a]ll the other manifold social relationships are derived from the originary 
experiencing of the totality of the Other’s self in the community of time and space,”501 so all 
derivative manners of grasping the meaning of a musical activity (for instance, watching a DVD 
of the concert, listening to a recording of the concert) leads us to imperfectly imagine how our 
experience would have been had we been there. For this reason, the case of being present at an 
act of improvisation is the example par excellence of experiencing the subjective meaning of 
musical activity. Does this meaning concern music qua mere perception or viewed through the 
socio-cultural lens? Hearing music merely perceptually, we have said, is a theoretical conceit 
that is phenomenologically useful, but experientially derivative. That is to say, we always 
experience music as laden with significance and fringes of meaning that derive from our being 
always already cultural subjects.  
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8. Subjective Meaning of Music Qua Socio-Cultural Activity 
 We saw in section 6a that an actor understands the meaning of her action in terms of the 
project of which it is a part. This appeared difficult to gloss when we construed music merely as 
a formal phenomenon. However, when we allow socio-cultural considerations to reenter the 
picture, things become clearer and our field of investigation widens. To repeat and elaborate: the 
subjective meaning of the activity of playing music will be the relation of this activity to some 
larger, orienting project in the mind of the actor. This is as far as the formal definition of the 
meaning of activity will get us. If we wish to understand the actual, ‘material’ meanings (as 
opposed to the formal meaning) of the activity of playing music we shall have to consider some 
of the projects of which the activity of playing music forms a part. And in order to identify some 
of these projects we shall make recourse to the discipline of ethnomusicology, the study of music 
in its cultural context. First, however, we will consider the particular province of meaning in 
question when dealing with the activity of music. 
 
8a. Finite Province of Meaning Correlated to the Activity of Music 
 The activity of music making encompasses a number of different finite provinces of 
meaning, depending on our perspective. If we assume the attitude of a listener (as opposed to a 
participant), such as that of someone attending a concert by a symphony orchestra, then the finite 
province of meaning in question may well be the same as the finite province of meaning 
discussed in section 2a as correlated to merely perceptual music. We can imagine a listener 
having no previous acquaintance with the concert program,502 who has some grounding in the 
conventions of Western classical music and who has adopted the sort of aesthetic attitude that is 
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implicit in Schütz’s analysis in FPM. An observer from a different culture, an anthropologist for 
instance, may experience a musical event from a theoretical standpoint. With a disinterested 
attitude that distinguishes the theoretical thinker from the active participant, the anthropologist 
inhabits the world of scientific theory.503 A participant engaged in a musical activity that is 
inextricably linked with some pragmatic purpose, on the other hand, will be operating within the 
natural attitude of daily life, which was discussed in section 1.   
 This goes to show that the socio-cultural world bears within itself an indeterminate number 
of sub-universes. It is the particular interest of the individual that will determine which finite 
province of meaning holds sway, and this means that the role of the individual will determine 
within which finite province of meaning the activity of music making is experienced. The roles 
that may be fulfilled are in turn partially dependent on the specific function of the musical 
activity. Let us now consider the different functions that music may serve.  
 
8b. Functions of Music 
 In Music in Human Life: Anthropological Perspectives on Music, John E. Kaemmer gives a 
survey of the different uses and functions that music serves in societies throughout the world. In 
order to better grasp the types of projects to which music may be an essential component, let us 
consider these functions individually. 
 One of the major uses of music is as a form of play. Play involves a lack of explicit concern 
with practical purposes. One who plays is not, for the moment at least, concerned with food, 
shelter and other material necessities of life. Citing anthropologists and ethnomusicologists, 
Kaemmer lists some of the unspoken and unnoticed ‘useful’ functions that music may serve even 
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without any explicit awareness on the part of the individuals who are playing; for instance, 
playing music with other people facilitates the development of social skills, playing music 
develops motor skills, playing music satisfies a human desire for complexity. There may be some 
truth to these explanations; however, they do not pertain to the subjective meaning of the 
activity. These explanations are not in-order-to motives and thus are not the subjective meanings 
of the activity of making music as play.   
The in-order-to motives that orient the action of playing music as play will vary from 
instance to instance. The activity may be conceptualized as an accompaniment to other play-
activities, such as chanting a skipping rhyme while jumping rope or singing “pat-a-cake, pat-a-
cake, baker’s man” while playing patty cake. Determining the subjective meaning of a particular 
instance of play-oriented musical activity can be accomplished simply by asking the agent why 
he or she is undertaking the activity. 
Kaemmer also identifies “self-expression” as a common function of musical activity, noting 
that this “expression is often related to the psychological needs and personal integrity of the 
individual.”504 Catharsis, the release of pent-up emotion or tension, is one such psychological 
need that music can serve. The Flathead Indians, for instance, use music and dance to “relive the 
tensions of constant interaction with the dominant white culture.”505 “Among the Tuareg of 
Niger,” another ethnomusicological study reports, “a vassal woman can use tende songs for such 
things as stating in public her feelings for a man. Spoken openly, this type of statement is 
unthinkable and would cause untold embarrassment and criticism. Being sung makes it 
acceptable.”506 In some cases, such as the shrieking vocals of heavy metal music or the 
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unapologetically repetitive rhythms of groove-based music, the cathartic function of music may 
be sufficiently explicit to the actor to be cast in the form of an in-order-to motive.  
The function of music as self-expression also encompasses its use to express one’s individual 
identity. In the jazz tradition, for instance, a premium is placed on the development of a 
distinctive sound and improvisational conception. 
Music also functions in projects involving communication. Courtship songs are listed by 
Kaemmer as instances of the communicative capacity of music and accords with our 
understanding of an activity’s in-order-to motive as its meaning. Why does the lover serenade 
the beloved? In order to communicate his love. The communicative function of music even 
extends to parties that are unaware that communication is taking place. In the South Pacific, 
where it was common for sailors to set out on the water and to never return, a group of islanders, 
the “Tikopia considered certain people to be spirit mediums who could provide news of missing 
persons through song.”507 Music also communicates to large groups. “In rural India,” it is 
reported, “ Wedding songs serve to make the whole community aware of the marriage.”508  
Music is additionally mobilized in political projects, such as conflict resolution: “Settling 
disputes by song contests was formerly practiced among the Inuit of the polar regions, since 
violence connected with ordinary disputes could seriously endanger the whole community.”509 
The political import of music is also related to its role within power dynamics. Protest songs 
unify the voice of the dissenters, facilitating group identification and enhancing perseverance. 
Oppressive powers, in turn, may restrict music thought to be subversive and promote music that 
reifies power relations. 
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9. Objective Meaning of Music Qua Socio-Cultural Activity 
 The objective meaning of musical activity concerns the meaning attributed to the act by an 
observer. Lester Embree’s discussion of species of meaning in Schütz’s thought, discussed in 
section 1a, points to an important distinction that must be drawn with respect to the objective 
meaning of musical activity when viewed as a socio-cultural phenomenon. Embree’s insight is 
that there exist varying degrees to which one may be an outsider. By virtue of not being the 
author of an action, I am an outsider and lack epistemological privilege to the subjective meaning 
of an action. However, if I am a member of the culture to which the author of the observed action 
also belongs, then I am more qualified to judge to meaning that the action’s author attributes to 
it.510 Of course, this does not make my interpretation of the action any less objective, but it leads 
Embree to distinguish between “‘personal’ (or ‘individual’) and ‘collective’ (or ‘communal’)” 
meaning511, and to subdivide the latter into the meaning attributed to an action by the “in-group” 
(i.e. the group performing the action or the culture to which the actor belongs) and an “out-
group” (i.e. a group with a different cultural background).512  
Thus when we discuss the objective meaning of musical activity viewed as a socio-cultural 
phenomenon, we must consider whether the observer in question is a member of the in-group or 
a member of an out-group. And as we have already intimated in section 8a, the category “out-
group” contains an indeterminate number of sub-universes that will yield a differently 
meaningful experience. 
The everyday relationship of an in-group to its folkways is ethnocentric, that is, this view of 
the world situates “one’s own group [at] the center of everything and all others are scaled and 
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rated with reference to it.”513 This does not mean that a member of the in-group can never take a 
proverbial step back and, viewing his group from a critical distance, recognize the equal validity 
of the values of different groups. But in the everyday attitude, the in-group’s way of life is 
encountered as a self-evident and taken for granted. A member of an out-group, however, will 
encounter the world taken for granted by the in-group through the lens of his own group’s taken 
for granted world: the “outsider measures the standards prevailing in the group under 
consideration in accordance with the system of relevances prevailing within the natural aspect 
the world has for his home-group.”514 The evaluation of another group’s system of relevances 
and typifications in incommensurable terms will, at best, leave them not understood and, at 
worst, result in their being regarded as inferior and detestable. A member of an out-group who is 
operating as a social scientist, on the other hand, “supersedes his situation as a man among his 
fellow-men within the social world. The problems of the theoretician originate in his theoretical 
interest, and many elements of the social world that are scientifically relevant are irrelevant from 
the viewpoint of the actor on the social scene, and vice versa.”515 
 
10. Ethnomusicology and the Reciprocal Advantages of Philosophizing About Music 
 This section will argue for the essential relevance of ethnomusicology for an adequate 
philosophical treatment of music. We will begin by examining the discipline of 
ethnomusicology, which, over the course of its young existence has never ceased to ask itself just 
what it means to do ethnomusicology. Then we shall consider how a lack of cross-cultural 
agreement concerning the nature of music itself appears to pose a challenge to both 
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ethnomusicology and the philosophy of music. Finally, we shall consider the role of universals 
and the a priori in ethnomusicology and the philosophy of culture, in order to establish the 
fundamental compatibility of the two disciplines. This will entail considering some of Cassirer’s 
statements about methodology in the philosophy of culture, with an eye towards the ways in 
which ethnomusicology has long been asking questions and collecting data that are of great 
interest to the philosopher of culture.  
 “Ethnomusicology carries within it the seeds of its own division,” writes Alan Merriam, “for 
it has always been compounded of two distinct parts, the musicological and the ethnological.”516 
Over the course of its young life,517 the focus and methodology of ethnomusicology has 
remained one of the discipline’s constant concerns.  
The dual nature of ethnomusicology, to which Merriam refers, saddles the discipline with 
two distinct study objects and without a clear-cut manner of relating them. With the 
musicological approach, the ethnomusicologist encounters “music sound;” while with the 
ethnological or anthropological approach, the ethnomusicologist thematizes “music behavior.”518 
As Merriam points out, ethnomusicology’s dual nature has given rise to disciplinary definitions, 
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Middle Ages (Sachs, The Wellsprings of Music, 5). Also cf. Anthony Seeger “Lost 
Lineages and Neglected Peers: Ethnomusicologists Outside Academia.” 
518 Stone, Let the Inside Be Sweet, 11. 
  
190 
which, depending on the inclinations of the scholar, have tended to emphasize either the 
musicological or anthropological aspect. 
Initially, scholars highlighted the geographic uniqueness of ethnomusicology’s study of 
music, namely its focus on the music of non-Western cultures.519 While, from a philosophical 
point of view, these studies are useful for the invaluable data they furnish about different 
conceptions of melody, harmony, rhythm and other musical characteristics of interest to Western 
views of music, there are at least two problems with the geographic definition of 
ethnomusicology. First, Merriam suggests that if “emphasis is placed upon where rather than 
upon how or why,”520 then ethnomusicology does not differ in any essential respect from the 
methodology of musicology or the geographic focus of ethnology. A second problem with the 
geographic definition of ethnomusicology is that the traditional categories of Western music 
theory do not necessarily map on to the musical culture being studied. For instance, not all 
cultures have a definition of music that accords with the Western philosophical emphasis on 
music as a sequence of tones that exists for itself and is capable of being conceived apart its 
cultural context and function. “For the Basongye [an ethnic group in the Congo],” reports 
Merriam, “to the contrary, every song depends heavily upon its cultural context and is 
conceptualized in this relationship.”521 In her study of the music of the Kpelle people of West 
Africa, Ruth Stone writes: “For the Kpelle music sound is conceived as part of an integrally 
related cluster of dance, speech, and kinesic-proxemic behavior referred to as pêle and occurring 
in particular time-space dimensions.”522 Thus, focusing on the ‘where’ rather than ‘how’ or 
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‘why’ risks resulting in a study documenting a phenomenon that would be unrecognizable to the 
culture for which this phenomenon is a meaningful activity. A methodological pluralist might 
charitably argue that casting the study object in terms of concepts and categories derived from 
the researcher’s can yield valuable insights that would otherwise go undiscovered; and in terms 
of the taxonomy of meaning that we derived from Schütz’s phenomenology of the social world, 
this dimension of meaning would most likely be categorized as the objective (outsider) meaning 
of music qua merely perceptual object. But it cannot be denied that unreflectively relying on 
one’s familiar concepts and categories when faced with the unfamiliar is at very least incomplete 
and more likely the type of naïve conceptualizing that has historically justified the subjugation 
and exploitation of putatively “primitive” people.  
Merriam’s own definition of ethnomusicology presents it as “the study of music in 
culture.”523 Merriam takes pains to explain the way that this definition both acknowledges and 
bridges the anthropological-musicological schism at the heart of ethnomusicology: 
Music sound cannot be produced except by people for other people, and although we can 
separate the two aspects conceptually, one is not really complete without the other. 
Human behavior produces music, but the process is one of continuity; the behavior itself 
is shaped to produce music sound, and thus the study of one flows into the other.524 
Merriam’s disciplinary definition gives way to a “simple” model of the ethnomusicologist’s 
task, which unfolds across three “analytical levels”: “conceptualization about music, behavior in 
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relation to music, and the music sound itself.”525 In other words, according to Merriam, the 
ethnomusicologist studies music as concept, behavior and sound.526  
It would seem unproblematic, if somewhat provisional, to say that the ethnomusicologist 
studies music as a complex nexus where different threads of a given culture are interwoven and 
interactive. However, as the study of music as a concept suggests, the signification of the key 
term of this definition – music – is not as self-evident as one may think. And the indeterminacy 
of this term is of interest for ethnomusicology and significant for the philosophy of music. 
Self-evident as the phenomenon may seem, defining music proves to be a surprisingly 
difficult task. One such definition proposed by John Blacking – music is “humanly organized 
sound”527 – seems to be a reasonable attempt. Ethnomusicological findings, however, suggest 
that Blacking’s definition may be too limited. “Ethnomusicologists have learned,” writes 
Timothy Rice, “for example, that in agricultural and pastoral cultures, where people work 
outdoors most of the time, humans sometimes sing in counterpoint with the sounds of animals 
and the natural environment, as if animals and nature were singing to and with us.”528 Examples 
of such interaction between humans and nature abound in the Tuvan musical culture of Inner 
Asia. In fact, there are certain types of music that are meant to be performed in particular natural 
                                                        
525 Merriam, The Anthropology of Music, 32. Interestingly, Ruth Stone reports “Merriam 
staunchly maintained, in class lectures and conversation, that ethnomusicology as a 
whole possesses no single paradigm” (Stone, Theory for Ethnomusicology, 2). 
526 In 1986, Timothy Rice published “Toward the Remodeling of Ethnomusicology,” 
which suggested an alternative tripartite model derived from the work of Clifford Geertz. 
Rice’s model presents music as “historically constructed, socially maintained, and 
individually created and experienced” (Rice, Modeling Ethnomusicology, 6). During his 
tenure as editor of Ethnomusicology, Rice determined that this model better represented 
the research that ethnomusicologists were undertaking; and in a recent examination of 
articles published in Ethnomusicology between 2006 and 2015, Rice determined that his 
model had grown in explanatory power, accounting for 81% of the literature as opposed 
to 73% from 1978 to 1986 (Cf. Rice, Modeling Ethnomusicology, 8). 
527 Blacking, How Musical Is Man?, 10. 
528 Rice, Ethnomusicology: A Very Short Introduction, 5. 
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acoustic environments.529 In their monograph on the sound world of Tuva, Theodore Levin and 
Valentina Süzükei record instances of musicians interacting with their natural environment and 
even altering this environment in order to elicit the types of sounds that the musician wishes to 
make music with.530 Given the extent to which Tuvan singing is tied up with nature, not only in 
performance, but also in pedagogy – many styles are said to be imitations of natural phenomena 
such as wind – it seems fair to say that humans are taking their cue from nature in the 
organization of sound. Considerations such as these have motivated certain ethnomusicologists 
to argue that the discipline’s research domain ought to encompass sound as opposed to just the 
humanly organization of it.531 
Another common, if less academic, understanding of music regards it as “the art of 
organizing sound in pleasing or thought-provoking ways.”532 However, this definition erects a 
conceptual boundary between music and other elements that frequently accompany mere sound 
such as lyrics, dancing and costumes. Such a boundary proves to be at odds with the way that 
particular cultures conceptualize music. In comparison with the Western model of pleasantly 
organized sound, some cultures have a broader understanding of music that encompasses 
elements absent from the Western understanding of music. For instance, Bruno Nettl reports that 
in India “the word sangit or a derivative of it is used to translate ‘music’ rather accurately, but 
                                                        
529 Levin, Where Rivers and Mountains Sing, 31. 
530 Levin and Süzükei report, for instance, an experience with Tuvan singer Kaigal-ool 
musically interacting with a river and cliff: “In using his voice to excite the reverberant 
qualities of the cliff, Kaigal-ool’s aim was not simply to hear his own voice amplified, 
but rather to feel an interaction with the startlingly beautiful natural scenario in which he 
emplaced himself through singing. ‘I love to hear the voice of the cliff speaking back to 
me,’ he told me during one of our late-night recording sessions” (Levin, Where Rivers 
and Mountains Sing, 38). 
531 For instance, cf. Feld, Sound and Sentiment. 
532 Rice, Ethnomusicology: A Very Short Introduction, 4. 
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the term may also include dance.”533 Other cultures omit from the realm of music sounds and 
practices that Western culture takes for granted as music. For instance, Nettl also reports that the 
Blackfoot Native Americans “have a word for ‘song’ but not one for ‘instrumental music.’”534 
Summarizing what appears to be a grave problem for ethnomusicologists, Nettl writes 
There is no conceptualization or definition of music that is shared by all or perhaps even 
many cultures, and very few societies have a concept (and a term) precisely parallel to 
European ‘music.’ They may instead have taxonomies whose borders cut across the 
universe of sounds produced by humans (or even animals) in ways quite different from 
those of Western societies.535 
At first blush, this lack of intercultural consensus concerning the meaning of the term “music” – 
indeed, the occasional absence of a general term covering different musical activities536 – would 
seem to represent a methodological problem for the ethnomusicologist: how is the object of 
study, music, to be determined? However, Nettl encourages ethnomusicologists not to dwell on 
the problem. The task, Nettl argues, is to determine the definition of music operative in a given 
culture, not to approach said culture according to some presupposed concept of music. Thus 
ethnomusicologists have been led to study music in forms that would run afoul of the definitions 
of “music” found in Western standard reference works.   
This lack of concern for an orienting definition of music that Nettl advocates yields data that 
is useful for philosophical reflections on music, since a merely descriptive account of the 
unwieldy variety of concepts, behaviors and sounds considered music should encourage 
philosophers to skeptically regard the Western notion of music as a merely acoustic 
                                                        
533 Nettl, “The Art of Combining Tones,” 24. 
534 Nettl, “The Art of Combining Tones,” 24. 
535 Nettl, “The Art of Combining Tones,” 20. 
536 Cf. Nettl, “The Art of Combining Tones,” 24. 
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phenomenon. Just as avant-garde works of the Western tradition problematize common 
understandings of music,537 so should the musical practices of non-Western cultures inform the 
way that we philosophize about music. 
For instance, one such consequence of proceeding from ‘musics’ to ‘music as such’ would be 
the introduction of the aesthetic unit of the event. Ethnomusical rationales for conceptualizing 
music in terms of the event are not uniform. John Kaemmer, an early advocate of the approach, 
presents the event paradigm as a response to the methodological trends and concerns of 
ethnomusicology as a self-reflective discipline. In Kaemmer’s presentation, the study of music in 
culture has taken two distinct approaches; namely, as a product of cognitive or social processes. 
When focused on social processes, ethnomusicologists have chosen one of two approaches. The 
broader approach, exemplified by Alan Lomax’s Folk Song Style and Culture, took its cue from 
evolutionary theory and sought to study the universal development processes of music through a 
quantitative, comparative effort undertaken on a worldwide basis. This grand narrative approach 
resulted in an inevitable backlash, with scholars still framing music in terms of its role within 
society but opting for a detailed study of individual cultures. The focus on musical events derives 
from the social sciences’ interest in social interaction. 
A second motive for the study of music as an event is concisely expressed by Ruth Stone and 
derives from the researcher being oriented by the categories in effect among the group being 
researched. “Music event as a study object possesses conceptual validity from the Kpelle 
perspective,” Stone writes. “For the Kpelle music sound is conceived as part of an integrally 
related cluster of dance, speech, and kinesic-proxemic behavior referred to as pêle and occurring 
                                                        
537 For instance, John Cage’s 4’33” may be understood to problematize Blacking’s 
presentation of music as “humanly organized.” 
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in particular time-space dimensions.”538 In this case, the justification for studying music as an 
event involving more than the mere sounding of tones follows from orienting one’s study of 
music according to the conceptualization of music in effect in the society in question.  
The question of disciplinary concern for beginning with a definition of the study object in 
question is related to the different status of universals in ethnomusicology and the philosophy of 
culture. The history of ethnomusicology demonstrates a vacillating interest in and denial of 
musical universals. Just as Merriam found the seeds of ethnomusicology’s division planted in the 
term itself, Rice suggests that differing disciplinary definitions similarly evince a dual nature to 
ethnomusicologist’s task: 
In 1960 Alan Merriam…defined ethnomusicology in just this way: ‘[T]he study of music 
in culture’; but a sentence or two later he returned the definition of the field to the 
universality implied in my opening definition [“Ethnomusicology is the study of why, 
and how, human beings are musical”]: ‘[T]he study of music as a universal aspect of 
man’s activities.’ The two poles of the culturally particular and the humanly universal, 
whether understood as a tension or productive antitheses, have galvanized 
ethnomusicologists’ thinking about their field ever since.539 
Nettl tells a fine-grained story of the status of universals in ethnomusicology over the past 
century. Initially, his narrative goes, ethnomusicologists were primarily concerned with 
defending the difference of the world’s music. This was largely a response to the ethnocentric 
assumption of the scholarship of the time that “the basic principles of Western music were 
universally valid, because it was the only ‘true’ music, of which all other musics represented 
                                                        
538 Stone, Let the Inside Be Sweet, 1. 
539 Rice, Ethnomusicology: A Very Short Introduction, 3-4. 
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generative, or perhaps degenerative stages.”540  However, the theories of Chomsky and Lévi-
Strauss in linguistics and anthropology, respectively, brought a newfound validity and academic 
respectability to musical commonalities across far-flung cultures. Nettl outlines a number of 
different approaches to musical universality and deems the most realistic approach to the subject 
to be “whether there is anything that is found in every musical system, in the music of every 
society; whether, thus, there is a way in which all musics, all musical culture, are in some way 
alike; and whether there are any characteristics or traits present somewhere in all of them.”541 
Perhaps with Merriam’s simple model of ethnomusicology in mind, Nettl poses the question with 
respect to musical sound, behaviors and concepts.  
 As for concepts pertaining to music that pass the empirical, ethnomusicological test of 
ubiquity, Nettl notes “the association of music with the supernatural,” “the musical association 
with dance and speech” and the identification of discrete musical units.542 Such units are not 
necessarily akin to the Western notion of a “work,” which is embodied by a score of 
performance instructions that serve to an indeterminate extent as the identity conditions of said 
work, although the Western notion of a “work” is one such manifestation of the universal 
conceptualization of music as something consisting of “distinct units of creativity.”543 The 
individuation of musical units might otherwise result from the role that a given unit serves in a 
particular ritual or the unit’s attribution to a creator living or dead or perhaps supernatural. All 
musical cultures also give evidence of possessing a conception of musicality, a more or less 
sharply delimited understanding of what sounds are music proper and what sounds are noise or 
non-musical. Every known musical culture has a manner for the passing on of tradition, whatever 
                                                        
540 Nettl, “Is Music the Universal Language of Mankind?,” 32. 
541 Nettl, “Is Music the Universal Language of Mankind?,” 34. 
542 Nettl, “Is Music the Universal Language of Mankind?,” 35. 
543 Nettl, “Is Music the Universal Language of Mankind?,” 35. 
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the particulars of pedagogy may be. Finally, there are cross-cultural similarities of repertoire, for 
instance the omnipresence of a distinct body of children’s music.  
 With respect to musical sounds, Nettl identifies a number of commonalities. These include 
the overwhelming preponderance of the major second (“anything from three to five quarter 
tones”544) in vocal musics, a tendency for descent at the end of phrases, use of repetition, 
rhythmic structures created by distinctions between note lengths and dynamic strength. “All of 
the mentioned features are universals in the sense that they exist practically everywhere,” writes 
Nettl,545 “but they are significant universals also in another sense: they would not have to be 
present in order for music to exist and thus are not simply a part of the definition of music.”546 
The second sense in which these features are significant universals can be translated into a 
Kantian terminology, and doing so will assist in putting ethnomusicology in conversation with 
the philosophy of culture. To derive universals from the definition of music is to make analytic a 
priori judgments about music, which, as such, do not add to our store of knowledge about music. 
The universal features identified through a comparative analysis of ethnomusicological literature 
yields synthetic a posteriori insights about music – they tell us something about the nature of 
music, which is not definitionally contained in the concept of music, by way of the study of 
actual musics.  
 How do these synthetic a posteriori insights square with the sort of universality in question 
for the philosophy of culture? A priori knowledge is concerned with what we might call the 
universal conditions of cognition; it tells us about ubiquitous aspects of knowledge that – as 
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545 The problematic nature of attributing universal status to features that are found 
“practically” everywhere as opposed to absolutely everywhere is not lost on Nettl. He 
later notes that if we want to be “fussy” then we can add a qualification by speaking of 
“‘statistical’ universals” (Nettl, “Is Music the Universal Language of Mankind?,” 35). 
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universal – can be presupposed to give shape, and thus to create limitations, to experiences that 
we have not even had yet. In keeping with its Kantian origin, Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic 
forms is transcendental in reach; that is to say, it inquires into the conditions for the possibility of 
types of experience. Whereas, in the traditional Neo-Kantian reading, Kant’s epochal 
contribution to transcendental philosophy focused on a justification of the fact of Newtonian 
science, the Neo-Kantian school sought to expand this critique to different domains of 
experience, which in Cassirer’s parlance are symbolic forms. In Cassirer’s philosophy of 
symbolic forms, Kant’s understanding of the a priori is “pluralized.”547 Thus the conditions for 
the possibility of cognition enumerated in Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic cannot 
be assumed to apply to the types of experience within the symbolic form of art, myth, etc. 
Nevertheless, as was discussed in chapter one, the a priori elements of symbolic forms are not 
entirely different in each case, which is explained by Cassirer’s distinction between the quality 
and modality of a symbolic form. 
Cassirer’s conception of the a priori is also indebted to another advancement of the Marburg 
School of Neo-Kantianism; namely, in conceiving of the a priori as dynamic. Kant held that the 
pure forms of intuition (space and time) and the twelve categories of thought are eternal, 
universal conditions for the possibility of experience. Cassirer argues that, not only do the 
different domains of culture modalize these qualities of experience differently, but that even 
within a given symbolic universe, the nature of these a priori elements are historically 
developing.  
Crucially, for Cassirer, the philosophical discovery of the dynamic a priori governing the 
operation of a symbolic universe entails an intimate engagement with the special sciences tasked 
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with studying the various domains of culture. Philosophical inquiry “can neither disregard 
empirical particulars nor can it wholly submit to them and still remain entirely faithful to its own 
mission and purpose,”548 writes Cassirer of the curious methodological dilemma resulting from 
having to discover the universal from the particular. The philosopher of culture must therefore 
“formulate the questions asked of linguistics [or other special sciences] with systematic 
universality, but in each case derive the answers from actual empirical inquiry.”549 Doing so 
entails grounding one’s research in as broad a body of empirical material as possible. In the 
context of his volume of language, Cassirer even mentions the importance of consulting different 
linguistic families, that is, of not privileging Western phenomena.  
How does one derive the universal from the particulars? How does one know when a 
sufficient number of particulars have been consulted in order to make universal claims? Cassirer 
presents no hard and fast rule, but indicates that the particulars themselves will begin to 
demonstrate suggestive commonalities: “If I nevertheless continued [to delve into the ever-
expanding body of literature it proved necessary to consult], it is because, as the diversity of 
linguistic phenomena opened up before me, the particulars seemed more and more to cast light 
upon one another and to fit as though of their own accord into a general picture.”550 If the general 
picture derived from the study of particulars is to prove its mettle, then subsequently considered 
particulars will show themselves to be in accordance with the pure form of the phenomenon in 
question. And if a growing body of particulars cannot be made to accord with the general picture 
in effect, then perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. 
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Cassirer’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences 
makes clear the significance of ethnomusicology’s synthetic a posteriori insights into different 
manifestations of human musicality for determining the dynamic a priori at the heart of human 
musicality as such; namely, ethnomusicology provides the empirical particulars from which the 
philosopher of culture comes to understand the shape of the conditions for the possibility of 
musical experience. While these synthetic a priori universals cannot be claimed to have 
regulative import – that is to say, it is feasible that some hitherto unknown group of people may 
engage in musical practices that differ from those of all other known musical cultures – that is 
not out of character with the nature of the dynamic a priori, which must be altered to explain the 
facts of human activity. 
Nettl claims “what is most important to us – as ethnomusicologists – about the music of the 
world is its varieties, the fact that it consists of ‘musics,’ rather than its universals.”551 Although 
the same cannot be said of the philosopher of culture, it is serendipitous that the 
ethnomusicologist’s data collection and focus on variety serves the end of searching for an 
underlying unity at the heart of human musicality. 
 
11. Conclusion 
 The question concerning the meaning of music cannot be answered without a number of 
preliminary qualifications. These qualifications must be made with respect to the individual for 
whom the music is meaningful. Is the individual in question the creator of the work or a listener? 
What sort of epoché has the listener performed that affects the nature of the experience (e.g. 
bracketing out the socio-cultural dimensions of the music)? Is the hearing of the music tied up 
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with the broader experience of the activity of its creation? If the musical experience involves the 
experience of the act of musical creation, from what standpoint does the subject experience the 
activity? Is he a member of the culture engaged in the act of music making? Does he belong to a 
different culture? Has he adopted a theoretical standpoint towards the activity? Only by 
answering these and other clarifying questions do we disambiguate the otherwise equivocal 
concept of musical meaning. Schütz’s framework thus provides ethnomusicologists with 
distinctions essential for a consideration of the multifaceted meaningfulness that derives from the 
essential connection between music and cultural life. 
 Ethnomusicology, for its part, provides an indispensable service to the philosophy of culture. 
Following Merriam’s simple model of ethnomusicology as the study of music as sound, behavior 
and concept, ethnomusicological research furnishes the empirical data that orient the 
philosopher’s reflections and progressively points the way to an understanding of those 
structures which, at a given time, govern the relationship between human beings and sound. The 
many forms this research takes include transcription and tonal analysis (which serves as the basis 
for the determination of universals such as the ubiquity of major second interval), interviews 
with a wide range of members of the culture in question (which give way to insights into cultural 
conceptions of the boundaries of music and non-music, understanding of the hierarchy of talent 
and distinct categories in the repertory) and the writing of ethnographies (which offer the 
outsider’s perspective on musical behaviors). The philosophy of music thus proves itself to be an 
essentially interdisciplinary enterprise. 
 
 
 
  
203 
Chapter Four: Towards a Phenomenology of Improvisation 
 
In previous chapters we have argued that a viable philosophical treatment of music cannot 
afford to overlook the evidence provided by a diverse body of musical cultures. This conviction 
holds equally well when applied to the diverse body of musical practices that are found across 
cultures. Improvisation is one such practice that has been frequently neglected in philosophical 
literature, although, as will be seen in the literature referenced by this chapter, that situation is 
beginning to change.  
If the philosopher of music wishes to make claims about music or musical concepts such as 
improvisation without the qualification that these claims only pertain to a particular musical 
culture (usually, as we’ve seen, the tradition of Western art music), then the philosophy of music 
must reckon with the unwieldy world of human musicality. In other words, the philosophy of 
music must become ethnomusicological. 
The aim of this chapter is to begin such an undertaking by examining some of the central 
themes of a philosophical treatment of musical improvisation. The first task towards the 
completion of this aim involves clarifying what we mean when we talk about improvisation. 
Doing so will involve a consideration of etymology, the pedagogy of improvisation and the 
question of the relationship between improvisation and composition. These and other 
considerations will also lead to a revision and expansion of some of the phenomenological 
claims about music that we have discussed in past chapters. For instance, we shall see that 
improvisation motivates an expanded concept of retention and suggests enhancements to 
Schütz’s picture of the social relationships that constitute the musical experience. 
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1. What is Improvisation? 
Etymologically, the term “improvisation” derives from the Latin improviso “unforeseen; not 
studied or prepared beforehand.”552 This term can be broken down into the privative prefix im-, 
connoting “not, opposite of, without,”553 and the verb providere meaning to “foresee, 
provide.”554 Thus to improvise is to act in an unforeseen manner. But the unforeseen-ness of 
improvisation is never absolute. As thrown into a world that has been shaped by history and 
other forces that predate our existence and agency, we ourselves are shaped by a realm of 
possibility that is not of our creation. The world has furnished us with foreseeable possibilities. 
To improvise a poem entails an understanding of what a poem is; an understanding that is 
historically and culturally contingent. Is a poem something that, by definition, rhymes? Is a poem 
something with a predetermined structure like the fourteen lines of a sonnet or the five-seven-
five syllabic structure of a haiku? If we take it for granted that a cultural object like a poem has 
no Platonic ideal existence but instead exists as a historically and culturally agreed upon set of 
rules, then to improvise such a thing necessarily involves a foreknowledge of these rules. This 
qualifies the unforeseen-ness built into the definition of improvisation. 
In her study of Italian poetic improvisation and its relationship to Romanticism, Angela 
Esterhammer suggests that improvisation as such – whether in the practice of the Romantic 
improvvisatore, the contemporary improv comedian or a jazz musician – involves three factors. 
First, improvisation involves a relationship to time that distinguishes it from other varieties of 
                                                        
552 Online Etymology Dictionary, “Improvisation (n.),” accessed February 12, 2018,  
https://www.etymonline.com/word/improvisation. 
553 Online Etymology Dictionary, “In (adv., prep.),” Accessed February 12, 2018,  
https://www.etymonline.com/word/in. This prefix is better known in the form in-, but still 
survives in terms such as “impertinent.” 
554 Online Etymology Dictionary, “Improvisation (n.),” accessed February 12, 2018,  
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literary, comedic and musical activity; namely, the improviser submits to the “forward motion of 
time, which disallows erasing, editing, or revision.”555 While, of course, a non-improvising poet 
or a composer also create in the forward motion of time, their activity admits of retrospective 
refinement: what was written earlier, for instance, can be revised in light of what was written 
later. It is the complete coincidence of creation and performance that places the improviser in a 
distinctive relationship to time. 
Secondly, the improviser is influenced by “the immediate feedback provided by fellow 
performers or by the audience.”556 This factor, I argue, is less defensible than the first. It entails 
that improvisation is, by definition, a communal act; or, to make the same point negatively, it 
entails that one cannot improvise alone. This seems patently false. One can certainly poetize or 
make music in the forward motion of time (factor one) and limited by a pre-given framework 
(which we shall see is factor three), without other people present and without this running afoul 
of our intuition that a genuine improvisational act took place. Conversely, and equally damaging 
to the assertion that immediate feedback is unique to improvisation and therefore by definition 
absent from composition, we can imagine a poet or composer trying out musical or poetic lines 
on someone else who is present. In short, we can imagine a non-improvisational literary and 
musical process that is shaped by immediate feedback of fellow performers or an audience. 
However, some sense of this second factor can, and arguably should, be salvaged as 
constitutive of improvisation. Instead of pointing to feedback, we might note the essentially 
contextual or situated nature of improvisation. This may include audience and co-performer 
feedback, but it is not limited to it. The contextual or situated nature of improvisation 
acknowledges that insofar as the process of conception and actualization are coincident in 
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improvisation, the considerations that influence the conception will also influence the 
actualization. In a compositional situation, on the other hand, the separation of conception and 
actualization purifies the conception from the conditions of realization. For instance, an 
improvising poet offered the theme of love is likely to foreground different aspects of the 
phenomenon if performing in a brothel as opposed to performing at a wedding. And a musician’s 
improvisational decisions will be different when subject to the echo of a cavernous hall versus an 
acoustically dead space. And the influence of context may, as Esterhammer suggests, extend to 
the presence and feedback of an audience or co-performers. A receptive and demonstrative 
audience can push an improviser in an exploratory direction, while a staid reception might 
promote a more conservative approach that privileges tried-and-true audience pleasing 
maneuvers. 
The third factor distinctive of improvisation is “a given theme and a limiting framework that 
make meaningful invention possible, precisely by constraining the possibilities of totally free 
creation.”557 As discussed above, absolute improvisation is inconceivable. To improvise always 
involves a foreknowledge of the rules that constitute the particular activity in question.558 The 
themes and frameworks that limit the improviser come in different forms. In the practice of the 
Italian improvvisatore and improvvisatrice, audience members might write themes on slips of 
paper that would be drawn at random from an urn, giving the improviser the subjects on which to 
improvise.559 The improvvisatore or improvvisatrice would be further constrained by a particular 
poetic form, for instance ottava rima stanzas. The jazz musician improvises over the melody, 
chord changes and structure of a particular tune. Bruno Nettl sums up this aspect of 
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improvisation when he suggests that we accept as a “basic assumption that all improvisation is 
somehow based on something pre-existing, some kind of point of departure – an existing tune, a 
series of chords, a group of style imperatives, a system of modes such as ragas, a precisely 
delineated system such as the radif [in Persian music].”560  
As is clear from the references to Romantic poets and jazz musicians, to say nothing of 
improvisational comedy or everyday situations of acting in the midst of indeterminacy, 
improvisation comes in many different forms; and the differences between these forms is of 
potential significance for a study of improvisation. Even species of improvisation, like musical 
improvisation, admit of further subspecies that harbor important differences. It is past the two-
thirds mark in the 1938 monograph Die Improvisation in der Musik: eine 
entwicklungsgeschichtliche und psychologische Untersuchung that Hungarian musicologist Ernst 
Ferand explicitly addresses instrumental improvisation. It proves necessary to do so, because 
when turning attention to the subject “at every turn in this peregrination we find ourselves before 
problems that were foreign to the praxis of vocal improvisation.”561 Since instrumental 
improvisation will be our chief interest in this chapter, let us consider the problems unique to 
instrumental improvisation, which, explains Ferand, are in part phenomenological and in part 
genetic. 
Ferand first addresses the phenomenological problem group with the observation that, with 
the introduction of instrumental music “a new and certainly especially significant component for 
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Improvisationspraxis fremd waren] 
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improvisation praxis comes along,”562 namely “the moment of instrumental technique, which 
ensues from the specific construction of the instruments in question and the related moment of 
timbre, which is connected with the material of the instruments.”563  
While it is true that the singer encounters technical difficulties in realizing the inner musical 
impulses that precede their externalization, it is also clear that “these material-technical moments 
are incomparably more intensely in the foreground in instrumental music.”564 In fact, in the case 
of instrumental music, the instrument itself plays a role in shaping the musician’s imagination.565 
Considerations such as comfort of instrument design – which are overlooked when music is 
considered as an abstract finished product as opposed to a process – “can be of virtually decisive 
significance for the instantaneous instrumental utterance.”566  
Ferand does not discuss in great detail by what justification this problem group is to be 
regarded as ‘phenomenological,’ other than to say that it concerns the “psycho-physiological 
particularities of instrumental music in comparison with those of vocal musician.”567 While 
Ferand’s discussion has little in common with the technical uses of the term ‘phenomenology’ 
                                                        
562 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 274. […kommt in der Instrumentalmusik eine 
neue, gerade für die improvisatorische Praxis besonders bedeutungsvolle Komponente 
hinzu] 
563 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 274. [das aus dem spezifischen Bau des 
betreffenden Instruments sich ergebende Moment des Instrumentaltechnik, und das damit 
bzw. mit dem Material des Instruments verbundene Moment der Klangfarbe] 
564 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 277. […doch treten diese 
materialtechnischen Momente in der Instrumentalmusik unvergleichlich stärker in den 
Vordergrund] 
565 Cf. Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 274. [Sind es doch gerade die besonderen 
baulichen Eigenheiten der einzelnen Instrumentengruppen, Art und Anordnung der 
Besaitung bzw. der Grifflöcher oder Tasten, die der Phantasie des Spielers ganz 
wesentlich die Richtung weisen; und dies um so stärker, je unentwickelter die 
Musikübung ist] 
566 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 275. […für die instrumentale 
Augenblicksäußerung von geradezu ausschlaggebender Bedeutung sein können.] 
567 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 287. […psycho-physiologischen 
Besonderheiten des instrumentalen Musizierens gegenüber dem vokalen] 
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that we have seen in Schütz, Husserl, Zuckerkandl and others, his discussion of the decisive role 
of the instrument in improvisational praxis may be considered ‘phenomenological’ insofar as it 
concerns the musician’s first-person experience during improvisation.  
The group of problems concerning instrumental improvisation that Ferand refers to as 
‘genetic’ concern the implications of the historical dependency of instrumental music on vocal 
music, at least in the Western tradition, which is Ferand’s primary focus. In the fifteenth century, 
when music historians can first piece together direct knowledge of instrumental music (as 
opposed to the indirect knowledge of previous centuries when music historians must rely on 
indirect sources such as literary descriptions and sculptures), the lines of development between 
instrumental and vocal music begin to separate.568 The genetic questions stemming from 
instrumental improvisation thus concern historical questions about the ways in which composed 
vocal music influenced the development of instrumental improvisation. Given the rootedness of 
this group of problems in the Western musical tradition, we will not delve deeper into it, other 
than to note the importance of genetic considerations in the study of improvisation.569 
To review, improvisation is characterized by a submission to the onrush of time, an 
engagement with the contextual situation of performance and the liberating limitation of a theme 
and framework. This third factor, the liberating limitation of some type of framework, warrants a 
closer consideration for the purpose of establishing that improvisation should be understood as 
                                                        
568 Cf. Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 289: “It unfolds from the situation that 
until this time [the fifteenth century], the transition from improvisation to composition 
had not, or only very imperfectly, taken place. Linked to this, we also have the lack of 
independence so peculiar to Western music of the first millennium and a half.” [Sie ergibt 
sich aus dem Umstande, daß bis zu dieser Zeit der Übergang von der Improvisation zur 
Komposition noch nicht, oder nur sehr unvollständig, vollzogen war. Damit hängt auch 
die für die abendländische Musik der ersten eineinhalb Jahrtausende so eigentümliche 
Unselbstständigkeit der Instrumentalmusik und ihre langandauernde Abhängigkeit von 
der Vokalmusik zusammen.]   
569 Cf. Gushee, “Improvisation and Related Terms in Middle-Period Jazz.” 
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existing on a spectrum. As Nettl points out, musical improvisation encompasses “a vast array of 
types of creativity, from the choice among two or three ornaments for insertion to presentations 
of totally ‘free’ improvisatory performance.”570 Anticipatorily, we will now investigate the claim 
that improvisation admits of different approaches that can be distinguished according to the 
degree to which the improviser is constrained by a theme and framework; and we will investigate 
this claim in the context of the pedagogy of improvisation. 
 
2. The Pedagogy of Improvisation 
In this section we will consider some approaches to teaching improvisation, which will give 
contour to a practice that, even in light of section one, remains abstract. Improvisation, we have 
said, admits of degrees of freedom, which not only reflect different improvisational traditions 
and their respective values, but also serve as a pedagogical device for learning to improvise. 
Saxophonist Lee Konitz, for one, advocates the use of these different degrees of improvisation as 
a method of learning how to improvise and illustrates its utility with an example consisting of ten 
gradients of improvisational freedom. The neophyte begins by willfully being highly constrained 
by the theme and framework in question before adopting a progressively looser relationship to 
these limitations. “The goal of having to unfold a completely new melody on the spot and 
appraise it as you go the closer you look at it, can be frightening!” Konitz acknowledges. “So I 
think that first and foremost you have to adhere to the song for a much, much longer period of 
time.”571 Initially, then, the would-be improviser must internalize the melody of the tune in 
question, which is the theme on which the musician will eventually improvise. The second 
                                                        
570 Nettl, “Landmarks in the Study of Improvisation: Perspectives from 
Ethnomusicology,” 169. 
571 Kastin, “Lee Konitz: Back to the Basics,” 12. 
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gradient introduces embellishments, which subtly begin the process of transforming the given 
theme into variations and, eventually, entirely new melodies: “I suggest the kinds of 
compositional devices that are available: a trill, a passing tone, an appoggiatura that can bridge 
one melody note to another. The point is, you're still playing the melody, but you're doing 
something to it now.”572 Providing hard and fast criteria for distinguishing a gradient from its 
predecessor or successor is perhaps impossible, but in the ten-stage example on the first eight 
bars of All The Things You Are that Konitz supplies, it appears that there are four gradients of 
embellishment. What marks these gradients as embellishment can be illustrated by considering 
the first bar. The unadorned melody, which is the first gradient, involves sustaining an f for four 
beats. In the second gradient, which is the first stage of embellishment, the melody’s f has 
become a dotted half note, meaning that it is sustained for three of the bar’s four beats. The final 
beat of the bar is given to two eighth notes (e-d) that descend a whole tone. In this first stage of 
embellishment, the thrust of the original melody is still of central importance.573 The third 
gradient, i.e. the second stage of embellishment, the original melody note is only heard for a beat 
and a half of the bar’s four beats. However, its placement at the beginning of the bar574 and the 
end of the bar affirms its significance and renders the intervening quarter note and triplet the 
status of embellishment. The de-emphasis of the original melody note in the first bar continues in 
the fourth gradient, where it is sounded for one beat, spread over two eighth notes. But again 
Konitz is able to suggest the significance of the tone without insisting on it, so to speak. In both 
cases, the f is sounded as the peak of a brief ascending eighth note motif (d-e-f). In the course of 
                                                        
572 Kastin, “Lee Konitz: Back to the Basics,” 13. 
573 The construction of a logical improvisation can be illustrated by considering the first 
three beats of the second bar, where we find an approximate mirror image of the first bar. 
Two descending eighth notes (albeit in the second bar descending only a half step) lead to 
the sustained tone of the original melody (albeit in the second bar for only two beats).  
574 On the ‘and of one,’ to be precise, but it is the first tone sounded.  
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a traditional performance in which the tune’s melody is played more or less as written before the 
musicians take to improvising on it, the first bar of the fourth gradient would be heard as making 
self-evident reference to the melody while clearly also departing from it. The fifth gradient treats 
the f in very much the same way as the fourth gradient, as the peak of an ascending eighth note 
motif, which, however, in this case admits of wider intervallic leaps (a-d-f). 
The sixth gradient inaugurates a departure from the previous approaches. In the preceding 
five gradients the original melody of All the Things You Are was present but diluted by the 
introduction of tones, which while harmonically apposite, had not been written by Jerome Kern 
when he composed the tune in 1939. In our discussion of the gradients two through five we saw 
how the melody is still suggested despite its dilution. The sixth gradient takes a new liberty with 
original melody by “still using melodic targets but displacing for new melodies.”575 In other 
words, the second bar of the sixth gradient begins with a b-flat, just as the original melody does. 
However, this b-flat has been displaced to one octave below where Jerome Kern had originally 
written it. Thus while partaking of the ‘rightness’ of the original melody by placing the ‘correct’ 
tone at the ‘correct’ rhythmic moment, the sixth gradient also gives the impression of newness by 
situating this melodic target as part of a lengthy phrase that disguises its rightness: ars celare 
artem. 
The seventh gradient consists, in Konitz’s words, of “more new melodies.”576 In his example, 
the original melody’s f is not heard in the first bar and the b-flat melody not of the second bar has 
been delayed by an eighth note, becoming disguised in the melodic flow. The eighth gradient 
contains “still a subtle reference to the original song,”577 by containing more references to the 
                                                        
575 Kastin, “Lee Konitz: Back to the Basics,” 13. 
576 Kastin, “Lee Konitz: Back to the Basics,” 13. 
577 Kastin, “Lee Konitz: Back to the Basics,” 14. 
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melodic targets than the seventh gradient. However, the eighth gradient reverses the general 
direction of the melodic line, which has been mostly preserved in previous gradients. The 
original melody involves an upward leap of a fourth (i.e. five semi-tones) from f to b-flat. Even 
when previous gradients have disguised or omitted the tune’s melodic targets, they have 
maintained this ascending movement.578 
The ninth gradient involves a “totally new theme.”579 In his example of this advanced stage 
of improvisation, Konitz – perhaps studiously – avoids reference to the tune’s melodic targets 
and maintains the descending motion that also differentiated the eighth gradient from the 
morphology of the original melody. Finally, the tenth gradient culminates in “an act of pure 
inspiration,”580 for which Konitz provides no illustration. Perhaps this gradient should be taken 
as a sort of limit idea, as one of those rare instances in which an improviser manages to invent a 
melody as compelling and seemingly inevitable as the original. 
These ten gradients represent different degrees of limitation that, as we have argued, make 
improvisation possible. A musician may elect to improvise while more or less sticking to one 
gradient. Such an approach is common in the early history of recorded jazz. At this inchoate 
stage of improvisational practice, musicians tended to improvise embellishments on a tune’s 
melody. Overtime, as improvisational practice became increasingly sophisticated, some 
musicians eschewed the ‘lower’ gradients for the creation of new themes. 
But for the most part, and probably always in the case of successful improvisations that span 
several choruses, these gradients constitute stages of a single improvisation. As Louis Armstrong 
inimitably put it, “the first chorus I plays [sic] the melody. The second chorus I plays the melody 
                                                        
578 With the exception of the sixth gradient; but this is for the sake of a different 
symmetry that requires a consideration the first four bars to perceive. 
579 Kastin, “Lee Konitz: Back to the Basics,” 14. 
580 Kastin, “Lee Konitz: Back to the Basics,” 14. 
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round the melody, and the third chorus I routines.”581 Or, to adapt an apt quote attributed to 
novelist Laurence Sterne, “I progress as I digress.”582 Konitz too advocates constructing an 
improvisation by proceeding from the lower gradients to the higher. He points out to a student 
who plays an arranged and stylized version of There Will Never Be Another You that it “would 
be very difficult to follow or develop what you’re doing at that level, starting out at that very 
high intensity, for ten choruses or whatever you would do.”583 
In addition to the method of progressive embellishment, Konitz advocates another heuristic 
for learning to improvise or developing one’s improvisational conception: memorizing and 
learning to play exemplary improvisations recorded by musicians that one admires. 
Paradoxically, at first blush, this method appears to be anathema to the spontaneity that 
characterizes improvisation as such. In effect, this method treats an improvisation like a 
composition. But if one considers that a great improvisation possesses the sort of perfection that 
a composition also demonstrates, then memorizing and learning to play recorded improvisations 
constitutes an analytical step directed towards understanding “what a great solo consists of.”584  
As taught by Konitz and his own teacher Lennie Tristano, learning improvisations is a multi-
step process. One must learn to sing the improvisation before translating it to their instrument. 
“If you can't sing it, you haven't heard it,” Tristano claimed – a provocative claim given how 
                                                        
581 Richard M. Sudhalter and Philip R. Evans, Bix, Man & Legend (New Rochelle: 
Arlington House, 1974), 192. To “routine” is an early term, more or less synonymous 
with improvisation, which was used primarily by New Orleans musicians. The term 
initially had pejorative connotations among musicians. Armstrong’s use of the term, 
however, is not used in a negative sense. Cf. Gushee, “Improvisation and Related Terms 
in Middle-Period Jazz,” 266. 
582 Blitzer, “The Worldly Digressions of Javier Marías,” accessed December 10, 2016,  
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/persons-of-interest/the-worldly-digressions-of-
javier-marias. 
583 Hamilton, Lee Konitz: Conversations on the Improviser’s Art, 141. 
584 Kastin, “Lee Konitz: Back to the Basics,” 12. 
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difficult it is to accurately sing an improvisation a cappella.585 And before taking up one’s 
instrument and before even vocalizing, learning to sing an improvisation involves repeated 
listening, which allows the listener to memorize the improvisation and internalize all the subtlety 
and nuance that casual listening tends to overlook. Capturing the subtleties and nuances of an 
improvisation is a crucial part of the sing-along method: “Not only are we trying to hear a 
recorded solo perfectly and sing along with it precisely, we are also trying to recreate that solo 
with all its dynamics, inflections, and shape of sound—everything which makes that solo 
distinctive—including that intangible element, feeling, which is such a vital part of jazz.”586 
Through the sing-along method, the listener aims “to ‘become’ the solo, so if we were to listen to 
someone accurately singing along with a recorded solo, it would be difficult to distinguish the 
singing from the solo.”587 Once the improvisation can be accurately sung along with the 
recording, the student is then to ensure that the improvisation can be sung without the recording, 
an unexpectedly beguiling test that demonstrates whether the student has really heard, in the 
profound sense of the term, the improvisation. Finally, only once the improvisation can be 
adequately sung with and without the recording is it time to translate this knowledge to one’s 
instrument with the same aim of ‘becoming’ the solo.  
Let us consider in phenomenological terms the value of learning an improvisation for 
learning how to improvise. In previous chapters we have discussed Schütz’s account of the 
musical experience from the perspective of the beholder. In brief, this experience consists in the 
beholder’s performance of the various acts of consciousness that the creator of the work also 
                                                        
585 Tehan, “A Guide to Lennie Tristano's Sing-Along Method and the Art of 
Improvising,” 1. 
586 Tehan, “A Guide to Lennie Tristano's Sing-Along Method and the Art of 
Improvising,” 1. 
587 Tehan, “A Guide to Lennie Tristano's Sing-Along Method and the Art of 
Improvising,” 1. 
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performed in the work’s composition. Thus is established a quasi-simultaneity of consciousness 
that connects the beholder and the creator, even in cases where the creator is absent and perhaps 
long deceased. Learning an improvisation also establishes this quasi-simultaneity of 
consciousness but deepens it by involving the beholder’s body in the process, a factor that is 
conspicuously absent from Schütz’s account of the musical experience. There is undoubtedly 
phenomenological work to be done on the way in which a tuning-in relationship can be affected 
not only through the co-performance of processes of consciousness (e.g. retention and 
protention), but also by performing the bodily processes that contributed to the constitution of 
the work. This sort of embodied, communicative experience is also brought about in the 
preliminary stages of learning an improvisation; for instance, in the aforementioned sing-along 
method. Learning to sing an improvisation involves breathing along with the improviser, 
affecting a quasi-simultaneity of physical processes that enhance the quasi-simultaneity of 
conscious processes and yield a more complete, more tuned-in experience. Embodied 
engagement can of course also take on more immersive forms, as noted by Vijay Iyer: “The 
notion of musical co-performance is made literal in musical contexts primarily meant for dance; 
the participatory act of marking time with rhythmic bodily activity physicalizes the sense of 
shared time and could be viewed as embodied listening.”588 
 
3. Improvisation and Composition 
The pedagogical method of learning to improvise by learning improvisations raises an 
interesting and important question: if a great improvisation is like a composition to the extent 
that it has the sort of perfection that a thought-out, written-down work has, then why concern 
                                                        
588 Iyer, “Improvisation, Action Understanding, and Music Cognition With and Without 
Bodies,” 79. 
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oneself with improvisation in the first place? Why not just listen to composed music, which 
presumably enjoys a lower hit-miss ratio than improvisation? What is it about improvisation that 
confounds comparison with composition? What does it mean to hear an improvisation as 
improvised? This section will consider various treatments of the relationship between 
improvisation and composition, with an emphasis on the status of ‘imperfections’ in 
improvisation. 
Some writers have taken an apologetic view when comparing improvisation and 
composition, casting improvisation as an “imperfect art”589 and identifying this imperfection as 
the unique and valuable characteristic of improvisation, if problematically so and with the need 
of explanation and justification. In Ted Gioia’s presentation, the “central problem of jazz 
criticism” is as follows: “It has become a commonplace to assert that jazz is an ‘art’; yet those 
who glibly pronounce this word seldom move on to a discussion of how jazz compares (if at all) 
with the established arts.”590 For Gioia, this discussion amounts to a defense of the technical 
imperfections and creative lapses that mar a great many recorded jazz improvisations. Gioia 
advocates a different sort of approach that, instead of evaluating jazz in terms developed to 
address Western classical music, accepts jazz “on its own terms” by developing an “aesthetics of 
imperfection.”591 
                                                        
589 This phrase was introduced as the title of Ted Gioia’s 1988 book The Imperfect Art: 
Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture. 
590 Gioia, The Imperfect Art: Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture, 54. 
591 Gioia, The Imperfect Art: Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture, 54-55. It does 
seem odd that accepting jazz on its own terms involves defining the music as “imperfect” 
as opposed to just different. Andy Hamilton suggests that the etymological senses of the 
terms “perfect” and “imperfect” overcome the conundrum: “‘perficere’ means ‘to do 
thoroughly, to complete, to finish, to work up’; ‘imperfectus’ means ‘unfinished, 
incomplete’” (Hamilton, “The Art of Improvisation and the Aesthetics of Imperfection,” 
171). Thus, the aesthetics of imperfection would evidently describe the artistic values 
belonging to works in progress. 
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Gioia suggests two different ways of thinking about jazz that cast its putative imperfections 
in a new light. First, in response to the charge that improvisation is an anarchic, formless music, 
Gioia presents two ways of thinking about form. The familiar approach is termed “the blueprint 
method,”592 in which the trajectory of the work is planned in advance of its execution, just as 
architects draw up an exhaustively detailed blueprint before ground is broken. With respect to 
music, the blueprint method is the approach to form commonly found in the Western classical 
tradition. The blueprint – that is, the score – tells musicians what notes to play, for how long, 
with what intensity. Because improvisation eschews such a blueprint, it has often been 
summarily concluded that this approach is by definition formless. This conclusion is neither 
inevitable nor, as Gioia tells it, correct. “The improviser may be unable to look ahead at what he 
is going to play, but he can look behind at what he has just played;” he writes, “thus each new 
musical phrase can be shaped with relation to what has gone before. He creates his form 
retrospectively.”593 The retrospective method of artistic form stands beside the blueprint method 
as an equally valid approach, one that finds analogs in other arts such as early Italian fresco 
painting and stream-of-consciousness literature.594 
The second change of perspective required to appreciate jazz improvisation on its own terms 
addresses the putative imperfections that result from the retrospective approach. When a 
musician does not know exactly what he will play over the course of an improvisation, there is 
frequently a mismatch between one’s melodic instinct and one’s technical facility, which leads to 
imperfections – flubbed notes, squawks, rhythmic awkwardness. Such moments are regarded as 
defects viewed through the aesthetic lens of the Western classical tradition. Arguably, this is 
                                                        
592 Gioia, The Imperfect Art: Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture, 60. 
593 Gioia, The Imperfect Art: Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture, 61. 
594 Cf. Gioia, The Imperfect Art: Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture, 61. 
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because, in the Western classical tradition, the musician is regarded as a vessel through which 
the musical intentions of, for example, Mozart come to fruition. Thus any departure from the 
letter of the score, which cannot be justified as an interpretive decision arising from the 
ambiguity of the score, is regarded as an error. Such a perspective, however, is at odds with the 
improvisatory practice of jazz in which the musician is not regarded as expressing another’s 
musical thoughts, but rather one’s own. Thus, when evaluating an improvisation, it must be 
considered “in relation to the artist who created it; [this jazz attitude] asks whether that work is 
expressive of the artist, whether it reflects his own unique and incommensurable perspective on 
his art, whether it makes a statement without which the world would be in some small way, a 
lesser place.”595 To the informed ear, then, an improvisation is heard in a special context. An alto 
saxophonist is heard in relation to other recordings they have made, as well as other alto 
saxophonists working in the same idiom, as well as other instrumentalists working in the same 
idiom, as well as other alto saxophonists of different idioms, etc. Imperfections are therefore not 
evaluated against an abstract notion of the ideal improvisation, but what we know of the 
musician and the tradition of which the improvisation in question is a part. Perhaps we know that 
an imperfection arose in the course of an especially ambitious passage that suggests future 
directions for the idiom. Perhaps we know that an imperfection represents an uncommon level of 
emotional involvement for the musician in question. Perhaps we know – as in the case of Charlie 
Parker’s famous recording of Lover Man on the Dial label – that a recording took place shortly 
before a mental collapse that resulted in the artist’s temporary institutionalization. Viewed from 
such a perspective: “When we listen to Charlie Parker’s records we take delight in probing the 
depths of his abilities as an artist, and even his failures interest us because they tell us about the 
                                                        
595 Gioia, The Imperfect Art: Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture, 66. 
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musician who created them.”596 Thus, in Gioia’s account, preserving the dignity of an 
improvisation entails rejecting the autonomy of art by understanding works as intimately tied to 
their author. 
On this note, one objection that could be leveled against Gioia’s account is that it promotes 
an elitist view of improvisation. Appreciating jazz and forgiving its alleged flaws requires an 
intimate acquaintance with the tradition, which allows the listener to contextualize what is being 
heard. While it is certainly the case that the more one gets into jazz, the richer one’s experience 
of jazz becomes, Gioia fails to account for the ignorant listener’s experience of jazz and how, 
despite this ignorance, the listener’s experience can still be aesthetically satisfying. 
In his monograph Philosophie des Jazz, Daniel Martin Feige explicitly rejects casting jazz in 
terms of an “aesthetics of imperfection [Ästhetik der Unvollkommenheit].”597 Feige charges this 
approach with “tacitly drawing on certain qualities of a specific type of musical performance in 
the tradition of European art music as a measuring rod of aesthetic qualities, in order to then 
formulate a compensatory theory of value for jazz performances.”598 In other words, 
understanding jazz in terms of an aesthetics of imperfection privileges, without adequate 
justification, the criteria of a successful performance of classical music and, in light of such 
criteria, tries to make amends for jazz’s non-adherence to the norms of Western classical 
performance practice. Feige also argues that defenders of an aesthetics of imperfection 
frequently identify as imperfections what are, in truth, “aspects of the personal style of the 
                                                        
596 Gioia, The Imperfect Art: Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture, 67. 
597 Feige, Philosophie des Jazz, 31. 
598 Feige, Philosophie des Jazz, 32. [Es handelt sich vielmehr um das Vorgehen, 
stillschweigend bestimmte Qualitäten bestimmter Arten musikalischer Performances in 
der Tradition europäischer Kunstmusik als Messlatte ästhetischer Qualität 
heranzuziehen, um dann eine kompensatorische Theorie des Werts von Jazzperformances 
zu formulieren.] 
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musician in question [Aspekte des spezifischen Personalstils der entsprechenden Musiker].”599 In 
a footnote he points to Lee Brown’s characterization of Miles Davis’ solo on My Funny 
Valentine as containing “cracked notes not quite in tune, sloppy triplets, unaccountable pauses, 
arbitrary shifts of rhythm, and chaotic runs that go nowhere.”600 Feige’s point seems to be that 
these supposed imperfections are more accurately understood as purposive aesthetic decisions. 
For instance, a certain disregard for the conventions of Western tonality (cracked notes, playing 
slightly out of tune, smearing groups of notes instead of cleanly articulating them), can be 
interpreted as a bequest of the African diasporic musical traditions that Miles Davis’ inherited.  
Feige provides the resources for another critique of conceiving of improvisation as imperfect. 
The temporality of improvisation differs from that of composition. As Bruce Ellis Benson 
describes it, improvisation is a process that occurs “in-time” whereas composition takes places 
“over-time.”601 In other terms, improvisation is a process-oriented, as opposed to product-
oriented, practice and improvisations are thus embedded in time as opposed to merely contained 
in time. As such, improvisation reveals a “retrospective temporality [rückblickende 
Zeitlichkeit]”602 such that “What the improviser does first obtains its specific meaning in light of 
what he will have done later. [Das, was der Improvisierende tut, erhält seinen spezifischen Sinn 
erst im Lichte dessen, was er später getan haben wird.]”603 Thus, a ‘wrong’ note in an 
improvisation neither attains that status by virtue of not conforming to what the improviser 
intended to play nor does this note become ‘wrong’ at the moment it is played; since, if the 
improviser is able to immediately construct a phrase in which this unintended note is elevated to 
                                                        
599 Feige, Philosophie des Jazz, 32. 
600 Brown, “‘Feeling My Way’: Jazz Improvisation and its Vicissitudes – A Plea For 
Imperfection,” 113. 
601 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 78-79. 
602 Feige, Philosophie des Jazz, 78. 
603 Feige, Philosophie des Jazz, 77.  
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a central place, then the note’s initially ‘mistaken’ occurrence will retrospectively not appear as 
an imperfection or a mistake, but rather as evidence of the musician’s reactive prowess or as a 
bold aesthetic choice.604  
While Gioia is the contemporary reference point for discussions of the alleged aesthetic 
imperfection of jazz, he is not the first to discuss the curious status of the unexpected and 
unintended in improvisatory situations. Ernst Ferand also addresses what Gioia would later term 
the aesthetics of imperfection in Die Improvisation in der Musik: eine 
entwicklungsgeschichtliche und psychologische Untersuchung.605 In Ferand’s account, 
‘imperfections’ are understood in an even more positive light than Gioia’s apologetic treatment. 
“It belongs to the most appealing particularities of improvisation, that apparently unintentional 
accidents or lapses influence the further development of thoughts, lend new impulses to the 
imagination of the musician,” writes Ferand. “Such accidents are welcome opportunities for the 
genuine improviser to prove his superiority in the mastery of compositional and technical 
media.”606 One might counter that improvisational (including compositional and instrumental) 
                                                        
604 Ernst Ferand made the same point some eighty years prior: “Even blunders, technical 
lapses, mishandlings can become creative occasions. Every skilled improviser knows 
about singing a song, how an initially entirely unintended, accidentally played harmony, 
a ‘melodically strange’ note (if such an expression is permitted) can become meaningful 
and positively configured through spontaneous, interesting resolution or continuation – 
and especially when this note is highlighted again through subsequent repetition” 
(Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 17) [Selbst Fehlleistungen, technische 
Entgleisungen, Zufallsgriffe können zu schöpferischen Anlässen werden. Jeder gewiegte 
Improvisator weiß davon ein Lied zu singen, wie eine zunächst gar nicht beabsichtige, 
zufällig gegriffene Harmonie, eine ‘melodiefremde’ Note (wenn dieser Ausdruck gestattet 
ist) durch spontane, interessante Auflösung bzw. Weiterführung – und erst recht, wenn 
sie durch nachträgliche Wiederholung und Betonung noch hervorgehoben wird – 
bedeutungsvoll und positiv gestaltet werden kann.] 
605 Ernst Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik: eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche und 
psychologische Untersuchung, (Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1938). 
606 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 424. [Es gehört gerade zu den anziehendsten 
Eigentümlichkeiten der Improvisation, daß scheinbar unbeabsichtige Zufälle oder 
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mastery should correspond to a minimum of accidents and lapses with which the improviser 
must reckon, but interestingly Ferand does not regard improvisational imperfections as stemming 
from inadequate creativity or technical prowess. Instead – and perhaps representative of the 
intellectual inclinations of the age – Ferand favors a psychological (more specifically, a 
psychoanalytic) explanation of artistic inspiration607 and thus misfires of inspiration: “If one asks 
after the origin and the ultimate cause of the aforementioned accidents and lapses, the answer 
points to the deepest layers of psychological events, to processes that happen under the threshold 
of consciousness.”608 As with all such psychoanalytic accounts, it is difficult to satisfactorily 
engage with and argue against this interpretation of improvisational imperfection. 
“Disharmonious or mutually opposed psychic forces”609 do not present themselves for direct 
observation and therefore the identification of symptoms that are evidence of such unconscious 
conflicts will remain ineluctably speculative. Assessing the philosophical commitments and 
presuppositions that make such a theory viable is a task beyond the scope of this project; 
however, it is interesting to note that, for Ferand, the psychological explanation of 
improvisational imperfection is connected with what he understands to be the extra-musical 
significance of the improviser: “Precisely the overcoming of such obstacles and inhibitions… 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Fehlleistungen das Weiterspinnen der Gedanken beeinflussen, der Phantasie des Spielers 
neuen Impuls verleihen. Dem echten Improvisator werden solche Zufälle willkommene 
Anlässe sein, seine Überlegenheit in der Beherrschung der kompositionellen und 
spieltechnischen Mittel zu beweisen.] 
607 Cf. Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 425. “When it comes down to it, [artistic 
inspiration is] unanalyzable, because it is rooted in the deepest depths of the 
Unconscious.” […letzten Endes unanalysierbaren, weil in den tiefsten Tiefen des 
Unbewußten verwurzelten]. 
608 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 425. [Fragt man aber nach Herkunft und 
Ursache der erwähnten Zufälle und Fehlleistungen, so weist die Antwort in die tiefsten 
Schichten des psychischen Geschehens, in die unter der Schwelle des Bewußtseins sich 
abspielenden Vorgänge.] 
609 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 425. [unausgeglichener oder gegeneinander 
gerichteter seelischer Kräfte…] 
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however, forms the value – one could say the ‘ethical’, or if one prefers, the educational value – 
of improvisatory capacity.”610 The figure of the improviser thus assumes for Ferand a 
significance that transcends merely musical considerations: “Through the harmonious unification 
of spiritual and bodily (ideal and material) elements, improvisation virtually becomes an emblem 
of an eternal educational ideal.”611 We shall return to this theme below when we consider the 
relationship between improvisation and ethics. 
All said, Ferand and Gioia are roughly in agreement. Both recognize imperfections as an 
inevitable element of improvisatory practice and both wish to explain these imperfections in such 
a way so as to evaluate and value improvisation on its own terms, as opposed to the criteria of 
reproductive performance. Both Ferand and Gioia wish to vindicate these imperfections with 
reference to what we might call the humanity of the improviser. For Gioia, this humanity is 
particular. We affirm improvisatory lapses like we embrace an intimate’s peccadillos, since both 
shed new light on an individual with whom we have an aesthetic-emotional connection. For 
Ferand, the humanity of the improviser is more general. The improviser is an emblem of 
humanity as such and its struggle to harmoniously unite its material and spiritual aspects. 
According to Ferand, this shared struggle of the human condition also explains the effect of 
improvisation on the listener: “This circumstance [of the unification of the spiritual and the 
                                                        
610 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 426. [Gerade die Überwindung solcher 
Hindernisse und Hemmungen… aber macht den – man könnte sagen ‘ethischen’, oder 
wenn man will, erzieherischen – Wert der improvisatorischen Leistung aus.] 
611 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 426. [Durch die harmonische Vereinigung 
von seelischen und körporlichen (ideellen und materiellen) Elementen wird die 
Improvisation geradezu Sinnbild eines ewigen Erziehungsideals.] 
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material] accounts for the happy effect of a worthwhile improvisation: it is the satisfaction that 
human beings find in the concordance of idea and actualization…”612  
Other writers have taken issue with the improvisation-as-imperfect paradigm by questioning 
whether the dichotomy between composition and improvisation is as simple as Gioia seems to 
suggest. Andy Hamilton argues for a more fluid relationship in which composition and 
improvisation exist on a continuum. At the farthest reaches of the compositional end of this 
continuum stands “pre-realized electronic music,”613 in which the composer’s vision need not 
contend with performers’ interpretive liberties or imperfect technique. Other epochs and 
aesthetics of the Western classical tradition either did not strive for or lacked the means for 
achieving the compositional fixity of pre-realized electronic music; Lydia Goehr’s investigations 
in the history of the Western classical tradition abound in examples. As early as the sixteenth 
century, Goehr writes, “it had been believed sufficient to notate the figured bass and the melodic 
outline, leaving the performance to embellish and perform extempore according to established 
conventions and taste. Even in the eighteenth century, performers used well-established and 
traditional conventions for reading incomplete scores.”614 Composers of such works accepted the 
improvisational contribution of the performer in the realization of their somewhat schematic 
compositions. Other composers have regarded performers as something of a necessary evil; 
inevitable, but all too liable to distort the composer’s inviolable intentions. Igor Stravinsky, for 
one, inveighed against performers as “the root of all the errors, all the sins, all the 
misunderstandings that interpose themselves between the musical work and the listener and 
                                                        
612 Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik, 426. [Aus diesem Umstand erklärt sich wohl 
auch die beglückende Wirkung einer wertvollen Improvisation: es ist die Befriedigung, 
die der Mensch in der Übereinstimmung von Idee und Verwirklichung findet…] 
613 Hamilton, “The Art of Improvisation and the Aesthetics of Imperfection,” 171. 
614 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Music, 187. 
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prevent a faithful transmission of its message.”615 Despite even the best-intentioned performer’s 
desire to adhere unswervingly to Stravinsky’s “great principle of submission,”616 occasional 
errors and undetected interpretive decisions are unavoidable, thus introducing a modicum of 
improvisation into the performance.  
At the most extreme reaches of the improvisational pole of the continuum would stand so-
called ‘free’ improvisation or, in Derek Bailey’s useful terminology, “non-idiomatic 
improvisation.”617 This approach to improvisation proceeds without any pre-determined 
structure, tonal center, consistent rhythmic pulse and with a desire to avoid the conventions of 
any particular improvisational idiom. 
Between the extremes of pre-realized electronic music and non-idiomatic improvisation, 
there are an indeterminate number of approaches to improvising. One type of improvising that 
flirts with compositional procedure is what Lee Konitz calls “prepared playing,”618 which relies 
on worked-out patterns that a musician knows to be effective. There may be some slight variance 
in the prepared phrase – a new articulation or added embellishments – but, in essence, the phrase 
is set. Prepared playing is to be distinguished from what Konitz calls the “compositional”619 
approach to improvisation. Using alto saxophonist Charlie Parker as an example, Konitz writes, 
“As a ‘composer,’ [Parker] conceived of these great phrases and fit them together in the most 
logical way, and played them until they came alive.”620 Konitz seems to distinguish the 
compositional approach from prepared playing by way of the former’s “truly dynamic feeling for 
                                                        
615 Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons (Cambridge: Harvard  
University Press, 1970), 122. 
616 Stravinsky, Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons, 127. 
617 Bailey, Improvisation, xii. 
618 Hamilton, Lee Konitz: Conversations on the Improviser’s Art, 109. 
619 Hamilton, Lee Konitz: Conversations on the Improviser’s Art, 102. 
620 Hamilton, Lee Konitz: Conversations on the Improviser’s Art, 103. 
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the music, and…great phrases…put together ingeniously”621 as opposed to the more sclerotic, 
less changeable nature of prepared licks that are used at specific moments.  
Moving farther from pre-realized electronic music and prepared playing, Konitz classifies his 
own improvisatory approach as “intuitive improvisation.” Unlike free improvisation, Konitz and 
other intuitive improvisers bring material to the improvisational situation, as opposed to 
attempting to discover everything anew, as the truly non-idiomatic improviser does. However, in 
contradistinction to the prepared and compositional improviser, the intuitive improviser utilizes 
what Konitz calls “filler material.”622 Filler material is distinguished by its relative abstractness, 
and therefore by its applicability to an indefinite number of situations. “For example, odd 
rhythmic phrases – in 5/8, ‘da-ba-ba-da-ba, da-ba-ba-da-ba,’ that kind of a feeling, you could 
play it against any chord at any point.”623 Konitz’s use of filler material derives from his early, 
formative study with pianist Lennie Tristano, who is commonly regarded as the first musician to 
systematically teach improvisation.624 Part of Tristano’s course of study involved working with 
melodic fragments, “short melodic phrases played sequentially and diatonically in all twelve 
keys, starting on each scale degree.”625 These melodic fragments furnished grist for the 
improvising mill, without constraining the improviser to prepared phrases. As one of Tristano’s 
                                                        
621 Hamilton, Lee Konitz: Conversations on the Improviser’s Art, 109. 
622 Hamilton, Lee Konitz: Conversations on the Improviser’s Art, 104. 
623 Hamilton, Lee Konitz: Conversations on the Improviser’s Art, 104. 
624 Konitz says that Tristano “was one of the first to get something together, to offer a 
course of study. Guys used to get together to practice, and share their ideas; but this was 
kind of formal, and Tristano was the first to do that” (Hamilton, Lee Konitz: 
Conversations on the Improviser’s Art, 15). It may be argued, however, that Samuel T. 
Daley’s Sure System of Improvising from 1926-1927 is an earlier example. “Improvising 
is an art that has been credited with being born in a person and therefore, impossible, to a 
certain extent to teach,” writes Daley “In this book I try to convey the idea of 
Improvising in a systematical manner” (quoted in Gushee, “Improvisation and Related 
Terms in Middle-Period Jazz,” 271). 
625 Shim, Lennie Tristano: His Life In Music, 142. 
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guitar students noted, “when you want to improvise, perhaps if you’re playing an idea, you 
would be able to take that idea and modulate it into another place on the neck or another key or 
another chord.”626 Stated differently, the practice of working with melodic fragments introduced 
students to the indispensable improvisatory practice of thematic development without dictating 
what themes to play or where to play them, which would be characteristic of the compositional 
or prepared approach to improvisation.  
Other tools taught by Tristano were similarly geared to maximizing a musician’s flexibility 
without being constrained by a pre-composed cache of licks, i.e. intuitively improvising: “He 
showed us how to take three notes and invert them, how to use them in retrograde, and so 
on…They were the standard motivic materials…imitation, retrograde-inversion, diminution, 
augmentation, adding materials, subtracting materials…It gave me a sense of composition and 
improvisation being similar.”627 Tristano also encouraged his students to compose 
improvisations – to write out thirty-two-bar choruses that, ideally, they would have liked to have 
improvised. This exercise instilled a feeling for the compositional character of the best 
improvisations: “[Tristano] also tried to get the idea across that it’s like actually telling a short 
story. Even though it’s one thirty-two-bar tune, there should be a good beginning and a good 
middle section…and then towards the last eight [measures] you would come to some sort of a 
climax and then that would end somehow.”628 In teaching improvisation, then, Tristano taught 
many of the tools of composition (“imitation, retrograde-inversion, diminution, augmentation, 
adding materials, subtracting materials”) and had his students practice actual composition to 
internalize the possibilities of these procedures.  
                                                        
626 Shim, Lennie Tristano: His Life In Music, 143. 
627 Shim, Lennie Tristano: His Life In Music, 143. 
628 Shim, Lennie Tristano: His Life In Music, 143-144. 
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This emphasis on compositional procedures in Tristano’s pedagogy of improvisation once 
again elicits the temptation to regard improvisation as composition manqué. Is an improvisation 
at best an imperfect composition (albeit with its own compensatory charms, as Gioia would have 
it) or is there something sui generis about improvisation that allows us to preserve the practice’s 
dignity and uniqueness? 
Bruce Ellis Benson defends an ennobled conception of improvisation in his monograph The 
Improvisation of Musical Dialogue: A Phenomenology of Music wherein he argues that “the 
activities that we call ‘composing’ and ‘performing’ are essentially improvisational in nature, 
even though improvisation takes many different forms in each activity.”629 In other words, 
Benson flips the common script, which conceives of improvisation as instantaneous and thus 
imperfect composition, by instead presenting composition as an elongated process of 
improvisation. What prevents us from initially recognizing the validity of Benson’s claim, he 
argues, is not the way that we make music but rather the ways that we have become habituated to 
thinking about music. Like Christopher Small and Lydia Goehr, Benson argument is largely 
based on a genealogical examination of the Western classical tradition, the historical ascendance 
of “the ideal of Werktreue”630 and the related privilege accorded to the composer as the author of 
the work (Werk), to which performers are to be ideally faithful (treu). 
The uncertain status of improvisation derives from “the schema that we normally use to think 
about music making – that is, the binary opposition of composition and performance.”631 With 
respect to performance, improvisation flouts the conventional paradigm that regards performance 
                                                        
629 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 2. 
630 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 3. 
631 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 24. 
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as the presentation of a work. But improvisation also does not have the standard character of a 
composition, which is conceived as premeditated, prescriptive and permanent.   
Although improvisation is resistant to being explained in terms of composition or 
performance, Benson finds it to be a handy concept for describing these two musical activities. 
For instance, improvisation proves to be a more adequate characterization of the compositional 
process than creation or discovery, two concepts to which philosophers have historically 
adverted in trying to describe what composition entails.632 To the extent that composition 
involves the transformation of preexisting musical elements, it is, argues Benson, 
improvisational in nature. The improvisatory character of performance derives from what 
Ingarden called the “Unbestimmtheitsstellen,” or places of indeterminacy, of musical scores.633 
To actualize a musical score unavoidably entails making improvisational decisions about how to 
determine what has been left undetermined by the composer.  
Benson salvages the dignity of improvisation not by arguing for its distinctness, but rather by 
demonstrating that the boundaries between improvisation, composition and performance are 
more porous than is generally acknowledged. This position is perhaps more satisfying to 
defenders of improvisation than attempts to justify improvisation’s imperfections, but it still fails 
to account for what is singular about the experience of improvisation. We will return to this 
question of the uniqueness of the musical experience of improvisation, but in this next section we 
will take a detour in order to consider what the different varieties of improvisation have in 
common. Stated differently, we will bracket the question of what is singular about the experience 
                                                        
632 Cf. Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 37-44 on discovery and creation 
in composition. 
633 Ingarden, Ontology of the Work of Art, 90. 
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of improvisation in favor of the question of what is shared by the many different improvisational 
traditions. 
 
4. Audibility and Density 
“If the concept of improvisation can be said to be at all viable,” writes Bruno Nettl, adverting 
to the motivation for undertaking a comparative approach to improvisation, “it should be 
considered one of the few universals of music in which all cultures share in one way or 
another.”634 In this statement we once again encounter an underlying ethnomusicological interest 
in human musicality as such, which occasionally becomes overlooked by the discipline’s 
“specialized studies of systems and subsystems [that do not give] much attention to the nature of 
the concept [of improvisation].”635 
We have seen some philosophers attempt to subvert the improvisation-composition 
dichotomy by arguing, as does Bruce Ellis Benson, that composition is in fact improvisational. 
Nettl also problematizes the hard and fast separation of improvisation and composition, pointing 
out that even music that is unequivocally composed may admit of degrees of improvisation; as is 
clear, for instance, when we compare “the painstaking and often protracted method of Beethoven 
with Schubert’s quick, spontaneous creation of lieder.”636 
While Nettl agrees that improvisation and composition do not name qualitatively different 
processes and thus should be regarded as poles on a continuum, his comparative approach to 
improvisation proposes evaluating improvisational traditions in terms of audibility and density, 
the two central concepts to be discussed in this section. 
                                                        
634 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 4. 
635 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 4. 
636 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 6. 
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The preliminary task of identifying the object to be studied – namely, improvisations – 
proves to be more difficult than one might initially expect. We have seen that under Alan 
Merriam’s so-called simple model of the discipline, the ethnomusicologist studies music as 
concept, sound and behavior. As might be expected, however, different cultures conceive of 
improvisation differently, with the result that certain behaviors may count as improvisation to a 
Western scholar while being denied that status by a native practitioner. Some improvisatory 
traditions downplay the significance of the perceptible differences that result from 
improvisational activity, emphasizing what remains the same over what is different. When Nettl 
asked a Persian musician to elaborate on the differences between two performances of the same 
piece, the musician denied that there was in fact any difference. When presented with 
incontrovertible recorded evidence of such difference, the musician conceded that, while there 
were differences, they were insignificant and “implied that the essence of what he performed in a 
dastgah [an Arabic modal structure] is always the same.”637 What this anecdote illustrates is the 
philosophically salient point that a musical culture’s conception of a musical entity has 
implications for its conception of improvisation. Speaking of American Plains Indians, Nettl 
writes, “It is sometimes difficult to see why two rather different performances (without even the 
guidance of words) are regarded as variants of the same song, and why two others that sound 
practically alike are taken to be separate musical items.”638 Nettl concludes “Perhaps the way to 
approach the ‘improvised’ music of South and West Asia is likewise to say that performers sing 
or play the same piece, but that their idea of what is a ‘piece,’ a musical unit with its own 
integrity, is simply different from ours.”639 The plurality of concepts of music, in particular the 
                                                        
637 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 8. 
638 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 9. 
639 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 9. 
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plurality of ontologies of music, presents the study of improvisation with a methodological 
complication. A musical event may be regarded as improvisation when viewed through the lens 
of one particular conceptual paradigm, while being denied that status by a different conceptual 
paradigm. This variance is a central motivation for Nettl’s comparative approach to the subject. 
Nettl points to another methodological difficulties in getting access to study objects. In trying 
to assemble a body of recordings of Persian music for study he found that “the kinds of 
performances described by musicians as most characteristic of avaz [an improvised component 
of Persian music] took place in circumstances in which recording was forbidden.”640 
Consequently, Nettl was compelled to employ musicians to perform the music he wished to 
record and study, which he notes “might not have represented the decision-making processes that 
musicians might have used in other circumstances.”641 The contextual nature of improvisation 
here shows its methodologically nettlesome side: because the circumstances of performance alter 
the character of the study object, the researcher faces the difficulty of determining which features 
of the study object are essential, which features are variant and how the context has shaped the 
improvisation. 
How can we compare improvisation’s various manifestations? Nettl proposes to examine 
improvisatory practices “in accordance with their positions in the two continua of density and 
audibility.”642 Situating them on these continua first involves the acknowledgment, already 
discussed above, that improvisation is never creation ex nihilo, but rather is always oriented by 
                                                        
640  Nettl, “Landmarks in the Study of Improvisation: Perspectives from 
Ethnomusicology,” 179. 
641 Nettl, “Landmarks in the Study of Improvisation: Perspectives from 
Ethnomusicology,” 179. 
642 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 12. 
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certain rules, restrictions, conventions, etc., which Nettl calls the improviser’s “model.”643 A 
model may be the chord changes of the tune a jazz musician is playing or the particular mode 
(i.e. musical scale) and rhythmic cycle being performed by an Indian musician. Every model will 
consist of certain elements that function as points of reference, sustaining the latticing of the 
model, so to speak. For instance, a jazz musician is beholden to the chord changes of a tune, but 
also enjoys a certain degree of flexibility with respect to this model. In an accompanist’s role, the 
musician may allow certain chords to pass unsounded or may re-harmonize the tune by 
substituting different chords for those that were originally written. When improvising, the 
musician’s melodic line may refer to chords other than those being played by the accompanist in 
order to introduce a degree of tension that will then be satisfyingly resolved.  
Audibility concerns the question “to what extent does the model comprise the material that is 
actually heard by the student or performer?”644 For instance, Nettl identifies the show tunes that 
comprise a significant portion of the repertoire of jazz as a model of “more or less 
comprehensive audibility,”645 since at any moment listeners can orient themselves in the model 
by listening to the accompanying musicians. Like Yugoslav epic songs, these show tunes are 
learned without alteration before the musician takes the liberty of improvising on it. By contrast, 
Nettl mentions a pianist for a silent film as an improviser using an inaudible model, since there is 
no traditional score to which the pianist is improvisationally beholden. 
The density of an improvisatory situation refers to how close or distant a model’s points of 
reference are to one another. The denser a model, the fewer liberties a musician may take and the 
                                                        
643 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 11. 
644 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 15. 
645 Nettl, “Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach,” 16. 
  
235 
more similar iterations of the piece will be; as is the case, for instance, in Baroque music, in 
which a musician is limited to improvising embellishments on an otherwise rigid score.  
If, as we have argued, a viable philosophy of music must be oriented by an ideal of human 
musicality as such as opposed to any particular musical tradition, then Nettl’s continua of 
audibility and density are important in a consideration of the improvisatory dimension of 
musicking (to use Christopher Small’s vocabulary). These two continua allow the philosopher to 
bridge the conceptual divides that separate the humanity’s many divergent improvisatory 
traditions. Recognizing that no improvisatory activity is truly ex nihilo, but rather takes some 
‘model’ as its point of departure, audibility and density enable what initially appear as 
incommensurate practices to be understood as manifestations of the same factors governing 
improvisation.  
 
5. Listening to Improvising 
Perhaps by taking an analytic approach to the practice we have been viewing improvisation 
through the wrong lens. Do we achieve different insights by considering the listener’s 
experience? So far we have considered a number of different points along the composition-
improvisation continuum, stretching from pre-realized electronic music all the way to free, non-
idiomatic improvisation. But to what extent are these distinctions made manifest to the listener in 
the course of the musical experience? Do we hear an improvisation as improvised and a 
composition as composed or are these distinctions only realized reflectively? Let us consider 
from a phenomenological point of view the experience of listening to an improvisation. 
Musician and theorist Vijay Iyer addresses the question of whether it is perceptually evident 
that one is listening to an improvisation. In response to the question whether the distinction 
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between listening to improvised versus composed music matters, Iyer answers in the affirmative: 
“The main source of drama in improvised music is the sheer fact of the shared sense of time: the 
sense that the improviser is working, creating, generating musical material the same time in 
which we are co-performing as listeners.”646 In a word, listeners empathize with the improviser. 
But it is inadequately clear how this embodied empathy distinguishes the experience of listening 
to improvisation versus composition. Iyer suggests that it “extends to an awareness of the 
performers’ coincident physical and mental exertion.”647 However, the experience of the 
improviser’s mental exertion remains unclear. Iyer suggests, “improvisational music magnifies 
the role of embodiment in musical performance. The perception of improvisation seems to 
involve the perception of another body or bodies engaged in embodied, situated, real-time 
experience.”648 Still, one might object that the performance of a composition equally involves 
bodies engaged in embodied, situated, real-time experience, leaving the distinctive experience of 
improvisation still undetermined. Iyer summarizes his thesis with the claim that improvisation 
“‘matters’ in music because a knowing listener experiences some kind of empathy for the 
embodiment of the performer, or some kind of understanding of the effortfulness of real-time 
performance.”649 In addition to brilliantly marshaling a large body of scientific literature on the 
neuroscience of musical cognition, Iyer’s approach is valuable for the centrality of the listener. 
Nevertheless, for all its merits, Iyer’s account fails to capture the listener’s first person 
perspective and to differentiate the listener’s experience of improvisation from composition. 
                                                        
646 Iyer, “Improvisation, Action Understanding, and Music Cognition With and Without 
Bodies,” 80. 
647 Iyer, “Improvisation, Action Understanding, and Music Cognition With and Without 
Bodies,” 80. 
648 Iyer, “Improvisation, Action Understanding, and Music Cognition With and Without 
Bodies,” 80. 
649 Iyer, “Improvisation, Action Understanding, and Music Cognition With and Without 
Bodies,” 87. 
  
237 
Ethnomusicologist Thomas Turino also addresses the question of whether a listener can hear 
that improvisation is taking place. His answer is that, generally, improvisation is not perceptually 
evident, but certain exceptions must be made. Turino’s treatment of the question rests on a 
distinction he proposes between “improvisation” and “formulaic performance.”650 “In formulaic 
performance,” explains Turino, “a ‘piece’ is considered a platform for individual and group play 
rather than an art object to be faithfully reproduced.”651 Formulaic performance, therefore, is 
well suited to the field of music making that Turino calls participatory performance, in which 
there is no hard and fast performer-audience distinction and the goal is to involve as many people 
as possible in the music making.652 Turino likens formulaic performance to a game, which, as 
such, operates according to rules and, which, consequently, lends itself to the development of 
habitual ways of approaching the game; such habitual ways of approaching the game are the 
formulas that musicians develop over time and through experience. 
In the context of formulaic performance, improvisation takes on a different meaning than 
traditionally ascribed to the practice; and this is a consequence of formulaic performance’s 
conception of a ‘piece,’ which differs from that of the Western classical paradigm. Instead of 
merely referring to moments when the performer departs from the score or, more generally, the 
condition of performing without being entirely hemmed in by a score, in the context of formulaic 
performance, ‘improvisation’ names those “instances in performance where I surprise myself 
with purposeful alteration, extensions, or flights away from the model and habitual formulas.”653 
Improvisation is then characterized by the recognition of novelty – and this is why Turino 
concludes that improvisation is not usually perceptible to listeners. To hear something as novel 
                                                        
650 Turino, “Formulas and Improvisation in Participatory Music,” 103. 
651 Turino, “Formulas and Improvisation in Participatory Music,” 104. 
652 Cf. chapter 3 for a discussion of Turino on the four different fields of music making. 
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or surprising entails a significant acquaintance with a particular performer’s musical habits and 
tendencies. Only when a listener is familiar with what a musician usually plays can this listener 
hear something as especially inspired or uncharacteristic of this musician. Considering the 
improvisational criterion of surprise, Turino concludes, “it seems unlikely that we would be able 
to recognize a case of improvisation simply by listening to anyone but ourselves or our most 
intimate music partners, since we cannot know most people’s complete collection of 
formulas.”654 
To get closer to the first-person distinctness of listening to an improvisation, let us liken the 
experience to watching a tightrope walker. The musical improviser and the tightrope walker 
share the characteristic of being subject to the forward motion of time, which disallows revision, 
do-overs or mulligans. And, for this reason, watching a tightrope walker sans safety net is an 
especially exciting experience, given the morbid possibility of a fatal fall. Like the tightrope 
walker, the improviser is distinguished from the non-improvising musician by abandoning the 
musical safety net of a score. This is not to say that improvisers have no safety nets available to 
them, however. The musical improviser’s ‘safety net’ is not as self-evident as the tightrope 
walker’s, which can be simply seen. As Turino showed, perceiving an improviser’s safety net 
(i.e. their musical habits) requires a familiarity with both the musician’s improvisational tradition 
and individual musician’s work. Hearing an improviser play a hackneyed lick or rely on their 
favorite phrases detracts from the informed listener’s evaluation of the improvisation, but 
hearing these things requires an acquaintance with the musical tradition from which the 
improviser emerged as well as the improviser’s own oeuvre. Only once the listener has acquired 
this knowledge can an improvisation be heard as ‘more’ or ‘less’ improvised. 
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This points to an enlarged conception of retention at play in listening to an improvisation 
(and music more generally). In addition to the sense of retention discussed by Schütz, which 
serves as a condition of the possibility of constituting a musical phrase, there is also a historical 
dimension to retention. Certain musical phrases arouse the informed listener’s pre-reflective 
awareness that a reference has been made – perhaps a quote from another tune’s melody or an 
allusion to a famous improvisation on the tune being played. The fact that the listener often can’t 
immediately name the reference suggests that this experience is indeed the passive synthesis of 
retention as opposed to the volitional act of remembering. 
To hear an improvisation as improvised means to listen with an ear oriented by the 
appropriate criteria, which demands a foreknowledge of what ‘improvisation’ means in the 
context in question. It is an informed sort of listening, just as improvising is an informed sort of 
playing, in contrast to the anything-goes colloquial misunderstanding of the practice. “It is true 
that there is no way of distinguishing improvised from precomposed music just by hearing it,” 
agrees Bruno Nettl, “if one is ignorant of the musical culture or social context.”655 Only in light 
of the appropriate frame of reference can something be adequately heard as an improvisation, 
which entails that different frames of reference are required to properly hear the improvisations 
of different traditions. Possessing the requisite knowledge to appreciate a jazz improvisation 
does not mean that I can also fully appreciate the improvisations of North Indian Hindustani 
music or Persian radif. 
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6. The Social Situation in Improvisation 
 Up to this point we have treated improvisation by and large as a solitary activity, which is at 
odds with many actual instances of improvisation. Thus we must consider the social situation of 
improvisation; but before doing so it is worth noting that some scholars have, if not cautioned 
against the theme, encouraged caution when addressing it; namely to avoid “taking a 
preestablished commitment to an ideal of social interaction and ‘discovering’ it in certain 
improvised practices within jazz, leading to the conclusion that jazz is a better model for social 
life than we have now.”656 The charge against such accounts is that they beg the question and, 
more importantly for our purposes, “utilize an idealized model of improvisation that does not do 
justice to the phenomenology of the improvisational experience.”657 Such idealized models of 
improvisation can be found in certain uses of musical therapy as well as romanticized depictions 
of jazz.658 We will avoid this criticism of the social approach to improvisation by grounding our 
account in a phenomenology of improvisational experience. 
The social situation of the improvisational musical experience differs from Schütz’s portrayal 
in MMT and FPM. In fact, the improvisational situation is in certain respects more complicated 
than the actualization of a composition. Let us then revise certain components of Schütz’s 
account in order to accommodate the distinctiveness of the musical experience of improvisation.  
First, because of his focus on the playing of composed music, the “main social relationship” 
in Schütz’s account of the musical experience is that “between composer and beholder,”659 a 
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term that encompasses “the player, listener, and reader of music.”660 The improviser, on the other 
hand – again, we are here limiting ourselves to the jazz tradition – is involved in a plurality of 
relationships. While playing the melody of a tune, the improviser may indeed affect a 
relationship with the tune’s composer not entirely unlike that of Schütz’s classical pianist. 
However, this is not necessarily the case. Even when a jazz musician is not taking advantage of 
the full liberties of improvisation, there is no premium placed on playing the melody exactly as 
written, which would bring about the quasi-simultaneity of consciousness with the tune’s 
composer. The improviser enjoys a more fluid relationship to the score than a classical musician. 
Thus it cannot be taken for granted that the improvisatory situation involves the quasi-
simultaneity of consciousness between player and composer that is foregrounded in Schütz’s 
example of the classical pianist.  
What then are the social relationships of the improvisatory situation? Although we can easily 
imagine a solitary improviser, and therefore neither of the following relationships constitute a 
universal condition of improvisation, the relationship between improviser and co-performers as 
well as the relationship between improviser and audience assume a different form than they had 
in the mere realization of a score.  
If we assume the perspective of an audience member, then the situation does not seem so 
foreign to Schütz’s account. These passive beholders of the music are engaged in the activity of 
constituting the coherence of the tones being presented. Whether or not these tones have been 
pre-written does not materially alter this process of constitution. Assuming the audience 
members to be, if not connoisseurs then at least knowledgeable listeners with some degree of 
familiarity with jazz and the practice of improvisation, then surely their anticipations will be of a 
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different sort than a knowledgeable listener approaching the recital of a classical work with 
which the listener is familiar. Approaching an improvisation involves a broader horizon of 
possibility than approaching a composition. Of the pianist encountering an unfamiliar nineteenth 
century sonata, Schütz explains, the scheme of reference brought about by the pianist’s 
preknowledge of the typicalities of this genre “determines, in a general way, the player’s 
anticipations of what he may or may not find in the composition before him. Such anticipations 
are more or less empty; they may be fulfilled and justified by the musical events he will 
experience when he starts to play the sonata or they may ‘explode’ and be annihilated.”661 What 
Schütz says of the pianist encountering an unfamiliar sonanta also holds for listeners 
encountering an improvisation. In comparison with a composition, encountering an 
improvisation will entail emptier anticipations, and thus fewer experiences of fulfillment and 
annihilation. 
Indeed, improvisation seems to call for a more open mind, or in phenomenological parlance, 
emptier anticipations. But this does not mean that anticipations will be entirely empty. 
Knowledge that a musician is considered a representative of hot jazz, swing, bebop, post bop, 
free jazz or some such discrete genre brings with it a general sense of what types of things a 
musician is likely to play. If all I know of Sonny Stitt is that he is considered a faithful disciple 
of Charlie Parker, then I will not foresee (or forehear, to coin a terms that maps well onto one 
dimension of what Schütz has in mind when he writes of “anticipation” as opposed to protention) 
avant-garde liberties when Stitt plays a tune written by or associated with Charlie Parker. There 
is also a correlation between a listener’s familiarity with a particular musician’s style and 
improvisational approach and the fullness of the listener’s anticipations when presented with a 
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hitherto unheard improvisation. A vast acquaintance with Lester Young’s recordings of the 
standard blues form grants one a robust sense of the types of things they are likely to hear in 
another such recording.662 
Insofar as the activity of improvisation involves the coincidence of composition and 
performance, the improvisational musical experience involves the actual simultaneity of 
consciousness of the performer and the beholder, as opposed to the quasi-simultaneity 
established in the performance of a pre-written composition. The musical experience of 
improvisation also differs from that of composition in being more restricted in communicative 
possibilities; meaning that, whereas the sharing of the ongoing flux of the musical content of a 
composition “holds good whether this process occurs merely in the beholder’s recollection, or 
through his reading the score, or with the help of audible sounds,”663 improvisation only exists as 
embodied in audible sounds. A notated improvisation no more encapsulates the improviser’s 
mental processes than a photograph of an individual shows the world from the subject’s vantage 
point. Improvisation, we have seen, is a contextual practice, affected by factors resistant to 
notation. Composition can be abstracted from the conditions of its creation; an essential aspect of 
its ontological status as an ideal object. The improviser’s reactions to the prompts of co-
performers, on the other hand, are an essential component of the musical event and yet have no 
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place in traditional notation. The same holds for the influence of the acoustics of a room, the 
particular state of mind that the improviser is in at the time of improvising and other such factors. 
It may be objected that the improviser’s state of mind is no more on display when the listener is 
present than when we read the notated improvisation ex post facto. It may be responded, 
however, that other sense modalities yield a fuller picture of the experience. The musician’s body 
language, banter with co-performers and other such signs allow the listener to contextualize the 
improvisation.  
The social relationship between improvising co-performers differs from that of classical 
musicians by being unmediated by a score. Garry Hagberg presents a picture of form of 
interactivity that takes place in ensemble improvisation, and argues that this practice challenges 
both common pictures of social interaction and conceptions of the self.  
In attempting to understand ensemble interaction, the social contract model appears at first to 
be an effective explanatory mechanism, insofar as an ensemble can be conceived as a microcosm 
of society: “the collective is no more than a convergence of individuals, who, as individuals first, 
choose one at a time to join a group that offers benefits (in our case musical) that expand what 
the individual could create alone, in exchange for a corresponding reduction in individual or 
autonomous freedom.”664 Musicians in a symphony, for instance, have an agreement (generally 
unspoken) to play in accordance with one another’s phrasing, dynamics, timbre and other 
musical elements that yield a uniform and appealing sound. Improvising musicians, on the other 
hand, agree to share solo space and to adopt a background role when a co-performer has taken 
the lead. Hagberg concedes that the social contract model is a useful heuristic for 
conceptualizing non-improvised ensemble performance; for instance, the type of interaction at 
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work in symphony orchestras. Each musician is responsible for a part, delineated by the work’s 
score. Musicians privately rehearse their parts, ensuring mastery before the symphony comes 
together to become the sum of those parts. While effective in the case of non-improvising 
ensembles, Hagberg rejects the social contract model as an accurate representation of the 
interactivity of improvising ensembles.  
As Hagberg points out, the social contract model harbors a Cartesian conception the self, 
which “shapes and restricts, to a far greater extent than commonly realized, our thinking about 
the nature of ensemble performance.”665 This conception of the self regards individuals as 
inessentially related to externality, yielding an “additive” end result of ensemble interaction, 
which proves to be at odds with the spontaneous coming-into-being of an improvisation.  
Hagberg clarifies the problem with the notion of intention – not the phenomenological 
concept of intention, but the more colloquial sense of what one plans to do. He argues that the 
Cartesian model of selfhood entails that intentions are “mentally private to the intender.”666 
Thus, the intentions that constitute a performance of a symphony are simply the sum of the 
intentions that comprised the respective musicians’ individual practice and rehearsal regimens. 
Hagberg argues, however, that this model cannot account for what takes place between an 
improvising ensemble, which involves “collective intention…something essential to the 
phenomenology of collective action that remains after we subtract the sum total of individual 
intentions from the final result.”667 The subtle difference is illustrated with an example drawn 
from John Searle. In the first case, a group of individuals are sitting in a park, it begins to rain, 
the individuals quickly get up and take shelter. In the second case, a group of actors are 
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undertaking the same action as part of a play. The actions make look the same, but, Searle 
argues, they are qualitatively different. In the first case, the action is the sum of individual 
intentions. In the second case, the actors realize a we-intention. 
The difference can be discussed in terms of a weak versus a strong sense of collaborative 
action. The weak sense understands collaborative action in terms of additive autonomous 
intentions. In the strong sense: 
the action we are after is to be found in the interrelations between the collectively 
inflected intentions of the individuals as they work together. And the act of working 
together is not a moment, but a process, within which we coordinate individual actions 
into a cohesive unity that transcends the capacity of solo action, where this involves 
attending to the distributed progress of the agreed-upon action in the act of performing 
it.668 
Hagberg argues that the Cartesian picture of the nonporous self is problematized by this 
strong sense of collaborative action in which individual intentions undergo alterations in the 
course of their actualization. Jazz improvisation in general is a powerful illustration of 
intentional action that is not temporally pre-conceived and ensemble improvisation is a powerful 
illustration of collective intention spontaneously developing. 
A robust picture of the spontaneously developing collective intention of jazz improvisation 
emerges in ethnomusicologist Paul Berliner’s monumental monograph Thinking In Jazz: The 
Infinite Art of Improvisation, which contains much valuable information, gleaned through 
extensive interviews with practitioners, on the social situation unique to jazz. This social 
situation proves to be a highly complicated form of interaction involving fluid relationships 
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between the musicians who occupy discrete albeit porous roles and share responsibilities 
necessary for the establishment and maintenance of a successful improvisational happening. 
While precisely defining these roles and responsibilities would be exceedingly difficult and 
ineluctably provisional, certain commonalities can be identified that hold between different 
performances and styles. 
Some of the of more or less invariant relationships are those existing in the rhythm section, 
which usually includes the bass, drums and a harmonic instrument (e.g. a piano, guitar, organ or 
vibraphone). As the name suggests, the primary responsibility of the rhythm section is setting 
and maintaining the rhythm of the music: “Among all the challenges a group faces, one that is 
extremely subtle yet fundamental to its travels is a feature of group interaction that requires the 
negotiation of a shared sense of the beat, known, in its most successful realization, as striking a 
groove.”669 Let us first consider the relationship between the drummer and the bassist, whose 
relationship to one another and to the beat are most important to getting into a groove. Both the 
drummer and bassist must retain a faithful relationship to the beat while also allowing for some 
variation (it is not uncommon for groups to imperceptibly speed up or slow down such that there 
is some variance between the piece’s beats per minute when comparing the beginning and the 
end of the performance). This slowing down or speeding up is a function of the unspoken 
negotiations that take place between musicians, who may be feeling the music differently or are 
coping with the mechanical vicissitudes of playing an instrument. 
There are in fact an indeterminate number of ways that musicians may relate to the beat, 
which may broadly be characterized as playing behind the beat, playing on the beat and pushing 
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the beat. In other words, allowance must be made for “the elasticity of the beat,”670 which 
accounts for different time feels; playing behind the beat creates a ‘deeper’ more relaxed groove 
whereas pushing the beat lends a feeling of forward momentum and drive to the music. 
“Typically, either the bass player or the drummer provides an anchor or rhythmic ground for the 
more adventurous performances of the rest of the band,”671 Berliner finds. In other words, the 
musicians variously trade off adopting a more or less restricted approach to the beat.  
The rhythmic negotiations of the rhythm section are also not entirely separable from melodic 
considerations. Using a distinction between the music’s horizontal (i.e. rhythmic) space and 
vertical (i.e. melodic) space, Berliner points out that the rhythm section demonstrates a concern 
for the texture and transparency of the music while maintaining a consistent, if flexible, rhythm 
by playing in a melodic range that does not cover up the contributions of co-performers. For 
instance, the bass player may elect to play in a higher register if the soloist is playing an 
instrument, such as the baritone saxophone, whose tonality tends to overlap with the bass’ typical 
range.  
So far we have seen how relationships between the bassist and the drummer shape the 
rhythmic character of an improvisatory performance while also maintaining an appropriate 
melodic frame for the soloist to fit into. The harmonic instrument of the rhythm section must also 
fit rhythmically and melodically in the overall sonic gestalt. This involves a relationship with the 
bass and drummer, jointly and severally. A pianist672 and a drummer must coordinate their 
accenting of the beat so that “elements of their comping figures converge, reinforcing one 
another, or diverge, creating cross-accentuation schemes or interlocking patterns, one part’s 
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components occupying the space left by its counterpart.”673 An inattentive relationship between 
harmonic instrument and drummer will confuse the happening’s rhythmic character or at least 
will fail to realize the potential for creating dynamic time feels.  
Whereas the relationship between the harmonic instrument and the drummer is primarily 
rhythmic, the relationship between the harmonic instrument and the bass player adds a harmonic 
dimension, since the bass player’s role essentially involves describing the harmonic contours of a 
piece. Thus both the bassist and, say, pianist must be ready and able to hear and respond to the 
various ways in which their counterpart may treat the harmonic framework. This ability to 
respond includes the capacity to accommodate chord substitutions that the pianist may play or 
the bassist may suggest, such that the final harmonic result “is not the uniform representation of 
a lead sheet model, but a lively composite creation, the product of multiple, ever-changing 
interpretations of a progression.”674 
Within these roles, which have been codified by the historical tradition that the musicians 
inherit as well as the inherent qualities of the instruments themselves, allowances must be made 
for various sorts of hierarchies. The leader of a group, for instance, is at liberty to dictate aspects 
of the social relationships in the group. Among the leader’s prerogatives are creating the set list, 
setting the tempo, determining the order of soloists and requesting stylistic changes from the 
musicians.  
The particular nature of improvisational practice in the jazz tradition also brings about 
another social relationship, namely that between the individual whose improvising is 
foregrounded as the co-performers who are accompanying the soloist: “While carrying on their 
discourse, the members of the rhythm section ultimately provide support for the soloist, whose 
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entrance increases the demands upon their attention and musical sensitivity.”675 That being said, 
the relationship between soloist and accompanists is bi-directional, and the soloist counts on the 
accompanists for consistent support as well as stimuli that may influence the direction of the 
improvisation: “New lines of interpretation can occur to them [i.e. soloists] in ongoing 
inspiration, as soloists hear and feel features of their ideas reinforced by their counterparts.”676 
Conversely, the soloist may elicit a response from the rhythm section by repeating a strong, 
rhythmic pattern.  
The social relationships of musical improvisation differ between traditions, styles and other 
such differentiating factors, and are often learned through doing as opposed to being theoretically 
learned. If any generalizations may be made, it seems accurate to say that improvisation demands 
social conscientiousness, an openness to one’s co-performers as well as the ability and 
willingness to respond to the subtle cues that are non-verbally communicated in the course of 
performance. 
 
7. Improvisation and Ethics 
 The transition from the social situation of improvisation to the connection between ethics and 
improvisation is natural, since the former theme is usually understood as giving way to the latter. 
The variability and ambiguity of the rules of interaction between improvisers – especially vis-à-
vis the clarity of the situation for musicians co-performing a score – quite naturally lends itself to 
questions concerning how musical subjects ought to relate extemporaneously, what sort of 
responsibilities they owe to one another and other such questions of an unmistakably ethical 
character. In this section we shall consider a number of different approaches to the question of 
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improvisation and ethics, which view the connection from different vantage points, thereby 
uncovering different aspects of the ethical significance of improvisation. 
 We have already encountered the association of improvisation and ethics, in the curious form 
this association takes in the work of Ernst Ferand.677 What is noteworthy about Ferand’s 
treatment of the theme is that he discusses improvisational ethics in a solipsistic register; that is, 
for Ferand, the ethical upshot of improvisation does not emerge between improvising co-
performers but rather in what we might call the self-overcoming of the solitary improviser. 
Recall Ferand’s psychoanalytically inflected account of the imperfections of improvisation. 
Ferand attributed technical blemishes and imaginative lapses as symptomatic of subconscious or 
unconscious psychological conflicts, which, however nettlesome, also afford the improviser the 
potential to serve as an ethical symbol: “Precisely the overcoming of such obstacles and 
inhibitions… however, forms the value – one could say the ‘ethical’, or if one prefers, the 
educational value – of improvisatory capacity.”678 
 A similarly individual-focused, if not solipsistic, approach to the ethical significance of 
improvisation is found in William Day’s discussion of improvisation and moral perfectionism. 
Day’s approach to untangling the ethical upshot of improvisation relates the imperfections 
endemic to improvisation with the project of moral perfectionism, and argues that exemplary 
improvisers demonstrate the moral perfectionist aspiration to “check our habitual responses to 
the world…in favor of newly discovered or newly charted desires.”679 Habitual responses may 
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seem questionably categorized as imperfections, but they fit the bill insofar as they may be 
perceived as an aesthetically dissatisfying dearth of imagination.  
The self-oriented flavor of Day’s approach derives from the nature of moral perfectionism; a 
theory, the distinctive features of which are identified by Day as “a commitment to speaking and 
acting true to oneself, combined with a thoroughgoing dissatisfaction with oneself as one now 
stands.”680 While focused on music, Day’s account is not restricted to music. Much in the way 
that Schütz uses making music as an illustration of more general processes of communication, 
Day argues that improvisation is “best understood as a species of ordinary, unrehearsed 
activity,”681 thus rendering the ethical significance of the improviser to be equally applicable to 
non-musical improvisers, or, in other words, human beings.  
Day lays bare the improvisational instantiation of “the self heeding the self”682 through 
original interpretations of recorded improvisations in which he attempts to “locate the genius in 
the solos, that is, to name the place where the soloist and the solo find themselves in such a way 
that what follows…can be heard to be the result of the improviser’s full awareness of his place 
and presence, of his working through his conventional responses.”683 
It is worth tarrying for a moment on Day’s comments about improvisational analysis, since 
they bear on the theme of the relationship between improvisation and composition. Day defends 
the necessity of a different analytic outlook when dealing with improvisation, rather than 
composition. When improvisations are regarded as compositions “the wonder of [an 
improvisation] will seem to be not that the notes follow one another in the particular way they 
do, but that this in fact quite conventional way of organizing a stretch of music could be 
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improvised.”684 When marveling at the compositional nature of an improvisation, “our marveling 
will be essentially abstract, not growing out of this or that moment of the solo itself but out of, as 
it were, the fact that the solo exists at all, out of its ontological significance.”685 Day’s point is 
that an overemphasis on the that of improvisation (that such a perfectly formed musical utterance 
could be extemporized) leads us to overlook how such utterances are created.686 Moreover, 
conceiving an improvisation as a whole demands that each moment of the improvisation be 
understood in relation to the whole; that each gesture serve some indispensable purpose in the 
perfection of the entire utterance. Day’s analytic approach, then, focuses on nitty-gritty details of 
recorded improvisations, attempting to identify “the impulse or impetus that at each moment 
informs the solo’s progress” as well as to motivate the thought that “their improvising can be 
read as making…claims on us.”687 
Day examines Lennie Tristano’s improvisation on his “C Minor Complex” from 1961. Day is 
interested in a highly idiosyncratic section in which Tristano repeats a three-note figure for close 
to twenty seconds. The listener is likely to have several thoughts in response to this insistent 
repetition: How long can Tristano continue this figure? What musical solution will allow 
Tristano to transition out of this repetition? Through close description, Day presents Tristano’s 
negotiation of this improvisatory conundrum as purposive and self-trusting (insofar as Tristano 
commits to the figure instead of parodying himself or playing a contrasting run that would seem 
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on “how music becomes meaningful – rather than specifically what music means” 
(Warren, Music and Ethical Responsibility, 12) in order to highlight the indispensable 
role of social and cultural factors in the establishment of musical meaning. 
687 Day, “Knowing as Instancing: Jazz Improvisation and Moral Perfectionism,” 106. 
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to repudiate the figure). Day’s point is that in such exemplary improvisations we find didactic 
instances of moral perfectionist dicta such as Emerson’s “To believe your own thought…is 
genius.”688 
 Both Ferand and Day treat the ethical content of improvisation as a function of the self’s 
relation to the self. The second major approach to the connection between improvisation and 
ethics posits a social origin of ethical responsibility. 
 For ethnomusicologist Thomas Turino, the question isn’t so much whether improvisation in 
particular or music making in general is related to ethics, but rather how the different aesthetic 
values of different musical contexts yield different sorts of ethical responsibility. As discussed in 
a previous chapter, Turino argues that “music” is not monolithic but is rather comprised of 
distinct fields that can be differentiated according to various considerations; including their 
respective views of what music is, different conceptions of musicians’ roles and relationships, 
different types of hierarchy between the individuals involved in the performance, different 
aesthetic criteria and different evaluative criteria.  
This paradigm yields a pluralistic and relativistic conception of musical ethics. Not only each 
individual field of music making, but also each instantiation of a field in a particular tradition 
harbors a conception of how musicians are supposed to interact with one another. While the 
complex context surrounding every musical tradition will yield subtle variations in ethics, which 
are not necessarily codified or even explicitly verbalized, some commonalities can be identified 
by virtue of the general features of the field of music making to which the particular tradition 
belongs.  
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Participatory performance, for instance, “is defined by the ethical priority of involving as 
many people as possible in the actual acts of music making and dance, as well as by a distinct set 
of values by which the success of a performance is significantly judged by the degree of 
participation achieved.”689 Presentational performance, on the other hand, in which there is a 
strict division between performers and audience, excludes less skilled performers in order to 
maximize audience interest. Thus there are aesthetic ramifications to a musical event’s ethical 
underpinnings: participatory performance does not necessarily devalue more advanced musicians 
or more sophisticated types of playing; but the virtuosity of virtuosos must ultimately serve the 
ethical end of supporting non-virtuosos and not scaring-off would-be participants. Contrarily, by 
barring the less skilled, presentational performance severs any ethical responsibility that more 
skilled musicians would otherwise have to the less skilled – although it may be argued that the 
ethical responsibility of the more skilled towards the less skilled does not disappear but rather 
undergoes a transformation into a sort of aesthetico-ethical responsibility in which the 
performers are obliged to make music at the height of their abilities for the enjoyment or 
edification of the audience.  
Turino’s approach to musical ethics is an important supplement to that of Ernst Ferand, who 
treats the theme only with respect to a solitary individual. Upon reflection, Ferand’s focus on the 
individual seems odd insofar as ethical responsibility is often conceived as emerging in the 
encounter between individuals. But the ethical relationship between individuals is not always as 
simple as recognizing and respecting the contributions of a co-performer. The ethical 
responsibility of a musician is as much about roles as it is about relationships [“each field is 
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defined [in part]…by different ethics about roles, relationships, and responsibility.”690] For 
instance, during his tenure with pianist Thelonious Monk, soprano saxophonist Steve Lacy was 
rebuffed in his attempts to improvisationally interact with his accompanist: 
[W]hen we were playing together sometimes he would play something on the piano and I 
would pick that up and play that on my horn. I thought I was being slick, you know? And 
he stopped me, and he said, ‘Don’t do that. … I’m the piano player, you play your part, 
I’m accompanying you. Don’t pick up on my things.691 
Monk was reminding Lacy that his present role called for him to lead as opposed to follow, that 
he should be the ‘speaker’ and not the ‘respondent.’ 
  Just as Turino’s unpacking of the ethics of music making hinges on a fourfold understanding 
of what music is, so does Jeff Warren argue that misguided ontological conceptions of music 
prevent us from adequately understanding the connection between music and ethics. Yet again 
the culprit is a view of music that treats it as an object. To be more precise, Warren focuses not 
merely on the objectification of music, but on its commodification: “Discussion surrounding 
music and ethical responsibility in contemporary popular discourse usually involves the idea of 
music as a product.”692 The commodified conception of music yields a legalistic understanding 
of ethical responsibility: consumers have a moral obligation to purchase music, respect copyright 
laws, etc. 
 Of course Warren does not defend the moral permissibility of illegally sharing music; 
instead, he argues that viewing music as an object, which is entailed in conceiving of it as a 
commodity, is an impoverished and misguided way of conceptualizing music. Basing a treatment 
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691 Day, “Knowing as Instancing: Jazz Improvisation and Moral Perfectionism,” 108. 
692 Warren, Music and Ethical Responsibility, 1. 
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of music on a “phenomenology of the improvisational [or, more generally, musical] 
experience”693 yields a vastly different understanding of the connection between music and 
ethical responsibility. 
 Warren locates the origin of ethical responsibility in music, and especially in improvisation, 
in a Levinasian understanding of an encounter with another person. An in depth explication of 
Levinas’ ethics would take us too far afield, so a superficial presentation of his view will be 
adequate for our purposes:  
Levinas theorizes the face-to-face encounter as proximity. In proximity, two unique 
people come into relation. In this encounter responsibilities to the other emerge. Ethical 
responsibilities do not emerge by recognizing that the other person is just like me, but by 
recognizing that the other person is unique, requiring me to respond uniquely to the other. 
For an encounter with another to take place, a common space needs to be shared. Musical 
experience can create a shared experience that can allow difference to come into 
contact.694 
From this conviction that music is primarily a lived activity, as opposed to an object, and 
from his personal experience as a bassist, Warren investigates different ways that music brings 
people in proximity and thereby yields ethical responsibilities. On the basis of a close description 
of the experience of playing bass as part of a small group providing music for a corporate 
function, Warren identifies four different levels of listening. The first level involves listening 
primarily to oneself, ensuring perhaps that one’s instrument is in tune and that one is conforming 
to the structure of the tune being played. While all musicians spend some time on this level of 
listening in the course of a performance, more advanced musicians will find it unnecessary to 
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focus exclusively on themselves since greater skill makes it possible to attend to more inclusive 
sonic gestalts that incorporate the contributions of co-performers. The second level of listening is 
achieved when one’s engagement with the music becomes subconscious. This requires a degree 
of familiarity with one’s instrument and tunes (or song-structures) that allows for muscle 
memory to take the place of concentration, thereby opening up a space for consciousness to drift 
to matters that are tangentially or not at all related to the music being played. The third level of 
listening is directed towards one’s co-performers. Once one has been freed from the necessity of 
self-absorption through diligent practice, the musician is able to fine-tune their contributions, so 
to speak, to their co-performers. This may involve, for instance, adjustments of timbre, tuning or 
amplitude in order to better blend into the whole. The fourth type of listening puts the musician 
in the position of someone in the audience. This type of listening may result in acoustic changes 
to one’s playing, for instance to create the most advantageous balance of instruments, or 
aesthetic changes such as playing ‘inside’ the changes to provide audience members with 
musical reference points that are familiar to even the most musically uneducated listeners.  
The third and the fourth types of listening bring the musician into proximity with others, with 
the co-performers and the audience, respectively. While conceptual complications emerge when 
distinguishing between the musician and the sounds that the person sends forth into the world, a 
simplified picture of the improvisational situation makes clear the ethical implications of the 
practice: to occupy an accompanist’s role replicates the subservient position of obligation to the 
other that Levinas identifies in non-musical face-to-face encounters. As noted before, the 
philosophical – specifically, phenomenological – underpinnings of Levinas’ claim that an 
encounter with the other presents ethical responsibilities will not be considered here, but 
Warren’s understanding of the ethical significance of improvisation is subject to similar 
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questions about the status of encounters that take place between more than two people and the 
phenomenological objection about not experiencing an ethical bidding from the other.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 As a ubiquitous musical – not to mention existential – practice, improvisation warrants 
serious philosophical attention. Whatever one’s position on the improvisation-composition 
debate, the foregrounding of salient themes and questions for the philosophy of music in 
improvisation is sufficient motivation for further research. Especially as concerns the social 
situation in the musical experience, improvisation is a particularly rich field of study. The 
expanded notions of retention and the social situation in music serve as an argument for the 
importance of incorporating diverse musical practices and musical cultures into the philosophy 
of music. Only by striving for comprehensiveness can we hope to lay claim to valid insights 
concerning the uniqueness of the musical experience for the human condition. 
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Conclusion: 
 
 This dissertation began with a presentation of the project that Cassirer undertakes in his 
philosophy of symbolic forms. Then a historical overview of phenomenological treatments of 
music were examined and critiqued for what is argued to be problematic conceptions of music’s 
ontological status, which trickles down into its presentation of the musical experience. Next, the 
thoroughgoing sociality of the musical experience is a topic that permeates discussions of 
musical meaning and the practice of improvisation. I will conclude with a brief overview of the 
preceding chapters before suggesting future directions for research.  
In chapter one, I present the project that Cassirer undertakes in his three-volume Philosophy 
of Symbolic Forms by considering the project’s relationship to Kant’s critical philosophy as well 
as by mining unpublished resources from an early draft of Essay on Man. Then I review 
Cassirer’s assorted writings on art as a preliminary way of understanding what it means for art to 
constitute a symbolic form. The important concepts of the quality and mode of forms of relation 
are glossed, leading to the understanding that in order for “art” to name a distinct type of 
experience, it must involve unique meanings of time, space, subjectivity and a form of thought. 
Oriented by Cassirer’s essay “Mythic, Aesthetic and Theoretical Space,” I show how the 
aesthetic experience of space is characterized by concreteness (as opposed to the abstractness of 
theoretical spatiality), disinterestedness (as opposed to the goal-oriented care of everyday 
spatiality), and remoteness (as opposed to the violent interplay of forces and feeling values of 
mythical spatiality). I then investigated the contentious question of the relationship between 
music and spatiality, arguing that there is an auditory experience of spatiality that cannot be 
reduced to visualistic or kinaesthetic spatiality, despite being less rich than these more common 
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experiences of space. Time in music proves to be an easier theme than space and is shown to be 
qualitative (as opposed to the quantitative objectivity of theoretical time) and continuous (as 
opposed to the fragmentation of mythical time). I then address the experience of subjectivity that 
characterizes the musical experience. The I of musical hearing is distinguished from the I of 
objective hearing by virtue of emphasizing the relation of tones, as opposed to connecting what 
is heard with events in the external world. Musical thought is the final quality of relation that is 
discussed as constitutive of the musical experience. Musical thinking proves to differ from 
theoretical thought insofar as it does not seek a single, inevitable, “correct” solution to the 
problem it encounters, but nevertheless is answerable to music’s dynamic qualities, which 
neither belong to the tones themselves nor to the human mind. Thus, musical thinking differs 
from the common notion of thinking, yet also cannot be characterized as mere artistic fancy since 
it is answerable to considerations that exist outside the thinker. 
Chapter two focuses on phenomenological treatments of music, with an emphasis on the 
ontology of music and the nature of the musical experience. I unpack the rationale for 
conceptualizing music as an ideal object, a commonly held position among phenomenologists. 
This ontology derives from the view that music, properly understood, is constituted by the 
consciousness of the beholder, as opposed to inhering in the written score or the sonic 
externalization of performance. Nevertheless, Schütz’s account of the ontology of music has 
problematic aspects. I argue that such an account yields what I term a “digital ontology,” that is, 
one which presupposes what is to be construed as “signal,” i.e. what is essential, and “noise,” i.e. 
what is inessential. Schütz’s account of listening to a six-tone sequence, which is his chief 
illustration of the musical experience, is a misleadingly simple example that permits him to 
overlook the complexity of the question of determining signal and noise. However, when one 
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reflects on musical encounters more robust than an unaccompanied six-note theme, the signal-
noise situation is not so easy to parse. Using an example derived from ethnomusicological 
literature, I reflect on “multistable acoustic phenomena,”695 which harbor ontologically 
significant perceptual possibilities. These phenomena illustrate the broader point that 
considerations such as the direction of the beholder’s attention are consequential for the way in 
which music is constituted. Thus it is problematic to presuppose that all beholders constitute the 
“same” piece of music in the same way. I then critique another common assumption in 
phenomenological treatments of music and the philosophy of music more broadly; namely, the 
tendency to equate music with musical works. I demonstrate the historical contingency of 
musical works as presently conceived, before presenting conceptions of music beyond the work 
paradigm offered by phenomenologists, musicologists and ethnomusicologists. I then consider 
whether Schütz’s account of the musical experience is able to accommodate these alternative 
ontologically consequential conceptions of music.  
Chapter three picks up where the previous chapter leaves off, considering whether Schütz’s 
account of the musical experience is adequately social. I attempt to redress some of the lacunae 
in his account by supplementing his essays on music with his better-known work on the 
phenomenology of the social world. This task takes the form of unpacking the unexpectedly 
manifold meanings of the concept of musical meaning. Borrowing distinctions derived from 
Schütz’s account of meaning in Phenomenology of the Social World, the meaningfulness of 
music is discussed with respect to a number of overarching dichotomies: subjective versus 
objective meaning; merely perceptual, or phenomenological, objects versus socio-cultural 
objects; object versus activity. Utilizing these distinctions allows an exhaustive presentation of 
                                                        
695 Friedson, Dancing Prophets, 143. 
  
263 
the different ways that music may be experienced as meaningful. I then turn to the discipline of 
ethnomusicology, examining the history and nature of the discipline, as preparatory for arguing 
that it is an indispensable resource for philosophers of music. As became evident in chapter two, 
Schütz’s ethnocentric myopia resulted in problems for his ontology of music and account of the 
musical experience. By scrutinizing common definitions that orient philosophical treatments of 
music, I argue that ethnomusicology leads philosophers to adopt expanded understandings of 
what music is, what music does and what music reveals about our relation to the world and to 
one another. Finally, I turn to the topic of musical universals, relating ethnomusicology’s 
approach to such universals to the type of universals that Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic 
forms seeks. I argue that the synthetic a posteriori universals discovered by ethnomusicologists 
are significant in the philosopher of culture’s search for the dynamic a priori universals at the 
heart of human musicality.  
In chapter four, I thematize improvisation. There are at least two reasons for doing so. 
Firstly, just as it has been argued that a viable philosophy of music must study human musicality 
as instantiated across a broad range of cultures, it must also study a broad range of musical 
practices. As chapter two demonstrated, a historical consideration of the Western classical 
tradition discovers that its prioritization of the written score is, in the grand scheme of things, a 
recent phenomenon, which in no way can be considered characteristic of most musical practices. 
Improvisation, broadly construed, names the situation of musicking without a written score. 
Secondly, while Cassirer argues for the necessity of studying human beings by way of their 
works, there is the danger that in studying works we overlook the working. In other words, the 
product must not obscure the process; studying improvisation safeguards against such a 
methodological error. I approach the theme of improvisation by different means including the 
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etymology of the term, through different improvisational practices, the pedagogy of 
improvisation, the comparison of improvisation with composition, the concepts of audibility and 
density and the question of whether improvisation is heard as improvised without any 
contextualizing knowledge. I then investigate the social situation in improvisation, which 
supplements Schütz’s account of the sociality of the musical experience in important ways. 
Finally, I address the relationship between improvisation and ethics, which naturally follows the 
discussion of sociality, since improvising co-performers must negotiate performance without the 
orienting authority of a score.  
 To conclude I would like to outline a few ways in which the research undertaken in this 
dissertation could be continued. One direction for future research is simply quantitative. We have 
seen that Cassirer’s philosophy of culture studies the human being through concrete cultural 
products, insight about which is gleaned and critically assessed through situating the product in 
the historical context of its emergence and understanding it in light of its predecessors and 
progeny. Thus, the more concrete cultural products that come under consideration, the finer-
grained is our resultant picture of human beings. Cassirer’s pluralism also pertains to theoretical 
frameworks: the more perspectives we have on a given phenomenon, the richer our final account 
of it. With respect to music, then, research could be advanced on two fronts. First, more 
ethnographies of particular musical cultures would add to our understanding of the ways that 
human beings conceptualize and perform music. If it is consonant with the concepts and 
practices of other cultures, then we are closer to the determination of the ethnomusicology’s 
synthetic a posteriori insight into musical universals, which, as was argued in chapter three, puts 
us on the path to the dynamic a priori with which Cassirer’s philosophy of culture is concerned. 
If, on the other hand, a musical culture presents significant differences in ideas and behavior, 
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then we will have guarded against overly reductive understandings of the existential significance 
of sound. 
In addition to more study objects, our research would also be advanced by the inclusion of 
more theoretical perspectives. For instance, a purely physiological approach to human hearing 
would be a useful supplement to the sources included in this dissertation. While 
phenomenologists refuse to reduce music to a merely auditory phenomenon – recall that Schütz 
did not even believe that externalized sound was a condition for the possibility of the musical 
experience, since constitution could be effected by the internal recollection of a musical work – 
the vast majority of our musical experiences involve audition. The question of whether artistic 
conventions are grounded in physiology is a question first investigated in Herman von 
Helmholtz’s On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music,696 
which would be profitably supplemented by the interdisciplinary research that has transpired 
since its publication in 1863. Neuroscience would doubtless provide another valuable 
perspective, with recent studies furnishing thought-provoking fodder on themes such as the 
relationship between music and language, the association between music and movement, the 
perception of emotions in music and the effect that musical training has on the musical 
experience.697   
Another direction for future research picks up on a tactic used in chapter three, where 
Schütz’s phenomenology of the social world was used to supplement his phenomenology of the 
musical experience. Schütz’s writings on the theme of relevance, for instance, would be 
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697 For a summary of current research on these issues, cf. Daniel J. Levitin and Anna K. 
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profitably mined for insight that may provide a Schützian response to the inadequacy in his 
musical ontology discussed in chapter two. The objection was raised that Schütz’s account of the 
musical experience presupposed a single, unambiguous way of constituting a musical work. 
However, this presupposition is problematized by the existence of multi-stable acoustic 
phenomena, which, like the Tumbuka rhythmic patterns discussed in section 2a of chapter 2, can 
be differently constituted depending on what aspects of the phenomenon the listener is attending 
to. The concept of relevance and the related concept of attention are points of departure for 
thinking about how consciousness latches onto certain aspects of a sensory manifold while 
relegating other aspects to the background. 
The aim of this research has been to achieve a better understanding of the significance of 
music in human life; where music is regarded as a distinct domain of experience with broader 
borders than have traditionally been recognized in philosophical discourse. Both Cassirer and 
Schütz furnish philosophical frameworks and resources for an expanded and ennobled 
conception of human beings’ relationship to sound. While neither thinker presents anything like 
a complete account of what music is and what music does, by placing Cassirer and Schütz into 
conversation and indicating the directions suggested by their work, we have seen how the 
harmonious projects of the philosophy of culture and phenomenology can lead to new ways of 
thinking about music. 
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